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ABSTRACT 
 
German Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire: 
A Comparative Study.  (December 2007) 
Niles Stefan Illich, B.A., Texas A&M University; 
M.A., Clemson University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Arnold Krammer 
 
 
 The conventional understanding of German expansion abroad, between 
unification (1871) and the First World War (1914), is that Germany established colonies 
in Africa, the Pacific Islands, and to a lesser degree in China.  This colonialism began in 
1884 with the recognition of German Southwest Africa.  This dissertation challenges 
these conventionally accepted notions about German expansion abroad.  The challenge 
presented by this dissertation is a claim that German expansionism included imperial 
activity in the Ottoman Empire.  Although the Germans did not develop colonies in the 
Ottoman Empire, German activity in the Middle East conformed closely to the 
established model for imperialism in the Ottoman Empire; the British established this 
model in the 1840s.  By considering the economic, political, military, educational, and 
cultural activities of the Germans in the Ottoman Empire it is evident that the Ottoman 
Empire must be considered in the historiography of German expansionism.   
 When expanding into the Ottoman Empire the Germans followed the model 
established by the British.  Although deeply involved in the Ottoman Empire, German 
activity was not militaristic or even aggressive.  Indeed, the Germans asserted themselves 
iv 
less successfully than the British or the French.  Thus, this German expansion into the 
Ottoman Empire simultaneously addresses the question of German exceptionalism. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Article one hundred-fifty five of the Treaty of Versailles, which is located in a 
section of the treaty devoted to German interests in China (articles 128-134), Egypt 
(articles 148-154) and other such territories, reads as follows:  
Germany undertakes to recognize and accept all arrangements which 
the Allied and Associated Powers may make with Turkey and Bulgaria 
with reference to any rights, interests and privileges whatever which 
might be claimed by Germany or her nationals in Turkey and Bulgaria 
and which are not dealt with in the provisions of the present Treaty.  
 
The reference to “any rights, interests and privileges whatever might be claimed by 
Germany” attests to the unusual imperial relationship that existed between Germany and 
the Ottoman Empire.  In spite of this obvious historical reference to the German 
relationship with the Ottoman Empire, historians have largely ignored German activity in 
the Ottoman territories.  Thus, this dissertation is a polemic against the conventional 
historiographic understanding of German imperialism.   
Traditionally, historians of German colonialism (there are very few historians 
who consider themselves to be historians of German imperialism, almost all such 
historians use the term colonialism) see the latter as a process begun with Bismarck’s 
recognition of German claims in what became German Southwest Africa (1884).  
Moreover, these historians see German colonialism principally in Africa, but also in 
China, and the islands of the Pacific (but generally nowhere else).  This dissertation 
______________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Diplomatic History. 
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argues that such an understanding of German colonialism is unnecessarily narrow and 
even a distortion.  As an example of this expanded notion of imperialism, this dissertation 
uses the Ottoman Empire, and, specifically, a comparative study of British and German 
activities there. 
 The notion that colonies are necessary for colonialism/imperialism to exist is a 
relic of the eighteenth-century and, in the nineteenth-century, a poor test of imperial 
activity.  Instead, by the nineteenth-century, many of the European powers (and 
increasingly the United States) extended themselves into foreign territories and countries 
without the ambition to settle them or to establish colonies.  Rather, in many such 
circumstances (of which the Ottoman Empire is certainly one), the Powers preferred not 
to formally colonize the territory, but instead to control it only to the point necessary to 
achieve specific goals. Indeed, in the Ottoman Empire, the cumulative consequence of a 
system of treaties reached between 1774 and 1856 prohibited any of the Powers from 
establishing colonies in the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire (peripheral 
territories, such as the European territories of the Ottoman Empire and parts of North 
Africa, were viewed differently).  In the case of the Ottoman Empire this interest in 
control began with the British, who sought to secure the “overland” route between the 
Mediterranean and the Red Sea, as the most important route for communications between 
London and India.  The British formally established themselves in Gibraltar (1830) and in 
Aden (at the mouth of the Red Sea) (1839), securing two of the three possible “choke 
points” between London and India, before they established themselves in the Ottoman 
Empire.  In establishing this overland route, the British created a model of imperialism 
3 
that all of the Great Powers, including Germany, used to extend imperialism (and in some 
cases colonialism) into the Ottoman Empire. 
As this dissertation considers German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, it does 
so by first considering the international conditions that required the British to overcome 
their reticence to establish themselves as an imperial power in the Ottoman Empire.  
After explaining the international conditions that compelled the British to overcome their 
hesitancy to extend into the Ottoman Empire and the system of treaties that prohibited the 
formation of formal colonies, the dissertation then considers the specific model of 
imperialism that the British developed for the Ottoman Empire.  This model is important 
to the history of modern1 imperialism in the Ottoman Empire because it became the 
accepted method for imposing imperial desires on the Ottoman territories without 
upsetting the European balance of power.   This British imperial model did not initially 
include formal colonies (in the principal areas of the Ottoman Empire, obviously it did 
include colonies in peripheral Ottoman territories, such as Aden), as the British did not 
make Egypt a “protectorate” until 1914, but instead dominated the Ottoman government 
(Sublime Porte) without formally imposing a system of colonialism on it.  However, the 
British, like the rest of the Great Powers, had positioned themselves for the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire, and, when it fell, the Great Powers (who were already established 
there) became colonial powers (except for the obvious examples of Germany, which lost 
all of its colonial and imperial territory, including the territory in the Ottoman Empire, 
after the First World War, and Russia whose Revolution prohibited imperial expansion).  
                                                 
1
 The historiographic question of when modernity arrived in the Middle East is interesting 
and considered in the footnotes of Chapter II, however it is sufficient here to note that 
historians of the Middle East conventionally (but not universally) agree that the modern 
era begins in 1800. 
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Understanding this model is important for two additional reasons: first, the British model 
provided the Germans with an established and accepted method to impose themselves on 
the Ottoman Empire; second, British Imperial historiography recognizes this activity in 
the Ottoman Empire as imperial (whereas historians of German colonialism do not, in 
spite of the strong parallels between the activities of the two).   
Some historians have considered this imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, and 
other places, as “informal imperialism.”  This term is intentionally rejected in this 
dissertation, because, it is the contention of this dissertation that the imperialism that 
developed in the Ottoman Empire, by both the British and Germans, was both quite 
formal and intentional.  However, this imperialism did differ from that of earlier periods.  
What has confused historians and other scholars is the lack of colonies in the principal 
areas of the Ottoman Empire. Somehow, without the immediate establishment of colonies 
the imperialism in these areas becomes “informal,” and thus less than the imperialism or 
colonialism of earlier periods (and in German history such areas are completely absent 
from the historiography leading to the general conclusion that all German imperial 
activity was colonial; such a position has distorted some of the arguments about the 
nature of German colonialism).  What scholars often fail to consider is the long imperial 
incubation that occurred in the Ottoman Empire.  While the Great Powers did not 
establish colonies immediately, by the early 1920’s, the victorious powers had formal 
colonies in the Ottoman Empire.   
Instead of using a diluted definition of imperialism (such as “informal 
imperialism”), I contend that the international conditions had changed by the time the 
Germans and the British sought to establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire.  These 
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new international conditions made the actual development of colonies undesirable, and, 
instead, emphasized the extension of influence (even dominance) without colonies 
(which were seen as a burden, both financial and logistic).  These international conditions 
changed again after the First World War (because of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and 
the new importance of petroleum, which had been discovered in Ottoman territories in 
the earliest years of the twentieth-century).   
The British model for imperialism in the Ottoman Empire (which the Germans 
appropriated almost without change, albeit less successfully) extended British control 
over three principal areas of the Ottoman Empire: first, financial (involving loans to the 
Ottoman government, railway construction, port construction, and trade); second 
governmental (instituting changes to the Ottoman governmental system to facilitate the 
ability of the Sultan to control his empire and for the Europeans to oversee his activities); 
and, third, cultural (the British model brought Ottoman treasure back to the “mother” 
country to “teach” imperialism to the citizens).  The Germans adopted the British model 
of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s, but never advanced it as far as the 
British did (with the possible exception of the appropriation of artifacts, the Pergamon 
Altar in Berlin is one of the greatest treasures taken from the Ottoman Empire).   
Although this dissertation considers both German and British imperial activity in 
the Ottoman Empire, it is not a history of either.  Rather, this dissertation is a polemic 
which contends that the Germans established a formal imperial presence in the Ottoman 
Empire.  The principal goal of this dissertation is to convince the reader that it is worth 
considering whether Germany had an imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire and how 
this imperial activity might be accommodated within the historiography of German 
6 
colonialism.  This dissertation shows the German imperial presence in the Ottoman 
Empire comparatively, by first establishing the British model of imperialism and 
illustrating that this British activity is included in the historiography of British 
imperialism.  Once British imperialism in the Ottoman Empire has been established, the 
dissertation contends that the Germans developed an imperial system that paralleled 
(intentionally) almost every aspect of British imperialism in the Ottoman Empire (even if 
the Germans were less successful).  The dissertation then asks, if the activities of these 
two powers were almost identical (although differing in intensity and success) and one 
(the British) is recognized as imperial, then why is the second example (German) not 
understood as the same?2  Further, the dissertation questions the position of colonies in 
the Ottoman Empire, had the Germans won the First World War, it is entirely reasonable 
to expect them to have established colonies in the Ottoman Empire. 
Consequently, this dissertation challenges the conventional understanding of 
German imperialism in two important ways.  First, the dissertation confronts the 
conventional view that the German empire began in 1884; and, second that the German 
Empire existed only in Africa, China, and the Pacific Islands.  This dissertation will show 
that German imperialism began significantly earlier than 1884, at least the 1870s, and 
that German imperialism existed beyond this narrow list of German colonial territories.  
Moreover, the dissertation concludes by considering the implications of including the 
Ottoman Empire in the historiographic arguments concerning German imperialism.  It is 
expected that the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire will help “normalize” the German 
imperial experience. 
                                                 
2
 No effort is made to deal with the logical question, was British activity in the Ottoman 
Empire imperial.  That has been addressed in the historiography of British imperialism. 
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There is no archive that produced a cache of documents that prompted this 
reconsideration of German imperialism; rather, this dissertation relies on generally well- 
known documents and archival sources that are quite familiar to scholars.  Indeed, much 
of the material included in this dissertation is intentionally secondary.  The reason for this 
is to illustrate that the argument presented here is not radical, because the materials 
considered here are conventional and well accepted by the community of German 
colonial historians.  The primary archival material for this dissertation has been taken 
from the records of the British Foreign Office and the German Foreign Office; these are 
supplemented by contemporary publications addressing British and German imperialism.  
Although scholars are well acquainted with the records reviewed for this dissertation, this 
dissertation differs from earlier studies because of its comparative context, and the 
attempt to understand imperialism based on nineteenth-century terms rather than 
contemporary ones (as well as the obvious inclusion of the Ottoman Empire).   
The second chapter of the dissertation discusses the historiography of German 
colonialism and the reasons why scholars have focused on colonies as the important test 
of German colonialism.  This chapter attempts to provide some meaning to the difficult 
words colonialism and imperialism.  Ultimately, the chapter concludes that the use of 
these terms must be considered relative to the historical period that the words are being 
used to describe.  Consequently, there can be no useful universal definition of 
colonialism or imperialism; instead, scholars can only define these terms by qualifying 
them, such as “nineteenth-century imperialism” or “seventeenth-century colonialism,” 
which were quite different.  Moreover, notions of imperialism are based (frequently) on 
the European imperial experience; however, imperial
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Empire without European participation, such imperialism differed importantly from 
European imperial activity.  Further complicating an understanding of these terms is the 
problem that they differed, not only based on the people imposing the imperial system, 
but also because of the geographic location where this imperialism was being imposed.  
Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire differed significantly from imperialism in Africa or 
the Arctic (which occurred concurrently with the extension of imperialism into the 
Ottoman Empire).  Thus, this dissertation contends that scholars must be even more 
specific, using increasingly detailed qualifiers like “nineteenth-century European 
imperialism in the Ottoman Empire” if they seek a meaningful definition of the term.  
Using the definitions from the second chapter concerning the meaning of 
imperialism and colonialism, Chapter III treats the general conditions of the eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-centuries that led the European powers, and specifically Britain, to impose 
this specialized form of imperialism on the Ottoman Empire.  The chapter contends that 
the parallel rise in the importance of the “overland” route between London and India and 
the possibility of the Russians moving into Constantinople compelled the British to exert 
themselves as an imperial power in the Ottoman Empire.  Additionally, the chapter 
emphasizes the threat that the Egyptian ruler (although technically Egypt remained part 
of the Ottoman Empire) Mehemet Ali and the French expansion in North Africa posed to 
the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire. These threats required the British to 
establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire and to impose their “reluctant imperialism.”  
However, the chapter also explains why the international conditions of the period 
prohibited the British from establishing a traditional or formal imperial system (a series 
of treaties signed between 1774 and 1856 aimed at maintaining the European balance of 
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power).  The chapter concludes in 1838 with the British ascension to the position of the 
strongest European power in the Ottoman Empire, but does not describe the specifics of 
the British model of imperialism that the Germans appropriated thirty-five years later.  
The importance of understanding the specific reasons for the establishment of the British 
imperialism on the Ottoman Empire is that these conditions defined the manner in which 
the British could impose themselves on the Empire.  Because the Germans copied the 
British model so closely, such an understanding concurrently explains German 
imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.  Moreover, the same factors that limited the British 
remained in place when the Germans began imposing themselves on the Ottoman 
Empire. 
The fourth chapter explains the elements of the British model of imperialism.  The 
model of British imperial influence in the Ottoman Empire has been divided into three 
components, each concentrating on a specific imperial goal.  The three divisions of the 
British model for Ottoman imperialism are: commercial relations, British influence in the 
government of the Ottoman Empire (including British military influence), and the 
“teaching of imperialism” to the people of Britain.  Each of these sub-topics is addressed 
in detail, and they are the basis for comparing British and German activity in the Empire.  
In comparing the German and British imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, these will be 
the specific topics considered. 
Chapter V explains the rise of German financial influence in the Ottoman Empire, 
and the concurrent decline of the British.  As the first element in the British model, this 
aspect of German and British imperialism has received significant attention from 
scholars.  Specifically, this chapter considers the use of loans and the construction of 
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large capital projects (such as the Anatolian and Baghdad Railway, ports, etc.) to increase 
the Sultan’s ability to administer his own territories but also to assert European influence 
in the Ottoman Empire.  The principal actor in this imperialism was Deutsche Bank; 
however, its directors were hesitant to invest heavily in the Ottoman Empire, only the 
direct involvement of Kaiser Wilhelm II convinced them to extend the loans.  Further, the 
chapter describes the new governmental administrations that permitted the European 
Powers (principally Germany, Britain, and France) to assert their influence in the Empire 
and the conditions that caused the British to reduce their influence, thus permitting the 
Germans an opportunity to become increasingly involved. 
Chapter VI is a specific consideration of German involvement in the 
governmental administration of the Ottoman Empire.  While the previous chapter 
addressed the involvement of the Germans in the financial aspects of the Ottoman 
government, this chapter describes the German effort to bring the Ottoman military to the 
standards of nineteenth-century European armies, both through training and through arms 
sales.  Because the Ottoman government did not separate military and civil duties, 
influence in the military had immediate political consequences.  Further, the chapter 
considers the growth of German influence in the Ottoman Empire that developed from 
Kaiser Wilhelm’s two visits to the Near East.  As the first sitting monarch to visit 
Constantinople, where he declared himself to be the protector of the world’s Muslims, 
Wilhelm’s visit to the Ottoman Empire catalyzed the German position in the Ottoman 
Empire. 
The seventh chapter examines German cultural imperialism.  Specifically, this 
chapter considers the German appropriation and display of Ottoman artifacts, as well as 
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the growing interest in teaching “Oriental” languages and the influence of “Oriental” 
architecture in nineteenth-century Germany.  Moreover, the chapter also considers the 
interest in archaeological discovery and the importance related to it (both in Germany and 
internationally).  The work of Heinrich Schliemann, as well as the discovery of the 
Pergamon Altar and the Ishtar Gates, made Germany one of the premiere centers for the 
study of Ottoman artifacts.  Further, a discussion of the ability of the German public to 
see these artifacts (in the context of the work of Glenn Penny and Suzanne Zantop) will 
also be included.  
Chapter VIII will conclude the dissertation and is specifically intended to 
incorporate the Ottoman Empire into the historiography of German imperialism.  Many 
of the debates about German imperialism and German political affairs identify Germany 
as an aberration; however, this dissertation contends that the Germans were well within 
the recognized imperial activity of the period (and possibly even less aggressive than the 
French or the British).  Additionally, the historiography of German imperialism discusses 
topics such as the motivation for the “sudden rise” in German colonial activity in 1884.  
This dissertation contends that this rise was neither sudden nor in 1884.  Thus, the 
conclusion of this dissertation is devoted to reassessing the historiography of German 
colonialism and questioning the established historigoraphic debates. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF GERMAN COLONIALISM:  
PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL 
 The British historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote a book entitled Germany’s First Bid for 
Colonies, 1884-1885.3  Published in 1938, the historiographical parameters of German 
colonialism had already been established, but the title of Taylor’s book provides a 
succinct glimpse into the unreasonably rigid geographical and chronological boundaries 
of German colonial historiography.  These boundaries have artificially restricted the 
discussion of German imperialism or colonialism4 to the period between 1884 and 1918 
and to Africa, the Pacific, and to a lesser degree China.  While there is no doubt that these 
territories developed into German colonies, it is important to consider that German 
imperial ambitions and activities existed beyond the narrow geographical and 
chronological boundaries that historians, such as Taylor, traditionally accept.     
While it is overly simplistic to attribute this lack of a broader understanding of 
German colonialism to the writings of one historian, the work of Mary Townsend (the 
first historian to address German colonialism after 1918) provided a context that later 
historians largely embraced, especially regarding the geographic and chronological 
definitions of what constituted German colonialism.  Her first book, The Origins of 
                                                 
3
 A.J.P. Taylor, Germany’s First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885: A Move in Bismarck’s 
European Policy (London: MacMilliam and Co., 1938). 
 
4
 It is important to define these terms, but for introductory purposes their general meaning 
is sufficient; and for this same purpose they will be used interchangeably.  A latter 
section of this chapter is dedicated to differentiating between these words and providing a 
specific meaning for them.  Nearly all historians who study German imperialism consider 
themselves German colonial historians, and rarely use the term imperialism. 
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Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885, concludes with a chapter entitled “The 
National Inauguration of Colonialism,” where she contends that German colonial efforts 
culminated in the transformative year of 1884-1885.5   
The conventional historiography of German colonialism does not include a debate 
concerning the question of what constituted German colonial territory; instead, historians 
have generally accepted the contention that Africa, the Pacific islands, and China 
comprised the entirety of German imperial territory.  This lack of debate means that 
historians have focused on other components of the colonial historiography.  Of the 
various other topics that German colonial historians have considered, the most important 
are the arguments that developed within the broader field of German history from the 
works of Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler—neither of whom considered 
themselves, specifically, colonial historians.  While these scholars generally did not 
publish on German colonialism, the scope and intensity of the arguments they introduced 
affected the writing of German colonial history, as it did nearly every other sub-genre of 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century German history.   
 Publishing his most famous work in 1961, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Grab for 
World Power, entitled somewhat blandly Germany’s Aims in the First World War in its 
English translation), Fritz Fischer incited what became known as the “Fischer 
Controversy.” Influenced by the then obscure work of Eckart Kehr, Fischer jettisoned the 
constraints of Rankean history and insisted on the consideration of economic and social 
                                                 
5
 Mary Townsend, The Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1921). Authors writing in the years immediately following 
the First World War wrote about German imperialism outside of this narrow 
understanding of German imperialism.  See for example: Edward Mead Earle, Turkey, 
the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism (New York: 
MacMillan Company, 1923).   
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explanations for historical events, most notably the origins of the First World War.  
Fischer asserted, in his principal claim, that Germany intentionally precipitated the First 
World War in order to assure itself of “world power” through an extended colonial 
empire and the consolidation of the state at home.  Although he did not specifically 
intend to write a book on German colonial history, his topic necessitated a consideration 
of the latter.  Fischer did not overtly claim a broad imperial goal for Germany, beyond 
what historians generally recognize (i.e. Africa, some Pacific Islands and China); 
however, he emphasized the expansionist policy of the Imperial German government.  
The importance he placed on expansionism included considerations of German efforts to 
secure coaling stations in Yemen, German interests in expanding within Europe, German 
expansionist policy towards the Ottoman Empire, and British concerns with German 
expansion around India.6  Consequently, while Fischer did not develop a broader context 
in which German imperialism existed, he recognized the German expansionist goals 
beyond the traditional German colonies and the significance that other European states 
(especially Britain, Russia, and France) attributed to this.  However, the most important 
contribution of Fischer’s work, for German colonial historians, is the emancipation from 
the limitations of Rankean history that traditionally bound German historiography.  This 
newly accepted freedom stimulated a generation of scholarship, which embraced social, 
cultural, and other “non-traditional” historiographic approaches.7 
                                                 
6
 Bruce Waller, “Hans-Ulrich Wehler on Imperial Germany,” British Journal of 
International Studies 1 (1975): 60-64. 
 
7
 Waller, 60-63. 
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 Among the scholars emancipated from the Rankean limitations was Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler, who published a series of books, most notably The German Empire, 1871-1918 
and Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Bismarck and Imperialism), that further  catalyzed 
debate within the historiography of German colonialism.  Instead of considering Wehler’s 
many books individually, it is prudent to summarize his contributions to German colonial 
historiography.  While Wehler is best known for his arguments in the historiographic 
debate concerning the German Sonderweg, he made an important contribution to the 
colonial historiography by acknowledging that Bismarck likely did not simply decide to 
embrace colonialism in 1884 as many historians contend.8  Instead, Wehler argues that 
Bismarck’s interest in colonialism developed earlier, from his experiences in the 
Depression of 1873.  Wehler further contends that Bismarck anticipated that colonies 
would moderate swings in the German economy by providing a market for surplus goods, 
a source of natural resources, etc.9  Bismarck’s efforts to secure stability for the newly 
formed Reich also influenced large components of Wehler’s most contentious arguments, 
commonly referred to as “social imperialism” and “negative integration.”10  For Wehler, 
Germany’s aggressive, expansionist, and imperialistic activities became Bismarck’s tool 
for re-directing pressures for further domestic political emancipation abroad (giving rise 
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to the idea of primat der Innenpolitik, or the primacy of domestic politics, which differed 
dramatically from the foreign policy focus of the Rankean historians).11   
 While Fischer and Wehler catalyzed a renaissance in German colonial 
historiography, their work focused German colonial historians on specific questions, such 
as the feasibility of “social imperialism,” in the case of Wehler, and the German intention 
to go to war in 1914 and the significance of colonial possessions in that decision, in the 
case of Fischer, instead of on the problem of the limited conception of German colonial 
activity.  However, the work of these historians re-energized the debate about nineteenth-
century German history and the German imperial system.  Moreover, the renunciation of 
the Rankean limitations permitted latter historians to consider a wider array of evidence 
and topics. 
  The historiographic furor that Fischer and Wehler unleashed dominated nearly all 
of German history in western Europe, the United States, and above all West Germany. 
However, its influence in the East (especially East Germany) is not as evident.  One 
reason that the significance of Fischer and Wehler is less apparent in the colonial history 
written in the DDR is that the historians of the DDR had devoted themselves to a study of 
colonialism since the early 1950s, and, thus, their interest in nineteenth-century German 
imperialism (and colonialism) predated Fischer.  However, as previously stated, Western 
historians did not commonly devote themselves to the study of German imperialism until 
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after the publication of Fischer’s famous book in 1961.  Unfortunately, the East German 
combination of Marxist dogma and the contemporary political interest in depicting West 
Germany as the successor to Nazism (which connected it directly to the Kaiserriech)12 
distracted historians from debating the broad parameters of German colonial history.13  
While the historians of East Germany dedicated themselves to the issues of German 
colonialism, the ideological component of much of their work ultimately proved 
unfounded. Consequently, these texts did not contribute to the historiography as fully as 
they might have. 
 In spite of the innovations of Fischer and Wehler as well as the contributions by 
East German historians, the historiography of German colonialism remains fettered by 
the contention that German colonial activity existed exclusively in the period between 
1884 and 1918 and in only in Africa, China, and the Pacific.  Indeed, historians have 
concluded that German activity in the Ottoman Empire, while impressive, specifically 
failed to rise to the level necessary to constitute imperialism.14   In spite of the real 
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limitations on the understanding of what comprises German imperialism, there is an 
evolving component of the historiography that has contributed to the expansion of the 
understanding of what German colonialism and imperialism entailed.  However, even 
these scholars have failed to broaden the consideration of German imperial activity 
adequately.  The scholars who represent this group of historians include: Suzanne 
Marchand, Susanne Zantop, Glenn Penny, Mary Louise Pratt, Nina Berman, Nancy 
Mitchell, Woodruff Smith, and Mack Walker.15   
The most relevant historiographic argument to develop from the work of this 
group of historians (relevant for this dissertation) addresses significance of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
“the relatively little known aspects of the German engagement in the Near East prior to 
World War I.”  See: S.M. Can Bilsel, Architecture in the Museum: Displacement, 
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representation16 of the “colonial” (often centered on Latin America) in Germany.  This 
contribution is relevant to the argument presented here because, finding imperialism in 
the Ottoman Empire requires considering unorthodox methods of imposing and teaching 
imperialism.  This group of authors contends that colonial and imperial ambitions and 
activities can be discerned from the display of foreign objects in Germany.  Suzanne 
Zantop prompted this debate with her Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family and Nation 
in Precolonial Germany, 1770-1870.17  Zantop’s well-received work is part of a larger 
field of social science research in which scholars consider the implications and 
didacticism of the display of colonial artifacts around the world.18  Zantop is hardly alone 
in this field as other scholars within the fields of German history and cultural studies, 
such as Nicholas Thomas,19 have also devoted themselves to the study of this “culture of 
colonialism.” These scholars emphasize the importance of moving away from defining 
colonialism or imperialism exclusively as political or economic domination and instead 
towards a more nuanced and less rigid understanding.  Zantop uses this expanded 
understanding of colonialism to consider the representation of Latin America in an 
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impressively broad array of nineteenth-century German books, pamphlets, plays, 
children’s literature, magazines, etc.  
Using these literary sources, Zantop argues that Germany established a “colonial 
fantasy” with Latin America.  Zantop focuses her study on the “colonial fantasy” instead 
of “colonialism,” because for most of the period that she studied, Germany (of course 
Germany per se did not exist, but instead of considering the different German states she 
uses “Germany”) did not have formal colonies in Latin America (importantly, her work is 
concerned with formal colonialism, meaning actual colonies and she formally rejects the 
use of imperialism, preferring to use colonialism almost exclusively).20  According to 
Zantop, the Germans established “colonial fantasies” because they did not participate 
formally in the colonial partition of Latin America.   Instead of establishing formal 
colonies, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German scientists, authors, political 
theorists, anthropologists, etc. all observed and then incorporated aspects of this Spanish 
(and British) colonialism into the literature of their specific discipline.  These authors 
contributed to the “colonial fantasy” because they conventionally concentrated on the 
negative aspects of Spanish or British colonialism and emphasized the ability of German 
colonizers to have conducted this colonization less brutally, or in her words, to have been 
“superior colonizers.”   
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Zantop furthers her argument by introducing the powerful image of Alexander 
von Humboldt.  According to Zantop (in an argument also advocated by Mary Louise 
Pratt21), Humboldt’s famous journey and writings made him a “second Columbus,” 
discovering a “new” Latin America for the Germans.  This “new” Latin America evolved 
from Humboldt’s scientific and highly descriptive writings on the previously largely 
unexplored interior of the continent.  While the lack of colonies necessarily drove these 
fantasies, examples of “lost opportunities,” such as Humboldt and the Fuggar and the 
Welser merchant and banking families, also contributed to the development of these 
fantasies.  According to the “colonial fantasy,” these “lost opportunities” provided 
evidence that the Germans would have been more benevolent colonizers.  The 
importance of these “colonial fantasies” (especially with individuals like Humboldt and 
the Wesler and Fuggar families) is that the Germans developed a myth that they were 
“superior colonizers,” which eventually led to a “moral entitlement” for actual German 
colonization.22  Ultimately, Zantop concludes that the representation of Latin America, 
through the literature of “colonial fantasies,” propelled and even dominated the eventual 
development of German colonies, even if these future colonies were not in Latin 
America.     
Glenn Penny contends that many scholars (including Zantop) who study the 
representation of colonialism in nineteenth-century Germany oversimplify German 
motivations.  He acknowledges that these representations of the wider world (be it 
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through literature, which Zantop studied, or through the artifacts that Penny considers) in 
Germany had limited imperial appeal, but contends there is a richer context in which to 
understand the foreign artifacts displayed in Germany.23  The most important alternative 
explanation for Penny is the international ethnographic movement that characterized the 
middle and late nineteenth-century.  According to Penny, viewing Latin American 
artifacts in Germany as purely colonial would be inappropriate, because, according his 
argument, they constituted a component of a broader effort by the Germans (as well as 
the rest of Western Europe) to develop a comprehensive knowledge of the rest of the 
world through museums dedicated to ethnology (Völkerkunde).  The creation of 
ethnographic museums to display such objects did not advocate for colonialism because 
artifacts in these museums came from literally all over the world, meaning that if they are 
to be viewed as colonial, then this claim for colonialism is impossibly broad.  Instead, 
these objects fulfilled an intellectual and scientific purpose, and that this appropriation 
and display of artifacts was an international phenomenon during the nineteenth-century.   
 Penny’s convincing argument concerning the representation and display of 
foreign objects requires qualification.  The general subject of colonial exhibitions is well 
developed in the broad historiography of colonialism; many historians who have written 
on colonialism place tremendous importance on the display of colonial artifacts for both 
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foreign and domestic audiences.24  Consequently, while Penny’s argument has validity 
and the reality of the ethnographic museums was that they were places where many 
“scientific” and other non-colonial activities occurred, it cannot be forgotten that the 
objects displayed there (or at least some of them, especially those artifacts from the 
Ottoman Empire) may have had an imperial function as well.  Although some of these 
objects may have been tools of scientific discovery, other objects displayed in 
ethnographic museums could not escape an imperialistic context (especially those items 
from the Ottoman Empire). 
One of the problems with considering the work of scholars like Penny and Zantop 
is the necessity of understanding the meaning of, and the relationship between, the terms 
imperialism and colonialism.  Many scholars inattentively use these terms 
interchangeably; however, more precise writers distinguish between the two.  The 
malleability of these two words both in the context of the contemporary event and in the 
scholarship of later historians is problematic; however, historians have established 
conventional definitions.25  These accepted understandings of colonialism and 
imperialism (and especially the relationship between the two) contribute to an 
appreciation of why the conception of German imperialism has often been so narrow.  
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Conventionally, it is understood that colonialism means the acquisition of colonies and 
that a colonial policy leads to imperialism, which is traditionally understood as initially a 
protective policy for the colonies and then, in the nineteenth-century, an aggressive 
economic policy.26  In this generally accepted interpretation, colonialism must precede 
imperialism; while historians do not often call this “the British model,” it is too heavily 
dependent on the early imperial and colonial experiences of the British (and other early 
colonizers).  Indeed, in the nineteenth-century, the United States specifically claimed that 
its model of imperialism was “exceptional” and “different from Europe’s and more 
morally acceptable.”27  Edward Said recently reversed this relationship contending that 
imperialism, which he defines as “the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a 
dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory,” leads to colonialism, which to 
him means “the implanting of settlements on distant territory.”  Further, Said claims that 
while “direct colonialism has largely ended [meaning in contemporary society]; 
imperialism…lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as 
well as in specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices.”28   
A further problem in establishing a definition for the words imperialism and 
colonialism is that the meaning of these words changes depending on the geographic area 
and the historical period that one considers.  Even the relationship between these words 
(i.e. which one comes first) is relative to the historical period and area being considered.  
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Nineteenth-century imperialism in the Ottoman Empire provides several examples of this 
problem.  One such example was the creation of the “greater” Bulgaria, which the Treaty 
of San Stefano (1878) accomplished following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.  
The Bulgaria created out of this treaty not only remained, formally, within the Ottoman 
Empire, but it also had to submit its new king for the Sultan’s approval and had to pay an 
annual tribute to the Ottoman government.  However, contemporaries in London, Paris, 
and Berlin viewed this (properly) as a major assertion of Russian imperial interests into 
the Ottoman Empire.  The contemporary reaction to this assertion of Russian imperial 
interests was so great that the European Powers met at the Congress of Berlin (1878) with 
the specific goal of reducing the Russian imperial influence in the Ottoman Empire 
through the new Bulgaria.  Thus, a context exists that permits the assertion of German 
imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire (during the nineteenth-century) without the 
establishment of colonies or for the imperial territory to be separated (formally) from the 
Sultan’s Empire (Egypt and Tunis had similar imperial relationship). Consequently, the 
selection of an appropriate definition for the words imperialism and colonialism 
necessitates that the specific conditions of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire be 
considered, as this imperialism clearly differed from Spanish imperial activity in Central 
America in the eighteenth-century, or any other earlier (or even contemporary) imperial 
activity. 
Based on the understanding of imperialism and colonialism from the Ottoman 
Empire, this dissertation will employ two methods to test for German colonialism or 
imperialism in the Near East: first, Said’s definition, in which imperialism precedes 
colonialism and that, presumably, imperialism and formal colonies are separate (albeit 
26 
potentially related) concerns; second, a comparative method with the imperial activity of 
the British, French, Russian, and other major powers.  Specifically, after developing a 
model of British imperialism for the Ottoman Empire, German activity relative to this 
model will be gauged, and, thus, an assessment of German imperialism in the Ottoman 
Empire can be made.  It will be argued that in the case of the Ottoman Empire, German 
activity paralleled Said’s understanding of imperialism and colonialism but that 
circumstances prevented the Germans from establishing formal colonies (the First World 
War); however, the failure of colonialism to follow imperialism does not invalidate the 
imperialism of the earlier period.29     
The use of a comparative model to test for the presence of German imperialism in 
the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth-century is important because, by the eighteen-
fifties, the European Powers (with limited exceptions such as Africa) seized fewer formal 
colonies and, thus, imperialism after eighteen-fifty differed from earlier nineteenth-
century imperialism.  In spite of these differences, British imperial activity in the 
Ottoman Empire has been generally recognized as such, even if the Crown failed to 
establish formal colonies.  The decision not to establish formal colonies is not unexpected 
(by historians) as a growing British disinterest in additional colonies is illustrated by the 
fact that not only did the British seize colonies more carefully and less frequently after 
eighteen-fifty, but they also increasingly permitted their established colonies self-
government and even autonomy under the crown.  Canada is an example of this 
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increasing autonomy;30 but, by the 1860s, nearly all of Australia governed itself, as did 
New Zealand, and to a lesser degree the Cape Colony.31  The reason the British were 
willing to permit their colonies (except India) increasing autonomy was that many British 
officials recognized that the benefits of direct colonial rule no longer justified the 
expense.32  However, in spite of both the increasing autonomy permitted for the 
established colonies and the growing disinterest in establishing new colonies, the British 
simultaneously continued to expand their global imperial presence.  The parallels 
between the extension of German and British imperial influence in places like the 
Ottoman Empire (without colonies) makes a comparative study of this phenomena 
particularly viable.  Consequently, by comparing British and German imperial 
experiences, through a definition of imperialism that accounts for the historical context of 
events in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, scholars will not only expand the 
understanding of German imperialism, but they may also recognize that German imperial 
ambition and activity remained solidly within the practices of other European states (i.e. 
by extending influence without establishing large colonies).  
One of the most effective tools for a comparison of British and German imperial 
activity in the Ottoman Empire is the idea of the “imperialism of free trade,” which has 
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dominated British imperial historiography with its contention that the British were 
“reluctant colonizers.”  The scholars most associated with the idea of “the imperialism of 
free trade” are Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher,33 whose so-called “Gallagher and 
Robinson Controversy” dominated the historiography of British colonialism from the 
1950s until the 1980s.  Gallagher and Robinson contend that the conventional 
understanding of nineteenth-century British imperialism (i.e. the pre-1953 
historiography) minimized the continuity of British imperial activity by claiming that in 
the latter nineteenth-century British imperial ambitions flagged because (in the latter 
nineteenth-century) the British seized fewer colonies and did so with apparently greater 
caution.  Gallagher and Robinson reject this claim (that a decrease in the establishment of 
colonies equated to a growing disinterest in imperialism) and argue that British imperial 
activity existed, with significant continuity, throughout the nineteenth-century, through 
this “imperialism of free trade,” even if the British seized colonies less frequently.34   
Gallagher and Robinson contend, in what is likely their most frequently quoted 
statement, that “British policy followed the principle of extending control informally if 
possible [i.e. through free trade agreements] and formally if necessary.”35 Consequently, 
while the British did not often overtly seize land after the 1860s (of course, they did 
participate in the “Scramble for Africa” as well as seize land elsewhere, but this does not 
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invalidate the argument) Gallagher and Robinson claim that this represented only a minor 
deviation from the established British imperial tradition.  Further, when the British did 
seize territory, such as Egypt in 1881 (although Egypt remained, formally, within the 
Ottoman Empire until 1914), Gallagher and Robinson contend that local or domestic 
events (i.e. events in the eventual colony) triggered the colonization, instead of a British 
ambition to establish formal colonies.  The argument that Gallagher and Robinson 
present is that if the British had an option, they preferred not to move along Said’s path 
from imperialism to colonialism; it was only when domestic political activity (in the 
imperial territory) necessitated direct colonization that the British established a formal 
colonial presence.  According to Gallagher and Robinson, this “informal imperialism” 
that the British reportedly preferred could manifest itself in the following ways:  
1) The exertion of power or diplomacy to impose and sustain free trading conditions 
on another society against its will; 
2) the exertion of capital or commercial attraction to bend economic organization 
and direction of growth in directions complementary to the needs and surpluses of 
the expanding economy; 
3) the exertion of capital and commercial attraction directly upon foreign 
governments to influence them toward cooperation and alliance with the 
expanding country; 
4) the direct intervention or influence of the export-import sector interests upon the 
politics of the receiving country in the direction of collaboration and political-
economic alliance with the expanding power; 
5)   the taking over by European bankers and merchants of sectors of non-European 
domestic economies under cover of imposed free trade without accompaniment of 
large capital or export inputs from Europe, as in China.36 
 
The model established by Robinson and Gallagher has not seriously been considered 
within the context of German imperial and colonial activity, in spite of the fact that it 
appears to be quite adaptable to contemporary German imperial activities.  While 
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Gallagher and Robinson have been properly criticized on many points of their argument 
(and especially on the contention that domestic conflict catalyzed, and sometimes even 
“required,” the establishment of British colonies), its core emphasis on recognizing 
imperialism without the presence of colonies means that German activity in the Ottoman 
Empire should be evaluated against this model.37 The official disinterest that the German 
government had in the establishment of colonies (under Bismarck) makes a comparison 
with imperial activity especially appealing.   
 This expansion of our understanding of colonialism and imperialism necessitates 
that historians also begin to question the assertion that April 1884 constituted a clear 
beginning to German imperial history.  In spite of his public arguments against colonies, 
Bismarck, in April 1884, sent a message directing his officials in Africa to publish notice 
of the German “protection” of what was to become German Southwest Africa.  
Predictably, many histories of German colonialism have seized this and begin with some 
derivation of the following: “On April 24, 1884, Bismarck, chancellor of the then 
thirteen-year old German Empire, sent a cable to the German consul in Cape Town to 
proclaim “imperial protection” over the territories…”38  The acceptance of 1884 as the 
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beginning of German colonialism has almost universal approval within the community of 
German historians.  However, to accept this, historians must be willing to ignore German 
(and especially Prussian) expansion within Europe, as well as German imperial activity in 
the Ottoman Empire.   
 An additional element that makes 1884 appear as a less plausible beginning for 
German imperialism is that when historians begin their books with some statement about 
24 April 1884 they cannot quote the headlines of the New York Times or the Times 
(London);39 the reason that historians cannot cite major headlines from these papers is 
that the papers did not report the alleged change in German colonial policy.  On 27 June 
1884 (in the first story devoted to German colonialism in that year), the New York Times 
flatly stated “There was a lively discussion of Germany’s colonial policy in the Reichstag 
today in connection with the consideration of the proposed treaty of commerce with 
Corea [sic.] and…”40  The Times (London) is similarly mute on the alleged change in 
German imperial policy, reporting on 2 May 1884 about the German fear of trichinosis 
from American pork, and on 24 June about the appropriation of funds to increase the 
number of steamers to Australia and China.41  Had 1884 signified a major transition in 
German colonial policy, it is reasonable to expect that either British or American 
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newspapers would have reported this change.  In fact there is no announcement in the 
principal newspapers of either country that claims that Germany suddenly became a 
colonial power.  
 The purpose of this dissertation is to argue that German imperialism did not begin 
with Bismarck’s recognition of colonial territories in Africa in April 1884 and that it is 
equally inappropriate for historians to accept the traditional geographic boundaries of 
German colonialism.  Instead, it will be argued that German imperialism existed in the 
Ottoman Empire before 1884.  While German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire 
does not adhere to the traditional models or definitions of imperialism, it does provide 
evidence of imperialism (and to some degree colonialism) outside of the generally 
accepted areas of German colonial activity (i.e. China, Africa, and the Pacific).   
 To sustain this argument several components of the history must be considered; 
consequently, this dissertation will attempt to make use of the resources of political as 
well as social history.  Using the work of Zantop and related scholars as a model, selected 
writings on the Ottoman Empire will be considered as indicators of imperial activity.  
However, in the case of the Ottoman Empire the discovery, appropriation, and display of 
Ottoman artifacts (especially the Pergamon Alter and Heinrich Schliemann’s discovery of 
Troy) will also be considered.  Further, these unorthodox indications of imperialism will 
be complemented by documents from the Auswärtiges Amt.   Within this context it will 
also be argued that the failure of imperialism to turn into colonialism (especially in the 
case of the Ottoman Empire) does not mean that German activity in that area should not 
be considered within the historical context of German colonial history. 
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 The use of a comparative study of British imperialism will also be important in 
considering claims that German activity was imperial.  This is especially important as 
British imperialists recognized the influence that the Germans were beginning to exert in 
the Ottoman Empire and competed with the latter for influence in the Ottoman Empire.  
Further, as British imperial historians have considered the activity in the Ottoman Empire 
as imperial, providing evidence that German activity there paralleled (strongly) that of 
the British increases the basis for considering German activity in the Ottoman Empire as 
imperial.  The fact that the Germans had political or economic relations with a less 
powerful country is not sufficient to claim that the Germans had an imperial policy 
towards that country; it is important that an expanded definition of imperialism does not 
develop into an impossibly broad idea.   
 Thus, by considering a variety of archives and documents, it will be argued that 
historians have misunderstood the richness of German imperialism.  Instead of focusing 
on the narrow group of territories that developed into formal German colonies, historians 
must consider the entire context of German imperialism.  Using the Ottoman Empire as 
an example, it will be shown that the spectrum of German imperialism is broader and 
richer than most historians accept. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE GREAT POWERS: IMPERIALISM AND 
EUROPEAN EXPANSION, 1850-1914 
 The Ottoman defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683 marked the zenith of Ottoman 
expansion into Europe.  This defeat also precipitated a permanent change in power 
relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire.  While European fantasies about the 
fighting abilities and ferocity of “the Turk” remained, from 1683 it would be the 
Europeans who advanced into the Ottoman Empire instead of the Ottoman armies 
marching into Europe.  This European expansion into the principal territories of the 
Ottoman Empire developed its own peculiar form of imperialism (related to Robinson 
and Gallagher’s “reluctant imperialism”), in which concerns about repercussions within 
Europe generally trumped expansionist desires for the overt seizure of Ottoman 
territories.   
The “reluctant imperialism” that developed in the Ottoman Empire in the early 
nineteenth-century arose less out of jingoistic ambition for additional territory or prestige, 
and, instead, from the British need to secure and maintain strategic positions in the 
Mediterranean.42  This need arose specifically from the development of steam ships, in 
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 This form of imperialism related specifically to the principal territories of the Ottoman 
Empire.  Traditional seizures of land occurred in other “non-essential” areas of the 
Ottoman Empire, such as North Africa, the Red Sea, some Arabian provinces, etc.  There 
is a historiographic debate in British colonial historiography concerning the establishment 
of the “Second British Empire,” in which a “swing to the East” meaning China, India, 
and to a smaller degree the Ottoman Empire are the representative cases.  This position is 
best articulated by V.T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1762-1793 
(London: Longmans, 1952).  One of the problems with this argument is that it fails to 
address the reality that the Americas and Europe remained the most important British 
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the 1820s; after this development the most important communications route between 
England and India became the “overland route.”43  This route, formally established in 
1839, but in existence for at least ten years before that, sent British ships into the 
Mediterranean, to Egypt, overland to Suez, and then into the Red Sea.  This route became 
important in the 1830s because, before the development of steam ships, the British 
considered sailing in the Red Sea too risky.44 With the development of interest in the 
“overland” route, the British established themselves at the three critical strategic locations 
from which other powers could have interrupted British communications with India (the 
Straits of Gibraltar, the “overland” parts of the Ottoman Empire, and Bab el Mandeb, the 
strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, see Map One). This 
                                                                                                                                                 
commercial concern.  Instead of considering commercial concerns as the reason for 
British activity in the Ottoman Empire, this dissertation uses geopolitical strategic 
concerns. 
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Figure One. Map of Strategic British Positions.45 
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 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Washington, DC: Government 
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process began in 1830 with the formal inclusion of Gibraltar in the British Empire,46 and 
continued with the seizure of Aden, at the mouth the Red Sea (1839).  However, the 
establishment of British administration in Gibraltar and at the mouth of the Red Sea 
provided the British only two of the three strategic points necessary to protect their 
“overland” route.  To secure this route the British also had to establish themselves in the 
Ottoman Empire, where Russia (by 1833), was the dominant power.  While the British 
could not formally colonize the Ottoman Empire (and no evidence exists to indicate they 
wanted to, specifically why the British could not do so is explained below) they needed to 
control portions (and make sure that Russia would not extend its influence there or 
destabilize the Ottoman government) of it to be certain that they could maintain their 
communications with India; this was the first step in the establishment of the British 
model of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.  Thus, in the 1830s, the British initiated a 
series of diplomatic maneuvers that culminated in their replacing Russia as the dominant 
power in the Ottoman Empire, and, thus, providing protection for the British “overland” 
route and establishing a peculiar form of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire.  Although 
British imperialism is not the focus of this dissertation, this British imperial activity 
provided the model that the Germans eventually used (almost without revision) to 
establish themselves as an imperial power in the Ottoman Empire.  While the Germans 
lacked the same security concerns as the British, the British model did not require the 
same motivations, merely the same methods. 
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 The purpose of this chapter is to explain the conditions that led the British, and 
eventually other European powers, to impose this peculiar form of imperialism on the 
Ottoman Empire.  Specifically, this chapter explains the international conditions that 
developed, which compelled the British to overcome their reticence to establish 
themselves as the imperial power in the Ottoman Empire.  These international conditions 
arose (immediately) from the development of Russian influence in Constantinople and 
the Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi (1833), which the British feared provided the Russians a 
future opportunity to occupy Constantinople and, thus, the principal areas of the Ottoman 
Empire.  In addition to explaining the conditions that led the British to become the most 
important imperial power in the Ottoman Empire, this chapter will also explain the 
elements of the peculiar imperialism that the British developed. Understanding this model 
of imperialism is important, because, by 1880, the Germans had appropriated it for 
themselves as they sought to become the premiere imperial power in the Ottoman 
Empire.  The British model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire represented a 
temporary solution to the broad European interest in Ottoman territories, which lasted 
from the seventeenth-century into the nineteen-twenties and became known as “the 
Eastern Question.”47   
Conventionally, the Eastern Question centered on two concerns: the debate about 
what would happen (i.e. would the European states fight each other or make some general 
agreement) when the Ottoman government collapsed and the Ottoman Empire no longer 
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 Until the eighteenth-century, the Eastern Question related to Poland, and in the 
nineteenth-century the term applied to both China and the territory of Central Asia 
(including present day Afghanistan). However, this dissertation considers the Eastern 
Question in the context of the Ottoman Empire.   
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existed (both of which were considered inevitabilities),48 and what would the future 
relationship between the Balkan states and the Ottoman government be (sometimes called 
the Balkan Question)?  Although the defeat of the Ottoman armies in 1683 catalyzed the 
Eastern Question, the latter did not appear immediately.  Instead, many historians date the 
origins of the Eastern Question to the Treaty of Küçhük Kainardji (1774), in which the 
Ottoman government, among other things, ceded a port at the mouth of the Don River on 
the Sea of Azov and territories along the Black Sea to the Russians and, importantly, the 
Khanate of Crimea (which had been administered by the Turks prior to the treaty) 
became an independent state.49  The Eastern Question usually contemplated the end of 
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Subsequent treaties supported and reinforced the Treaty of Küçhük Kainardji, 
including the Treaty of Peace (Jassy), signed between Russia and the Sublime Porte on 9 
January 1792.  Although this strengthened the Russian position it did not dramatically 
alter the spirit of the Treaty of Küçhük Kainardji; thus, instead of detailing every treaty 
and agreement between Russia and the Sublime Porte, the Treaty of Küçhük Kainardji 
will serve as the model for Russian expansion towards the Ottoman Empire.  See, Jacob 
C. Hurewitz, “Treaty of Peace (Jassy),” in The Middle East and North Africa in World 
Politics: A Documentary Record (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 92-100 
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the Ottoman Empire, but between 1774 and 1914 the Powers (in the late eighteenth- and 
all of the nineteenth-century) imposed a series of treaties aimed at preventing the 
Ottoman Empire from collapsing. 
Scholars who have considered the Eastern Question have generally done so based 
on the premise that the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of immediate and uncorrectable 
collapse.  Conventionally, these scholars explain the dire condition of the Ottoman 
Empire by detailing the decadence and corruption within its internal structure.50  While 
this view corresponds with many contemporary understandings of the Ottoman Empire, it 
is too simplistic.  Instead, to appreciate the condition of the Ottoman Empire in the 
nineteenth-century, it is important to recognize the significant role played by international 
affairs, which were particularly important because of the Empire’s geography.51 Instead 
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of focusing on the decadence of the Sultan, this dissertation ascribes the weakness of the 
Ottoman Empire to, among other things, two major geopolitical issues that challenged the 
Empire’s continued existence.  These conditions were: the Empire’s geographic 
proximity to the important strategic positions in the Near East (i.e. the Straits and India), 
and the number and proximity of the Empire’s potential enemies.52  While the Ottoman 
Empire always faced challenges from its neighbors,53 the consequence of its economic 
and technological backwardness, by the nineteenth-century, made the Empire’s 
traditional international problems acute.  However, in spite of its relative geographic 
vulnerability and the improved military technology of the West, the Ottoman Empire 
could not simply be divided among the European powers as other colonial territories of 
the period had been (or would be, in the case of Africa), because the colonization of the 
principal territories of the Ottoman Empire would upset the European balance of power 
and possibly precipitate a European war.  A series of treaties signed between 1774 and 
1856 created an imperial system in which the Powers could assert themselves in the 
Ottoman Empire without upsetting the European balance of power. 
Although many factors discouraged the formal colonization, or even partition, of 
the principal Ottoman territories,54 four require explanation (however, these factors can 
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 These conditions did not always exist, and throughout early modern and modern 
history, the powers of Europe devised plans to divide the Ottoman Empire.  It is not 
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generally be categorized as potential threats to the established European balance of 
power).  First, unlike Africa and other contemporary colonial territories, all the Great 
Powers coveted the Ottoman Empire.  The strategic location of the Ottoman Empire, near 
the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits, as well the Empire’s position relative to India, 
made its principal areas desirable to almost all the European powers.  This general 
interest distinguished Great Power competition for territory in the Ottoman Empire from 
Great Power interest in other imperial territory.  A distinction existed because, 
conventionally, in most imperial territories only one or two Powers would become 
involved.  Consequently, most of the European Powers expected that any effort to seize 
principal Ottoman territory would result in a major European war, something that most of 
them viewed as undesirable.  Second, the Empire contained a very large Christian 
population (the Orthodox Christians alone counted for approximately twenty-five percent 
of the Empire’s population).55 Not only did many European rationalizations for empire 
often wilt when fellow Christians were the subject of the colonization, but the various 
Great Powers had strong connections to different religious groups in the Ottoman Empire 
(specifically, the Russians to the Orthodox, the French to the Catholics, and less so the 
British to the Protestants; eventually the Germans claimed a special relationship with 
Islam).  Because these religious groups did not live in segregated territories, the position 
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of Christians in the Ottoman Empire complicated Great Power colonial ambitions.  Third, 
the Ottoman Empire remained a rather substantial military power (even in the late 
nineteenth-century) and conquering it, or making it an official colony, would have 
instigated a prolonged and multi-national war.  Although eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century wars had depleted the resources of the Ottoman Empire, conquering it entailed a 
greater commitment than the conquest of German Southwest Africa or other 
contemporary colonies.  Finally, the Great Powers had admitted the Ottoman Empire into 
the Concert of Europe in 1856 (in the Treaty of Paris) following the Crimean War; as 
such, direct colonization of the Ottoman territories created diplomatic problems.56  Based 
on these limitations this dissertation contends that the Great Powers developed (between 
1774 and 1856) a distinctive form of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire that permitted 
them to expand into it while maintaining the European balance of power.57 
This peculiar form of imperialism permitted the Great Powers to expand into the 
Ottoman Empire without the formal establishment of colonies and, therefore, without 
upsetting the balance of power.  This policy developed informally and, did not exist as a 
formal document, but, instead, as a set of generally understood rules that governed the 
ambitions of the Powers while emphasizing the maintenance of the European balance of 
power.  This distinctive imperial policy had four principal tenets, which included: first, a 
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guarantee to maintain the territorial and governmental integrity of the Ottoman Empire; 
second, European seizures of peripheral Ottoman territories (such as Aden, Algeria, the 
Ionian Islands, etc.) could be tolerated; however, any seizure could not threaten the 
continued existence of the Ottoman Empire and, thus, the balance of power in Europe; 
third, various powers could establish themselves as the dominant imperial power in the 
region, but could not exploit this to the point of creating an imbalance of power in 
Europe; and finally, the Great Powers could establish themselves, informally, as the 
hegemonic regional power in different parts (i.e. Tunisia, Syria, etc.) of the Ottoman 
Empire.  This complicated imperial policy governed European expansionist activity in the 
Ottoman Empire from 1838 until 1914; however, it required that the European powers 
pursue their colonial and imperial ambitions with great care and with the idea of 
maintaining the European balance of power as the primary goal. 
The extension of the European balance of power to the Ottoman Empire 
developed no later than 1833 (and probably sooner) as Britain sought to limit Russian 
territorial ambition in the Ottoman Empire.58 Simultaneously, this policy permitted the 
British to become the major imperial power in the Ottoman Empire within five years.59  
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Thus, in spite of the geographic vulnerability and strategic desirability of the Ottoman 
Empire, the extension of the European balance of power to the former generally limited 
the direct European seizure of territory (or the placement of formal colonies) in the 
principal lands of the Ottoman Empire.  However, the lack of colonies and the reticence 
of European leaders to break the balance of power by seizing Ottoman territory, should 
not blind historians to the Great Power imperialism that developed within the Ottoman 
Empire.  Indeed, by 1907, “the largest European empire [in the Ottoman Empire and 
surrounding areas, including India], that of Britain,…numbered ninety-six million 
Muslim subjects, almost one-third of the world’s Muslim population.”60  In spite of the 
obvious British imperial success in the Ottoman Empire (described in Chapter IV), the 
specific conditions of the Ottoman existence and its important geographic position 
required a careful policy of imperialism that considered European relations first and 
expansionist goals second.  However, because the imperialism that developed in the 
Ottoman Empire differed from traditional imperial activity, never developing into formal 
colonialism (in the principal Ottoman territories), scholars should not fail to recognize the 
Great Power imperialism that developed there. 
The modern roots of European involvement in the Ottoman Empire, while greatly 
accelerated and intensified in the nineteenth-century, began no later than the sixteenth-
century61 when the Ottoman government awarded the first capitulations (or ahdnames) to 
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the French.62 Capitulations granted trading privileges, and were designed initially to 
increase trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe.  Additionally, these 
capitulations included promises of peaceful relations and, importantly, the right to hire 
Ottoman translators.63  Significantly, the capitulations also permitted the French an 
ambiguous right to protect Christian citizens of the Empire;64 eventually, this became an 
important component of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Great Power influence in the 
Ottoman Empire.65  While capitulations may appear simply to be treaties between the 
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47 
Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government) and the western governments, the capitulations 
originally existed only as a favor granted by an Ottoman Sultan to the European Powers, 
and, thus, could be withdrawn at any time and for any reason.  After the Ottoman defeat 
in 1683, the capitulations, which had been granted under the premise that they were 
temporary and at the will of the Sultan, became increasingly difficult for the Ottoman 
government to control and rapidly acquired the characteristics of formal agreements (and 
thus no longer revocable at the will of the Sultan).66  The Ottoman position that the 
capitulations existed at the whim of the Sultan ended no later than the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca, which the Sublime Porte signed with Russia on 10/21 July 1774.67  This treaty 
made the capitulations difficult for the Sultan to revoke because, the treaty specifically 
addressed the capitulations and, consequently, formalized them.68  Moreover, by the 
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War, but the also permitted Great Power involvement in the internal affairs of the 
Ottoman Government.  Additionally, the British and Germans would claim rights to 
protect the Protestants and Kaiser Wilhelm II even claimed the right to protect Muslims. 
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conclusion of the eighteenth-century the Sublime Porte recognized the peril of fighting 
the Great Powers, and, consequently, sought to avoid conflict the conflict that would have 
resulted from removing or restricting the privileges included in the capitulations.  
Eventually, it became essentially impossible for any Sultan to revoke these capitulations 
without risking war; the capitulations remained until the twentieth-century, when 
Ottoman government renounced them, within ten days of the start of the First World 
War.69 
Not only did the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (and the Peace of Jassy) formalize the 
capitulations, but it also represented the origins of European imperialism in the principal 
areas of the Ottoman Empire.  The treaty contributed to the origins of modern 
imperialism in the Ottoman Empire because it accelerated the Eastern Question by 
granting Russia important concessions; these concessions, specifically the Russian 
possession of them, emphasized the strategic importance of the principal Ottoman lands 
to the other Great Powers.70 Among the important concessions included in the treaty were 
the provisions that provided permission for the Russia of Catherine the Great to navigate 
the Black Sea (merchant ships) and, significantly, for her (commercial) ships to travel 
through the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits.71 Importantly, this treaty also provided 
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the Straits and thus the Mediterranean remained a contentious issue.  The Treaty of 
49 
Russia a pretext for intervening in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, a pretext 
that the French, British, and Germans each, at some point (in the nineteenth-century), 
claimed applied to them as well.  The justification for this intervention came in Article 
VII of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which permitted Russia to “make… 
representations…of the new [Orthodox] church at Constantinople, of which mention is 
made in Article XIV, on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such 
representations in due consideration…”72 Eventually, the Russian leadership asserted that 
Article VII provided them jurisdiction over the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire; additionally, the Russian government claimed this article provided it the 
authority to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the 
latter’s Orthodox subjects.73  This article, combined with Article XIV, which required the 
Sublime Porte to permit the construction of Orthodox churches and chapels in 
Constantinople, “made Catherine the Great virtually the protector of the Greek Orthodox 
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subjects of the Sultan.”74 The Porte recognized the diplomatic humiliation of these claims 
and tried to assert a reciprocal right to protect the Muslims in Catherine’s empire; 
however, Russia never acquiesced to this demand.75 The cumulative affect of these 
provisions was to make Russia, briefly, the most important foreign power in the Ottoman 
Empire, and to raise concern within the community of Great Powers about the 
relationship between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. 
 The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, thus, was an important step toward the imposition 
of European imperialism on the Ottoman Empire.  While the British would not establish 
themselves fully until 1838, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca began the extension of 
modern European imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.76  Thus, as the eighteenth- century 
concluded, the system that had governed Ottoman-European relations since the sixteenth-
century had been formalized, the Great Powers recognized Russia as a threat to their 
strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Ottoman Empire was opened to 
European intervention in its internal affairs for the first time.   
 Following the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the conditions existed for the rise of 
modern European imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.  The parallel recognition that 
Ottoman military forces could not win a war against any of the Great Powers, under most 
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circumstances, accelerated the conditions that permitted the extension of European 
imperialism into the Ottoman Empire.  This recognition also catalyzed a shift in Ottoman 
foreign policy77 that ultimately permitted the Ottoman government to accept the 
establishment of European imperialism in its empire. This shift in foreign policy was 
evident by the early nineteenth-century, and it produced two new principles that quickly 
began to direct Ottoman foreign policy.  These two new principles were: first, that the 
Ottoman Empire sought to “avoid both conflicts and firm alliances” with any of the Great 
Powers and rely on the balance of power principle to mediate any conflict; and, second, 
[if the first were impossible] negotiate an alliance with one of the Great Powers and 
assure the defense of the Empire, even if it meant “temporary subordination.”78  This 
willingness to submit to “temporary subordination” for defensive purposes became the 
cornerstone that permitted the Great Powers to extend their imperial presence in the 
Ottoman Empire.79   
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Although the British became the first modern80 Great Power to establish itself as 
the clear imperial power in the Ottoman Empire, it did not pursue such a position until 
the geopolitical circumstances of the 1830s compelled it to seek an imperial policy that 
would protect its strategic interests (the “overland” route to India, chief among them).  
The change in geopolitics resulted from three concerns. First, the importance of the 
“overland” route between England and India and the rise of Russian influence in 
Constantinople (after the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca); second, the introduction of 
nationalism, following the French Revolution,81 into the already troublesome Balkan 
Peninsula; and, finally, Mehemet Ali’s rapid rise to power in Egypt (discussed below).82  
Starting in the early nineteenth-century, several Balkan territories under Ottoman 
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dominion sought independence; the Great Powers (especially Russia)83 supported several 
of these independence movements seeking to assert imperial influence through them.  
However, exclusive responsibility for the changing geopolitical conditions does not 
reside with the events in the Balkan Peninsula.  Instead, the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt 
facilitated the rise of Mehemet Ali, who contributed, perhaps more than any one else, to 
the shift in geopolitical circumstances in the Eastern Mediterranean.  This shift began as 
Ali extended his influence beyond Egypt into the Balkans and, eventually, into the 
principal territories of the Ottoman Empire.  These changes ultimately led the British to 
become the first modern imperial power in the principal Ottoman territories and to 
establish the model of imperialism that the Germans embraced in the 1870s.84  
 Mehemet Ali changed the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean because, 
as the ruler of Egypt, he established the region’s most powerful and effective military 
force, which he used to advance his personal interests.  Although Egypt technically 
remained a part of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth-century, the former had 
obtained a considerable degree of autonomy and was administered by the Mamluk tribe.  
Following the Napoleonic invasion, the Ottoman government sent Mehemet Ali to Egypt 
to support the British, hoping Ali would simultaneously return the province to the central 
control of the Sublime Porte.  When the British left Egypt in 1803, Mehemet Ali operated 
with considerable autonomy, and eventually removed Egypt’s Mamluk rulers; by 1805 he 
effectively governed the territory.  Following a second British retreat from Egypt in 1807, 
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Mehemet Ali became the ruler of Egypt (although he technically remained under the 
authority of the Sultan, the Sultan recognized Ali’s autonomy).  Ali’s military prowess 
and the devotion of his troops discouraged the Sultan from challenging Ali’s position in 
Egypt, and, consequently, the Sultan permitted Mehemet Ali to remain the ruler of Egypt 
so long as the latter recognized the Sultan’s nominal supremacy.85   
Sultan Mahmud II’s (1808-1839) position in the Balkans (and more importantly, 
his relationship with Ali) became acute with the start of the Greek Revolution in 1821.  
Great Power sympathy for the Greeks resulted in significant European assistance to the 
Greek rebels, and therefore significantly complicated the Sultan’s efforts to quell the 
revolt.  Facing such a revolt, Mahmud II requested Mehemet Ali’s assistance in 1824; as 
compensation, the Sultan promised Ali the island of Crete.  Ali sent his forces to Greece, 
and subsequently defeated the Greek rebels in several important battles, but did not end 
the revolt.  The Great Powers sought a mediated solution to the Greek conflict when they 
met for the London Conference (1827).  The conference did not produce the desired end 
to the war, and the Great Powers quickly attacked the Empire, destroying the 
Ottoman/Egyptian naval forces at the Battle of Navarino on 20 October 1827.86  Ottoman 
difficulties increased substantially as the Greek War of Independence spilled over to a 
new war between Russia and Turkey (the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829).87  Although 
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Russia and the Ottoman Empire were at war, the Russians waged a “peculiar kind of 
war”88 in which they did not involve themselves in the principal Ottoman territories but 
fought in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea.89 
The Greek War of Independence and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 ended 
with the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) in 1829.  This treaty, signed by Russia and the 
Sublime Porte, reestablished the boundaries as they existed before the war (no territorial 
gain for the Russians) and required the Sublime Porte to pay an enormous indemnity to 
Russia.  Additionally, it provided for Russian “protection” to the Danubian Principalities 
of Moldavia and Wallachia, required the Sublime Porte to recognize the Treaty of 
London (which established an independent Greece, ultimately under a Bavarian king, 
Otho I), provided the Russians further rights to protect the Orthodox Christians in the 
Balkans, and, most significantly re-opened the Straits to Russian commercial traffic.90  
Importantly, Russia consequently recognized the benefit of preserving a weak Ottoman 
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Empire on its southern boarder, and Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855) ordered his 
plenipotentiary to prevent the destruction of Turkey and not to permit Russian troops to 
enter Constantinople unless the representatives of the Ottoman Empire refused to sign the 
treaty.91  The Russian goal became “a policy of intimidation…the Sultan had to fear 
Russia more than any other power, and he had to be willing to turn his policy to suit 
Russia at all times.”92  This policy of controlling decisions in Constantinople through 
intimidation became one of two tactics that the Russians employed, into the twentieth-
century, to affect the decisions of the Ottoman government; the other was by supporting 
the Balkan states in their perpetual effort to separate from the Ottoman Empire.93  
Additionally, the French and the British also recognized the benefit of maintaining the 
Ottoman Empire, believing it the most efficacious method of impeding Russian 
penetration of the Eastern Mediterranean.94  Thus, the Treaty of Adrianople had three 
important consequences for the geopolitical condition of the Eastern Mediterranean: first, 
it recognized an independent Greece and thus led to a new era in Balkan relations with 
the Ottoman Empire; second, it led to a shift in relations between the Ottoman Empire 
and Europe; and finally, it represented an agreement on behalf of all the existing Great 
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Powers of the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman government and its 
principal territories. 
Although the Treaty of Adrianople brought a resolution to the immediate conflicts 
facing the Ottoman Empire, the Empire stood on the precipice of a new conflict, one that 
catalyzed the British decision to establish itself as the chief imperial power in the 
Ottoman Empire.  This conflict developed from the promise Mahmud II made to 
Mehemet Ali when the former asked the latter for assistance against the Greek rebels.  As 
payment for this service, Mahmud II promised Ali Crete, but because of the new Greek 
state this was no longer possible; consequently Ali occupied Syria.  Although the initial 
extension of Ali’s territory (into Syria) did not cause much concern in European capitals 
(France had the most concern but did not send troops), Ali’s subsequent orders to march 
towards Constantinople caused Mahmud II to plead for the European powers to 
intervene; only Russia responded.95  Reflecting on the decision not to aid Mahmud II, the 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerson (1830-1841) wrote: 
What Metternich says of our shirking from helping the Sultan when 
Mehemet was at Acre [a city in western Anatolia] and when a word 
might have stopped the Pasha [Mehemet Ali] without a blow is 
perfectly true, and there is nothing that has happened since I have been 
in this office which I regret so much as that tremendous blunder of the 
English Gov[ernment](emphasis added).96  
 
 Palmerston’s regret over the British decision not to assist Mahmud II, when 
Mehemet Ali posed his greatest threat to the Ottoman Empire, developed, principally, 
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from the privileges granted to Russia in the Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi (Unkiar Skelessi) 
(1833, signed between Russia and the Sublime Porte) as a reward for Russian assistance 
against Ali.97  Although this treaty purported to be nothing more than a defensive alliance 
between the two countries, it was simultaneously more than that and the catalyst for the 
British to establish themselves as the dominant power in the Ottoman Empire.98  The 
reason the British reacted with such enmity towards this treaty was that it provided the 
Russians a pretext to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire.  The 
alliance required the two powers to assist each other if one of them became involved in a 
defensive war; the British feared that Mehemet Ali would attack the Ottoman Empire, 
Russia would come to the aid of the Porte, and would occupy Constantinople and the 
Straits, never surrendering them (and thus, imperiling the British “overland” route to 
India).  Additionally, the treaty contained a secret (albeit well known) clause, which 
relieved the Sublime Porte of its obligation to provide military aid to Russia.  Instead, the 
treaty required the Sublime Porte to “close the strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to 
not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.”99  
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Because a primary British strategic concern for the Near East was that Russian warships 
be prevented from entering the Mediterranean and that British ships could operate in the 
Black Sea, the British viewed this treaty as a threat to their position in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and, thus, their ability to communicate with India.100  Consequently, the 
British government responded to the treaty on 26 August 1833 with a note of protest from 
Lord Palmerston to the Sublime Porte stating: “That Treaty appears to Her Majesty’s 
Government to produce a change in relations between Turkey and Russia, to which other 
European states are entitled to object…if that treaty should hereafter lead to the armed 
interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, the British Government will hold 
itself at liberty to act…”101 
 Palmerston’s reaction to the Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi developed out of the 
British recognition of the strategic importance of a stable Egypt and Eastern 
Mediterranean.  The principal British concern was that the Ottoman territories, due to the 
weakness of the Ottoman government and military, would fall into Russian hands and 
thus threaten the “overland” route to India.102  The stability of these areas was important 
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to the British because the “overland” route, via Suez (approximately eighty miles from 
Cairo to Suez) had developed into the primary route for communications between 
England and India.  While much bulk traffic traveled between India and Britain via the 
Cape of Good Hope, the “overland route” became popular not only with travelers (in 
spite of the challenges of crossing the desert), but also critical in achieving the fastest 
possible communications between London and India.103  As previously mentioned, this 
route reduced the time it took for correspondence to be sent to India (and answered) from 
two years to approximately one-hundred days.104  However, maintaining this important 
access to India required that the British be able to travel to Suez unmolested.  The British 
preferred not to formally control this land; Palmerston wrote the Earl of Cromer 
regarding the proposed British colonization of Egypt: “We do not want Egypt, or wish it 
for ourselves, any more than any rational man with an estate in the north of England and 
a residence in the south would have wished to possess the inns on the north road.  All he 
could want would have been that the inns should be well-kept…”105  Palmerston also 
wrote to the British Minister in Naples, William Temple, in 1833 “…[that] Turkey is as 
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good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign [Mehemet Ali] 
would be…”106  
By 1833 the preservation of the land route over Egypt from the Mediterranean to 
the Red Sea had become the principal British strategic goal (and the establishment of the 
British in Aden (1839) and Gibraltar (1830) provided two of the three strategic locations 
that the British required).  Maintaining this access did not necessitate colonization of 
Egypt, but instead, required reducing the established Russian influence in Constantinople, 
which also required British control over Mehemet Ali (whom the British believed, 
appropriately, to be the most likely power to challenge the Ottoman Empire, under the 
Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi if a power attacked the Ottoman Empire, the Russia had a 
treaty obligation to help defend the Ottoman Empire, which meant Russian troops into 
Constantinople and, in the British estimation, a permanent Russian occupation of the 
Straits).  Should the Russians control the Straits and occupy Constantinople the British 
believed that the “overland” route would be compromised.  Moreover, in spite of Russian 
assurances that they had no intention of invading India, the extension of Russian 
influence into Afghanistan in 1838 (under Dost Mohammed), after the collapse of the 
Persian Empire, exacerbated the British fear of Russian expansion into India.107 
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 Consequently, the Treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi, which provided Russia conditions 
that made her the dominant power in Constantinople, and permitted Russian troops to 
enter the Ottoman Empire if the latter were attacked (and an attack from Mehemet Ali 
was always a possibility) threatened the English position in India.  As the most important 
colonial possession in the British Empire, threats to connections between India and 
London could not be tolerated.  Moreover, the increasingly close relationship between 
France and Mehemet Ali, as well as French expansion into Algeria and Tunis further 
threatened the British position, as they feared that the Mediterranean might become “a 
French lake.”108  Thus, the confluence of the Russian position in Constantinople, French 
expansion in North Africa, the unpredictability of Mehemet Ali, and the necessity of 
British travel overland in Egypt from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea created the 
circumstances that forced the British to overcome their hesitance to establish themselves 
as the dominant imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. 
 Faced with the recognition that the Russian threat in the Ottoman Empire had to 
be curtailed and also recognizing that Mehemet Ali had to be stabilized, the British began 
a series of diplomatic maneuvers that culminated in the Balta Liman Commercial 
Convention between Britain and the Ottoman Empire (signed on 16 August 1838, 
hereafter called the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838, described in 
Chapter IV).  This convention established the British as the chief imperial power in the 
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Ottoman Empire and restrained the Ottoman ambitions of both Russia and Mehemet Ali.  
Although this agreement was a commercial agreement it advanced the British interest in 
maintaining the territorial and governmental integrity of the Ottoman Empire by 
increasing trade, and thus theoretically also increasing revenue, to the Ottoman 
government (although the treaty did not always work as intended). 
 The British success in the Ottoman Empire between 1838 and 1880 should not 
obscure the challenges that the Russians continued to present to the Ottoman Empire.  
The most important such example (although there were others) was the Crimean War 
(1853-1856), in which the British and French supported the Ottomans to limit further 
Russian influence in the Empire.  However, the treaty that resulted from the war was 
more important than the war itself.  This treaty (and the subsequent Treaty of Paris, 1856, 
which reaffirmed the original treaty that concluded the Crimean War) instituted what 
historians have come to call the “Crimean System.”  The Treaty of Paris formally brought 
the Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe, and guaranteed that the treaty’s 
signatories would protect the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and Russia had 
to restrict severely its naval strength (even bases) in the Black Sea.109  Britain, France, 
and Russia further codified the “Crimean System” on 29 April 1856 with a new treaty in 
which the signatories explicitly guaranteed the territorial and governmental integrity of 
the Ottoman Empire.110  Consequently, the treaties that concluded the Crimean War, as 
well as the treaties of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), Adrianople (1829), and Hünkiâr İskelesi 
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(1833), discouraged and then prevented any of the European Powers from establishing 
formal colonies in the Ottoman Empire.  Indeed, a component of the British “Crimean 
System” directed the British to go to war to maintain the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire (meaning going to war to prevent any power from establishing formal 
colonies in the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire).111  This prohibition, based 
principally on the strategic locations within the Empire and the interest in maintaining the 
European balance of power, required the British to develop a specific method to extend 
their imperial influence into the Ottoman Empire; a model that the German adopted, 
almost without revision, in 1880 and used until 1908 (and in some cases until 1914). 
Although it is easy to perceive the British as replacing the Russian influence in 
the Ottoman Empire following the Balta Liman Commercial Convention, the Russians 
remained a powerful influence and threat to the Ottoman Empire.  However, after 1838, 
the British influence in Constantinople superseded that of Russia; as British officials 
furthered their influence with the Sublime Porte, the British grew to be the most 
important power in the region. While the British never formally challenged the Sublime 
Porte’s sovereignty, the British increasingly became an important imperial power in the 
Ottoman Empire.  The subsequent chapter discusses this relationship in three specific 
areas: economics and trade, military, and the teaching of imperialism in Britain.  The 
importance of considering the British example so carefully is that in the 1870s the 
Germans appropriated this model (almost without revision) as they extended themselves 
into the Ottoman Empire.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 THE BRITISH MODEL OF IMPERIALISM IN THE  
OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1838-1880 
 The signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838 signaled the 
beginning of British imperial supremacy in the Ottoman Empire.  While Russia and 
France remained active in Ottoman affairs, the British operated as the most powerful and 
influential imperial power in the Ottoman Empire until at least the 1880s, when German 
imperial influence become increasingly assertive.  Through this position, the British 
secured their “overland” route to the Red Sea (and after 1869 the Suez route) and opened 
the Ottoman Empire to an increasingly mercantile trade relationship.  Moreover, during 
this period, the character of the Ottoman government changed, as it embraced western 
financial and military reforms, extended its influence into provinces that it had not 
effectively governed for decades, and facilitated the construction of railroads, ports, and 
roads.  Each of these changes accelerated the extension of Great Power imperialism in the 
Empire, and cumulatively permit England, France, and Germany to be considered 
imperial powers in the Ottoman Empire. 
This chapter is an examination of the model of imperialism that the British 
imposed on the Ottoman Empire from 1838 until 1880; however, as described in the 
previous chapter, the other European powers regulated the potency and character of 
imperialism in the Ottoman Empire (through the system of treaties developed from 1774 
to 1856).  Although the British remained an imperial power in the Ottoman Empire until 
the beginning of the First World War, this chapter considers British imperial activity in 
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the Ottoman Empire only up to 1880.112  The chapter concludes with 1880 because, in 
subsequent years, the British imperial influence in the Empire flagged and the Germans 
rapidly replaced the British as the most important imperial power in the Empire.  Thus, 
the subsequent three chapters consider German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire 
(beginning in 1880), which the latter based on an appropriation of the British model 
described in this chapter.  As German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire is considered, 
its deviations from the British model will be explained. 
 This examination of the British model of imperialism is predicated on the notion 
that the Great Powers expected the Ottoman Empire to collapse.113  This model was 
based on the demise of the Ottoman Empire, because, while the model permitted the 
Great Powers to impose imperialism on the Empire, it prohibited the establishment of 
formal colonies (in the principal areas of the Ottoman Empire) as long as the Empire 
continued to exist.114  In fact, as British involvement in the Ottoman Empire waned after 
1880, the British worried that if the Ottoman Empire collapsed that they “would not have 
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the economic basis, with which to justify a political intervention.”115  Although the model 
required the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the imperial powers were frequently 
satisfied not to hasten (and indeed they often sought to retard) this collapse, as they were 
satisfied with their established position.  Indeed, the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial 
Convention, and other British efforts to bolster the authority and prestige of the Sultan’s 
government, represented a British effort to support the Ottoman Empire and to prevent it 
from collapsing.  With the establishment of the “overland” route, the British possessed 
the strategic territories in the Ottoman Empire that mattered the most to them.  Had the 
Ottoman Empire collapsed, the British position would have been endangered (The British 
had nothing to gain, and something to lose, if the Empire collapsed.  By 1838 they 
controlled all the strategic locations important to them, but they could not be sure that 
they would control these same areas if the Ottoman Empire collapsed). 
Indeed, the model worked as the Great Powers anticipated; when the Ottoman Empire 
collapsed, the British and French (the only European Great Powers who could make a 
claim for new colonial territory) used their recognized imperial positions to establish 
themselves as formal colonial powers in the Ottoman territories.116  Although the 
Germans never established a formal colony in the Ottoman Empire, their imperial activity 
adhered closely to this model; had the Central Powers been victorious in the First World 
War, the Germans would have been well positioned to establish themselves as a colonial 
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power in the Ottoman Empire.117  Indeed, the American Ambassador to Turkey in 1915, 
Hans Morgenthau, wrote, regarding a potential German victory: “if Germany wins [the 
war], she will have such a preponderating position in this country [Turkey] that she 
[Germany] will practically govern Turkey.”118 
The examination of the British model of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire will 
consider three areas of British (and later German) influence: first, economic influence; 
second, political and military influence and the educational reforms that accompanied 
them; and, third, the teaching of imperialism in Europe through the appropriation and 
display of cultural artifacts.  Specifically, this model of imperialism permitted the British 
to dominate trade with the Ottoman Empire, control its finances and fiscal policy, 
contribute to the restoration of the Ottoman military, dramatically alter the Ottoman 
educational system (so that it was increasingly secular and western), to develop and 
exploit transportation networks (railroads, ports, and roads), as well as appropriate major 
cultural artifacts (sometimes against Ottoman law). The cumulative consequence of these 
incursions into Ottoman sovereignty permits historians to recognize imperialism even 
when the British (and later the Germans) did not establish colonies or assert a strong 
public claim to the imperial territory. 
Before considering the specific elements of the British model of imperialism for the 
Ottoman Empire, it is useful to briefly recall the components of Robinson and 
                                                 
117
 Letter, Myron T. Herrick (American Ambassador to France) to Secretary of State 
(Charles Hughes), 21 November 1922,  NARA, R.G. 59, 767.90d 15/4, 1.  This letter 
references the ambition for the “retention of Mosul by the British.”  
 
118
 Letter, Hans Morgenthau (American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire) to Secretary 
of State, 22 December 1915, NARA, R.G. 59, 762.67/½, 2. 
69 
Gallagher’s “Free Trade of Imperialism,” which include (this definition of imperialism 
does not require all of the components to be fulfilled): 
1) The exertion of power or diplomacy to impose and sustain free trading conditions 
on another society against its will; 
2) the exertion of capital or commercial attraction to bend economic organization 
and direction of growth in directions complementary to the needs and surpluses of 
the expanding economy; 
3) the exertion of capital and commercial attraction directly upon foreign 
governments to influence them toward cooperation and alliance with the 
expanding country; 
4) the direct intervention or influence of the export-import sector interests upon the 
politics of the receiving country in the direction of collaboration and political-
economic alliance with the expanding power; 
5)   the taking over by European bankers and merchants of sectors of non-European 
domestic economies under cover of imposed free trade without accompaniment of 
large capital or export inputs from Europe, as in China.119 
 
Although Robinson and Gallagher did not require all of these to be fulfilled for 
imperialism to exist, the British model will incorporate almost every component of this 
system, and in some cases greatly exceed it.  However, it is important to note that the 
British (in concurrence with Robinson and Gallagher’s theory) sought to exert control 
without the establishment of formal colonies.  Based on this definition of imperialism, as 
well as Said’s recognition that, in the nineteenth-century, imperialism preceded 
colonialism, this chapter will consider the imposition of imperialism on the Ottoman 
Empire, beginning with the so-called “British model” in 1838. 
 Before considering this British model of imperialism, it is worth noting the 
important domestic changes in the Ottoman Empire that contributed to the rise of 
European imperialism; specifically, the nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms focused on 
incorporating recent European advances in technology and finance into the established 
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Ottoman system.  The Ottomans referred to these reforms as the Tanzimat reform 
movement (conventionally, simply the Tanzimat), and they lased from 1836 until the 
eighteen-seventies; their principal goal was the preservation of the Ottoman state and the 
protection of its Muslim citizens.120  These Tanzimat reforms, and the ones concurrently 
imposed by European imperialist powers, provided (among other things) the Ottoman 
Empire with its first fiscal budget (1862), brought western military tactics and weapons to 
the Empire (as well as European educational systems to make these military reforms 
practical, specifically the teaching of science and European languages), and led to the 
development of the first Ottoman constitution (1878), all of which facilitated European 
imperialism.   
British Economic and Commercial Influence in the Ottoman Empire up to 1878 
 Stable economic relations between England and the Ottoman Empire originated in 
the Early Modern Period.  However, during the eighteenth-century, British commercial 
relations with the Empire (which had been among the strongest in Europe) declined.  
Writing in 1799, William Eton described British trade with the Ottoman Empire in the 
following way: “Formerly, the trade to Turkey was of considerable importance to this 
country [England], but of late years it had been languishing, and at last dwindled into a 
state of insignificancy, when the present war [Napoleonic Wars] entirely put a stop to all 
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communication with the ports of the Levant.”121 During the eighteenth-century, French 
commercial relations with the Levant surpassed those of the British; however, the 
Napoleonic invasion of Egypt convinced many officials in the Porte of French imperial 
ambitions for the Ottoman Empire, thus damaging the relationship.  While this tension 
between the French and the Porte provided an opportunity for the British, British trade 
did not enjoy unqualified success following the Napoleonic Wars.  An important 
explanation for the temporary decline of British trade with the Ottoman Empire (after the 
Napoleonic Wars) relates to the decision (guided by the Foreign Secretary, George 
Canning, who had a strong interest in the Levant) to dissolve the Levant Company, which 
had an established monopoly on trade between the Levant and England.  This decision 
(based on the arguments of free trade,122 with the idea that British trade would expand 
beyond the capacity of the Levant Company) not only slowed trade relations between 
England and the Ottoman Empire, but it also temporarily weakened the British political 
position in the Near East.  The revocation of the Levant Company’s charter contributed to 
a diminished British political position, because, until its demise, the company had funded 
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and staffed all the British embassies and consulates in the Ottoman Empire.123  Thus, as 
Europe emerged from the Napoleonic Wars, the English had a weak commercial and 
political position in the Ottoman Empire.   
Although the English had a limited commercial and political position in the 
Ottoman Empire after the Napoleonic Wars, in the later eighteen-twenties and eighteen- 
thirties, the British position in the Ottoman Empire improved, and even surpassed that of 
the other European powers, of which Russia and France were the most influential.124  The 
British position improved due to the confluence of official interest in developing and then 
protecting the “overland” route and a simultaneous increase in interest in the Near 
Eastern markets, largely due to their increasing economic accessibility.  The British 
considered economic accessibility particularly important because the economic theory 
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that directed British commercial (and political) affairs in the post-Napoleonic World 
emphasized achieving “free trade.”  This economic theory postulated that if no 
restrictions on trade existed, then British commercial superiority would permit British 
commercial interests to dominate trade (this is also, clearly, an important element in 
Robinson and Gallagher’s “Imperialism of Free Trade.”). 
The 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention (also known as the Balta 
Liman Convention, which the British pressured the Sultan into signing, based on threats 
from Mehemet Ali;125 hereafter, cited as “the convention” when appropriate) established 
the formal agreement for the development of a “free trade” relationship between the 
Ottoman Empire and Britain.  Among other things, the treaty included the following 
provisions: abolishment of all state monopolies and state regulatory activities, British 
merchants received an exemption to taxes that the Ottoman government imposed on 
internal trade, and British merchants received the right to buy and sell goods at any price 
that they wished.126  Although the terms of this treaty appear to favor the British 
(overwhelmingly), it is worth noting that the treaty also fit within the economic theory 
that governed Ottoman economic affairs in this period (discussed below).  Additionally, it 
can be argued that while the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838 
represented the imposition of free trade on the Ottoman Empire, the Convention also 
crystallized British interests in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
(especially after the British secured the “overland” route).  Lord Palmerston contended 
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that “free trade” would intensify commercial opportunities for the Ottoman government, 
thus providing increased financial resources, which would permit the Porte to develop a 
stronger army (which would be trained by British officers).127  Thus, the British believed 
“free trade” would contribute to the protection of the Ottoman Empire.   
While British trade with the Ottoman Empire increased significantly after the 
1838 Convention, this agreement was, at least in part, a successful effort to retard 
Russian commercial and political activities in the Ottoman Empire and, thus, secure the 
“overland” route.  However, the convention was simultaneously (and intentionally) an 
effective tool in limiting the power of Mehemet Ali, who remained, officially, a subject 
of the Sultan, and thus bound to the treaty (even if Ali could disobey the Sultan, he could 
not challenge the British, because of their powerful navy).  This treaty limited Mehemet 
Ali, because he extracted significant revenues from state (Egyptian) monopolies.  With 
the abolition of all monopolies in the Ottoman Empire, Mehemet Ali lost an important 
source of revenue, because between twenty-five and thirty-three percent of Ali’s revenue 
came from monopolies on foreign trade.128 Although the Convention intended to curb the 
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ambitions of Russia and Mehemet Ali and thus secure the “overland” route, it had 
predictable, but important, consequences for the imposition of British imperialism on the 
Ottoman Empire.  Among the consequences of the convention was the increased 
accessibility of Ottoman markets to the British.   
Ottoman markets became accessible to the British partially due to the 1838 
Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention, but also because of the recent economic 
reforms within the Ottoman Empire, including the destruction of the famous Turkish 
Janissary Corps (1826).  Although the Janissary Corps originally existed as a component 
of the Sultan’s military (and to some extent in the 1820s it still did), the Janissary had 
established impressive commercial privileges, and they had become elite merchants in the 
Ottoman cities.  As local elite merchants, the Janissaries, who remained powerful because 
of their established military training and position within society, became the strongest 
advocates for Ottoman protectionism.  The destruction of the Janissary Corps (1826) 
increased the accessibility of Ottoman markets and encouraged European trade.129 Thus, 
the confluence of the destruction of the Janissary Corps and the signing of the Anglo-
Ottoman Commercial Convention produced an unprecedented period of “free trade” and 
market accessibility in the Ottoman Empire.  The British embraced the new commercial 
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environment in the Ottoman Empire and used it to establish themselves as the premier 
imperial power in the Ottoman Empire.130  
British trade dominance in the Ottoman Empire is most easily illustrated 
statistically.131  Ottoman trade with England increased from £ 4 million in 1829 to £ 54 
million in 1876 and to £ 63 million in 1911, an increase of about fifteen times.132  
Further, between 1800 and the rise of German influence in the 1880s, the British 
accounted for approximately twenty-five percent of Ottoman exports (mostly agricultural 
products) and provided between thirty and forty percent of the imports to the Ottoman 
Empire.  Furthermore, the British controlled about fifty percent of the foreign investment 
in the Empire.133  Finally, the year before the Convention, 437 British commercial ships, 
with a gross tonnage of 86,253, called at Constantinople; ten years later (1848) 1,397 
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British ships with a tonnage of 358,422 called on the same port134 (a trend that continued 
into the late 1860s135).   
Although the Porte welcomed their relationship with England because of the 
protection that the Convention provided against the rampant ambitions of Russia and 
Mehemet Ali, this Convention did not receive universal approbation within the Empire.  
Opposition to the treaty developed from the resulting, nearly unrestricted, European trade 
with the Ottoman Empire, which contributed significantly to the devastation of domestic 
commercial enterprises; the Porte sought to remedy this problem by increasing import 
duties.136  However, due to the Capitulations granted in the eighteenth-century (addressed 
in Chapter III), the Porte had to seek European approval to raise its own import duties, 
which the latter consistently denied.137  This European control over the tariffs and import 
duties was merely the beginning of the European command of Ottoman finances. 
Recognition of the benefits accrued by the British under the Anglo-Ottoman 
Commercial Convention propelled the French to seek a similar agreement, which the 
Porte granted on 25 November 1838.  Eventually, most of the European commercial 
powers, including:  Sardinia, Belgium, Sweden-Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, the 
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Zollverein, and Prussia (individually), signed similar treaties with the Porte (all between 
1839 and 1841).138  The willingness of the Porte to sign such treaties developed out of 
what Charles Issawi, the preeminent economic historian of the Ottoman Empire, called 
the Ottoman “antimercantilist policy.”139  This “antimercantilist policy,” in the words of a 
nineteenth-century British observer “adopted the extreme reverse of the Spanish fallacies 
for enriching and aggrandizing a nation. If Spain determined to admit nothing produced 
by any other country than her own colonies, Turkey seized upon the fanciful idea of 
becoming rich, prosperous and mighty, by letting nothing go out of, and to let everything 
come freely into, her dominions…”140 In reality, the relationship developed a mercantile 
complexion, because Britain exported its manufactured goods to the Empire and 
purchased raw materials, especially cotton, there.  This commercial policy permitted the 
Powers to extend imperial influence by having commercial and economic monopolies in 
many parts of the Ottoman Empire.141  The Ottoman Empire maintained this economic 
theory until the eighteen-sixties, when it began to seek to revise the treaties that 
originated from the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838.  However, by the 
eighteen-sixties, the Powers had so fully established this relationship that it remained a 
reality until the beginning of the First World War. 
While the development of trade relations between the Ottoman Empire and 
Britain (and Europe in general) is worthy of consideration; the greater issue, relating to 
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European imperialism, was the growing economic dependence of the Ottoman Empire on 
European loans, specifically from Britain and France (later Germany).  This dependence 
began in 1854 and continued until 1914.142    Great Power investment in the Ottoman 
Empire can be divided into two categories: 1) direct investment into enterprises 
(railroads, ports, etc.); and, 2) direct lending to the Ottoman government.143  However, by 
1914 most of the loans that the Empire accepted went to “commissions and charges, or 
[were] used to repay earlier debts, or to finance wars, or for indemnity payments, or 
[were] spent by monarchs in various unproductive ways.”144  This economic condition 
fostered a dependant relationship between the Porte and the European Powers and 
permitted the latter—again principally Britain and France and later Germany, but also 
Austria-Hungary and Russia—to advance their imperial ambitions through the 
development of bureaucratic entities within the formal Ottoman government.  The 
imperial Powers eventually established a monopoly on the printing of Ottoman currency, 
developed Ottoman financial policy, and regulated the income of the Ottoman 
government.  This process began with the French and the British, but after 1871, 
increasingly involved the Germans.  Thus, while all of the Great Powers involved 
themselves in trade with the Ottoman Empire, it was the British, French, and German 
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domination and control of the Ottoman economy that facilitated the imposition of 
European imperialism on the Ottoman Empire.145 
While British trade with the Ottoman Empire influenced imperial activity, the 
most important components of British, as well as French and later German, economic 
imperialism in the Ottoman Empire were the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the Public Debt 
Administration.  These two organizations developed from loans extended by the British 
and the French to the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War (1853-1856).  The 
Russian effort in the Crimean War to extend their influence into the Ottoman Empire 
catalyzed the concern of the British and the French about Russian interests in the 
Ottoman Empire and shattered Ottoman finances146 (by the time the Ottomans began 
accepting loans from the West, the Ottoman government dedicated approximately 
seventy-percent of its regular revenues to maintaining the army).147   Reacting to the fear 
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of a Russian extension of power into the Ottoman Empire, the British sent armies to the 
Crimea, but, more importantly (for the purposes of considerations of economic 
imperialism), provided large loans to the Sublime Porte and, eventually, admitted the 
latter to the Concert of Europe, and thus guaranteed the integrity and continued existence 
of the Empire,148 following the successful end of the conflict.  Although these efforts 
temporarily, and in some cases for the long term, bolstered the ability of the Ottoman 
government to sustain itself, the acceptance of loans from Britain and France provided 
the latter with their most effective medium for the extension of Great Power imperialism 
into the Ottoman Empire.149 
Although the specifics of the loans made between the European Powers and the 
Porte are not themselves important, it is worth noting that the loans the banks that 
controlled these loans frequently floated these loans on the European markets and thus 
funded them through private means.  Although private investors frequently funded the 
loans, the British public perceived these loans to have been endorsed by the government; 
a perception that inflamed tensions when the Porte defaulted on its foreign debts.  As 
previously mentioned, the first loan from the European Powers to the Ottoman Empire 
occurred during the Crimean War (until this point, the Porte did not have foreign debt).  
This loan for £T (Turkish pounds)150 3.3 million represented the beginning of a 
transformation of Ottoman society and government.  Following the influx of money from 
the 1854 loan, the Ottoman government contracted loans with the European Powers (or 
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citizens of the European Powers) with increasing frequency and under increasingly poor 
terms (these loans were frequently, in fact predominantly made by private investors, but 
limited evidence indicates that the European Powers encouraged these loans).151  By 
1877, the Ottoman government owed £T 268.8 million in loans, which required nearly 
thirty-percent of the regular Ottoman finances simply to service this debt.152  Not only 
was the Ottoman government hundreds of millions of pounds in debt, but its poor 
economic conditions required accepting more loans to service the debt that the Empire 
already had.  This situation ended in 1875 when the Ottoman Empire announced the 
suspension of debt payments (discussed below).153  The Ottoman Empire also had very 
little choice from whom to accept loans in the decades before the First World War—
France, Britain, and Germany constituted the “chief capital exporting countries,” 154 and 
in 1914 their long term loans encompassed seventy-five percent of all the Empire’s 
outstanding international investments. 
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The necessity of accepting loans from the British and French permitted the these 
Powers to impose themselves on the Ottoman government, and, specifically, to develop 
the Imperial Ottoman Bank (which was not administered by the Ottoman state, or even 
citizens of the Ottoman Empire, but rather, principally the French and the British, not 
even from Constantinople and the administrators represented private bond holders not the 
French or British government).155  The Imperial Ottoman Bank originated out of the 
European insistence that the Ottoman government embrace European accounting 
standards and practices.156  The Bank’s bond holders157 demanded such reforms because 
the disorganized financial structure of the Ottoman government did not permit oversight 
of the loans or an accurate understanding of the Ottoman financial condition.  Henry L. 
                                                 
155
 This was not the first time western powers attempted to establish a bank in the 
Ottoman Empire, over the period from 1838 through the founding of the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank on 5 March 1863, several substantial attempts had been made for private 
western banks to establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire.  These are not essential to 
the dissertation, except to note that the French and the British had banks there, and 
consequently when the Imperial Ottoman Bank was chartered, the Sultan insisted that 
both French and British interests participate so that neither country could exert itself too 
fully in the Ottoman Empire.  See, Autheman, 30-48.  The Imperial Ottoman Bank 
remains in existence today. 
 
156
 Historian Christopher Clay contends that the Ottoman financial system was quite 
rational.  However, Clay later claims in his book Gold for the Sultan that Ottoman 
financial decision making was based on “almost universal ignorance about finance 
among Ottoman ministers.”  The chapter on the rational basis of Ottoman was not 
available for review, but interested scholars should see, Christopher Clay, “The Financial 
Collapse of the Ottoman State.” Note taken from Clay, Gold for the Sultan, 7, 15 and 
575. 
 
157
 It is important to emphasize that the Imperial Ottoman Bank represented the 
individuals who held bonds in the Ottoman Empire, and not (officially) the governments 
of England and France.  However, while the Bank did not officially represent London and 
Paris, the relationship between the two was quite close.  The Powers often extended 
themselves through private companies and individuals.  These companies did not always 
place the imperial interests of the Powers first, and sometimes made sales that injured the 
imperialism of the Great Powers, see: DBFP, I:B:XVI, 7. 
 
84 
Bulwer, the English Ambassador to Constantinople, wrote Lord J. Russell in June 1860 
regarding the structure of the Ottoman financial system: 
The first thing necessary for Turkey is financial order, and the first step 
towards it was the framing of a regular budget.  This as I have stated in 
a former dispatch has been done [Bulwer indicates in a footnote that he 
has not seen the budget]. 
 
…But what is still required is, a close examination into, and a strict 
control over, the State expenses on one side, and a better organization 
as to the collection and distribution of revenue on the other.  The Sultan 
has promised me, in regard to the first, that each department shall be 
forced to furnish every detail of its proceedings to the Mixed Financial 
Commission [a commission with both European and Ottoman official 
on it to oversee financial affairs], of which I have often spoken, and 
which will shortly assume a more general and positive character; 
whilst, in regard to the second, the Government has, in a similar spirit, 
resolved that proper rules should be laid down by the aforesaid 
Commission, and efficiently carried out by a Finance Department, 
constituted in a new basis, and containing Europeans with special 
knowledge required for the task assigned them.158 
 
The reform in the Ottoman financial system that Ambassador Bulwer sought did 
not happen as quickly as he might have anticipated. However, the eventual development 
of the Imperial Ottoman Bank (5 March 1863) did bring remarkable reform and order to 
the Ottoman financial system.  Interestingly, the Imperial Ottoman Bank did not develop 
out of pressure from either the British or French government; rather, it developed because 
the loans that the Empire attempted to float in 1860-1861 did not attract buyers (due to 
the chaos of Ottoman finances).159  Without the backing of the Imperial Ottoman Bank 
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(or the later Public Debt Administration), it became increasingly difficult for the Ottoman 
government to secure loans in Europe; eventually, almost every loan contracted by the 
Ottoman government came through one of these institutions.  This importance gave the 
banks, their bondholders, and their respective government important political influence in 
the Empire.  Consequently, seeking to establish this relationship, the Ottoman 
government promised the existing Ottoman Bank (a private British bank operating in the 
Ottoman Empire) the opportunity to become a “bank of issue,” if it would assist the 
Empire with a new loan.  The loan succeeded, and after combining with the French 
interest in the Ottoman Empire so that neither the French nor the British would have too 
strong a position in Ottoman finances, the Ottoman Bank became the Imperial Ottoman 
Bank.160 
The agreement for the establishment of the Imperial Ottoman Bank (signed by the 
Ottoman Foreign Minister, among others) included the following provisions (among 
others): 1) the bank had a thirty-year monopoly on the issue of bank-notes; 2) the 
Ottoman government promised not to issue “paper money during the lifetime of that 
concession;” 3) in Constantinople the bank would be responsible for all of the operations 
of the Ottoman Treasury; 4) the bank would pay [out of Ottoman funds] the 
government’s domestic and foreign debts; 5) it would be the government’s “financial 
agent for both domestic and foreign purposes;” and, 6) the Ottoman government 
promised not to tax the bank.161  While the Bank’s actual decision making bodies and 
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leaders resided in London and Paris, it is mistaken to thus perceive that the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank was a remote administrator of Ottoman finances.  While its decision 
makers resided in London and Paris, their representatives in Constantinople “had access 
to the government’s accounts, and indeed sometimes actually compiled them; they [the 
representatives of the decision makers] worked closely with Ottoman ministers and their 
senior officials…often meeting with them on a daily basis over long periods.”162  As 
citizens of the Ottoman Empire recognized the power of the foreign bankers, the Bank, in 
response to an outraged public, included a pasha as a token member of the decision 
making bodies.163  In spite of the enormous concessions to the Imperial Ottoman Bank, 
the Sublime Porte still had a limited capability to refuse the Bank’s demands.  However, 
as the Empire’s financial situation worsened, and the loans floated in Europe attracted 
                                                                                                                                                 
and André Autheman are the most authoritative scholars on the Imperial Ottoman Bank, 
both of whom have recently published a book on it.  The Ottoman Bank Archives and 
Research Centere (Istanbul) supported their research and published their books. 
Additionally, each has a number of articles on the subject.  However, both have written 
rather narrow histories of the Bank and not devoted themselves to the connection 
between the bank and imperialism (although the topic is not totally ignored).  The issue 
of the Imperial Ottoman Bank is one that scholars will find fruitful for study.  An 
important reason why scholars have not devoted themselves to this important topic is that 
most of the archives from the London branch have been recently destroyed, and the 
archives in Paris are apparently quite narrow.  Further, only recently have the documents 
in Istanbul been made available for scholars, but these are in Ottoman Turkish, and, 
consequently, beyond the linguistic abilities of many scholars of European imperialism.  
See, Edhem Eldem, “Archive Survey: The (Imperial) Ottoman Bank, Istanbul,” Financial 
History Review 6 (1999): 85-92.  Also worth noting is Jacques Thobie, Intérêtes et 
impérialisme français dans l’Empire ottoman: 1895-1914 Série Sorbonne, vol. 4 (Paris: 
Impr. nationale, 1977); however this book obviously deals with France and it 
concentrates on a period outside the scope of the chronological interest of this chapter. 
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fewer investors, the position of the Bank in relation to the rest of the Ottoman 
government rose, especially after the failure of a loan in 1873 (discussed below). 
As the original five year charter that administered relations between the Porte and 
the Bank expired, the two sought a new convention regulating relations between 
themselves.  This new convention included all of the provisions of the original charter, 
but, the 1873 Convention provided the following additional powers to the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank: 1) to assuage foreign investors, the Bank accepted the responsibility to 
make sure the Ottoman debt was “maintained, [and] drawing the necessary funds” from 
the treasury; 2) it established branch offices; 3) included provisions that increased the 
profitability of the bank; and 4) the Bank had an ex officio representative on the 
commission that developed the official Ottoman budget.164  Based on these provisions, 
the present historical expert on the Imperial Ottoman Bank, Christopher Clay, 
characterizes it as “perhaps the most powerful of the European financial institutions 
operating in the non-Western world.”165 The Bank’s power grew as the Imperial Ottoman 
Bank absorbed other private European banks, including the Austro-Ottoman Bank,166 
operating in the Empire.  The Bank simultaneously developed into the trésorier-payeur 
general for the entire Empire.167  Historian Christopher Clay contends that the Bank had 
become so powerful with the addition of privileges (from the 1873 Convention) that “the 
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arrangement amounted to a voluntary acceptance by the Porte of foreign supervision and, 
indeed control, of its finances.”168 
Although the Sultan, the European powers, and the bondholders of the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank were satisfied with the position of the Bank, members of the Ottoman 
government (as well as the previously mentioned Ottoman citizens) objected to the 
Bank’s power and influence, claiming that a foreign bank had “complete control over 
national income and expenditure.”169  This internal opposition required the Sultan to seek 
to revise the relationship between the Bank and the Ottoman state.  The specifics of this 
amendment are less important than the Sultan’s inability to achieve his goals, which 
sought to assert the authority of the state over the Bank.  The Sultan could not force his 
new demands on the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and the Bank did not grant a single 
concession to the Sultan.170 
Although the Imperial Ottoman Bank was a powerful entity in 1875, the influence 
of European financial imperialism did not fully begin until the Sultan suspended payment 
on his debts, leading to the creation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration 
(discussed in Chapter V).  The Public Debt Administration (in which the Germans 
increasingly participated, was formed in the Decree of Muharrem (1881); it developed 
parallel to, but did not replace, the Imperial Ottoman Bank. However, as discussed below, 
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the Public Debt Administration became a more assertive and imperialistic tool, extending 
its imperial powers beyond those of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. 
British Involvement in Ottoman Construction, Military, and Governmental Affairs 
 As English commercial and economic imperialism began to exert itself in the 
eighteen-forties and fifties, the British began to involve themselves in the construction of 
a transportation network in the Ottoman Empire.  The development of this transportation 
network, specifically railroads and ports, accelerated the extension of British (and quickly 
German) imperial influence in the Ottoman Empire. These railroads contributed to the 
acceleration of Great Power imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, because they permitted 
increased trade and mercantile commercial development as well as by extending 
economic (i.e. banking monopolies) influence in the area.  The combination of financial 
(banking and trade) and transportation (railroad and ports) monopolies in areas of the 
Ottoman Empire tended to facilitate the ability of individual powers to identify specific 
areas of the Ottoman Empire as imperial territory.  Additionally, the construction of these 
railroads increased the financial obligations owed by the Empire to the Powers.  Finally, 
the concessions granted for the construction of these imperial railroads provided the 
imperial powers with limited ownership rights over lands adjacent to the tracks, 
sometimes as far as twenty kilometers on each side.171 The scale of this railroad 
development can be illustrated by the fact that, as late as 1850, the Ottoman Empire did 
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not have a single railroad track,172 but, by 1900, the Empire (excluding Egypt) had 
seventy-five hundred kilometers of new track.173  In addition to a non-existent rail 
system, the development of steam ships in the 1830s made the Empire’s ports 
increasingly obsolete.  Consequently, the Powers also constructed what became the four 
principal mid- and late nineteenth-century Ottoman ports.  Between 1840 and 1914, the 
efforts and ambitions of the imperial Powers transformed the transportation network of 
the Ottoman Empire and accelerated the imposition of Great Power imperialism on the 
Empire.   
Explaining these changes, Charles Issawi contends that three factors contributed 
to the European interest in developing a transportation network in the Ottoman Empire; 
these factors were: “the region’s location, the pattern of growth of steam navigation, and 
the rivalries of the Great Powers.”174  Responding to these needs and conditions, the 
British, French, and Germans built nearly all of the railroads and ports within the 
Ottoman Empire between 1853 and 1914, and used this investment to extend their 
imperial influence in the Empire.   
A clear precedent for the construction of railroads and transportation networks as 
tools of imperialism existed in British India; however, the relationship between railroads 
and imperialism extended beyond India and even beyond the boundaries of the British 
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Empire.175  In fact, Ronald Robinson (of the Robinson and Gallagher Controversy 
mentioned in Chapter II) contends that “Industrialized Europe cast its imperial influence 
over much of a still agrarian world in the half century before 1914 by building railways in 
other people’s countries.”176  Although the British occasionally built railroads “merely” 
for economic gain, “the chief rational for building the railroad…[was that it] would serve 
as an arm of imperial strategy…”177 Consequently, the construction of railroads and ports 
in the Ottoman Empire illustrates that while a particular form of imperialism was 
established for the Ottoman Empire, the differences between this form of imperialism and 
the general nineteenth-century imperialism were not so great as to obscure the imperial 
objective of the Europeans in the Ottoman Empire. 
The parallels between the development of imperial railroads in the Ottoman 
Empire and India extended beyond the simple decision to build such railroads.  The 
parallels extended to the planning and financing of the railroads, because, in both cases, 
the government in imperial territory maintained “the ultimate control over the quantity 
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and direction of railway investment,”178 although the railroads, in both India and the 
Ottoman Empire, were constructed to meet British imperial aims.179  Moreover, in both 
territories, the local government financed the railroads through a combination of local 
funds and bonds floated in Europe (principally, but not exclusively, London).180  The 
British generally only worried about the beginning and the end of the railway (and not the 
stops in between and did not pay for the construction), these railways served British (and 
later German) imperial interests because they: 1) permitted the establishment of a 
recognized imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire, without formal colonies; 2)  
permitted improvements in the internal administration (which facilitated trade) and the 
ability of the military to meet immediate security needs (and to protect the 
“overland”/Suez route);181 3) provided a promising investment as the Ottoman 
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government guaranteed a return on each kilometer of rail constructed;182 4) the 
construction of such large industrial projects required an enormous amount of money, 
permitting the imperial powers to extend additional loans and advance their economic 
imperialism; 5) they provided an opportunity to increase trade with the imperial 
territory,183 as the railroads tended to “play a major role in providing inexpensive raw 
materials, foodstuffs and markets for manufactures to the country whose capital 
constructed the railroad,”184 and, 6) the concessions provided limited ownership rights to 
the Great Powers along the route of the railroad track, sometimes as much as twenty 
kilometers on each side.185 Generally, the British established themselves in Western 
Anatolia “after the construction of railroads in that region in the early 1860s,” and the 
French established themselves in Syria.  Beginning in the 1880s, the Germans adopted 
this model of imperialism and “applied it to Central and Southeastern Anatolia.”186 
The intent of the Great Powers was evident, but Ottoman citizens pressured their 
government to facilitate the construction of railroads, because such construction provided 
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access to the world market, and better movement for the domestic market.187  Ottoman 
officials inclined to reform (so called Tanzimat officials) also pressured the government 
to construct railroads, as a step towards modernization.  However, without foreign 
assistance, the Porte could not meet this demand because the former did not possess the 
necessary technical expertise188 or financing.  In fact, Ottoman efforts to construct 
railroads failed, with one exception, because they lacked the technological knowledge.  
For example, one railroad constructed, without European assistance, could not climb the 
track because the grade was too steep.189  Thus, the Porte had to rely on the British, 
French, or Germans to construct railroads within its boarders, and, consequently, a reform 
intended to emancipate the Empire from western economic influence “made them [the 
Ottomans] more dependant…[and] made the whole process of penetration a great deal 
more easy.”190   
The necessity of permitting the Powers to construct the railroads within the 
Ottoman Empire and the external trade that it facilitated “emerg[ed] as one of the key 
developments in the partitioning of the Empire” in the years before the First World 
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War.191 The combination of the transportation monopoly that developed from the 
construction of these railroads and the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention 
(and the similar conventions signed between the Porte and other Powers) permitted 
increased imperial control over portions of the Ottoman Empire.  Thus, while the railroad 
facilitated access to world markets, its construction also enabled the European Powers to 
exert their influence in portions of the Ottoman Empire without formally colonizing it.  
This occurred because the railroad construction (as previously mentioned) facilitated the 
ability of the imperial power to establish a mercantile relationship with a portion of the 
Ottoman Empire; these territories (which became increasingly associated with specific 
powers) provided inexpensive raw materials to the imperial power and imported 
manufactured goods from the imperial power.192  Further, “in many instances, the only 
banks in the region [where Powers constructed railroads] were owned by the capital of 
the same country.  The monopoly position enjoyed by the capital of that European 
country in extending agricultural and commercial credit and in transportation blocked 
commercial competition from other European Powers.”193 Eventually, the Powers 
furthered their investments in “their” regions of the Empire by building utilities and ports 
(where appropriate) along these same railroad routes.  As the British lost influence in the 
Ottoman Empire (in this case because British companies sold their railroads to the 
French), a British foreign office official lamented: “there now remains, therefore, only 
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one British railway in Asia Minor, that of the Smyrna-Adin Line.   As our future 
influence and the prosperity of this country must to a considerable extent depend on the 
continued success of this company as a British undertaking…” (emphasis added).194   
 Although the British were the first Power to construct railroads in the Empire,195 
other Powers rapidly recognized the value of such construction and thus became involved 
in the building of Ottoman railroads.  Among these other powers, Austria-Hungary made 
the most significant contribution (before the rise of German influence), because an 
Austrian, Baron Hirsch, connected Constantinople to Vienna via the Oriental Railway 
(completed in 1888).196  Hirsch’s accomplishments were eclipsed, however, by the 
eventual contributions of Germany.  German involvement in the Ottoman railroad 
industry began in 1872, when the Ottoman government invited the well known Engineer 
Wilhelm von Pressel, to develop a comprehensive plan for the construction of railroads in 
the Empire (while von Pressel was German, it is premature to believe that his invitation 
signaled the beginning of the extension of German power into the Ottoman Empire, 
rather he should be viewed as an individual instead of as a representative of German 
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imperial power).  Pressel completed this task, and the Porte accepted his proposal, which 
called for a trunk line from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf (2,700 km) and eventually 
another eighteen-hundred miles of branch tracks.197  The purpose of this line, the 
Anatolian Railway, was to connect Constantinople with the provincial capitals.   
The Porte considered a reliable connection between Constantinople and the 
provincial capitals to be an important goal, because the distant provinces conventionally 
operated with only the most minimal of oversight from the Ottoman government; due, 
partially, to the difficulties of travel.198 Recognizing the imperial potential of this railroad 
(although there was no reason, beyond the size of this railroad that it had greater imperial 
potential than other railroads in the Empire), other Powers, including the British (usually 
private companies supported by their governments attempted to construct these 
railroads), sought to build this line.  An official of the Foreign Office, A.H. Layard, wrote 
to the Marquis of Salisbury on 5 August 1878: 
The Duke of Sutherland has requested me to inform the Grand Vizier 
that he [the Duke of Sutherland] is the President of an Association [sic.] 
for the construction of a railway from Constantinople to the Persian 
Gulf, and to obtain from his Highness a promise that his 
scheme…should have the preference over any other that may be 
submitted to the Porte on equal terms. 
 
…Several schemes for a similar railway have been submitted to the 
Porte by various European capitalists and speculators…199 
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Eventually, a German company received the contract for the line, and, by 1900, more 
than a thousand kilometers had been laid.200  The combined efforts and ambitions of the 
imperial Powers led to the completion of approximately seventy-five hundred kilometers 
of railroad track in the Ottoman Empire by 1900.201  However, this construction catalyzed 
the imperial partitioning of the Empire and led individual powers to assert increasingly 
powerful imperial claims (unofficially). 
 In addition to building thousands of kilometers of railroad track, the European 
imperial powers also constructed port facilities in Salonica (on the Gulf of Salonica in 
modern day Greece), İzmir (on the Aegean Sea), Beirut, and Constantinople, these 
became the Empire’s four principal ports.202  These port facilities, while receiving less 
scholarly attention than the railroads, also contributed to the extension of European 
imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.  Much like railroads, ports permitted the extension 
of Great Power imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, because they: 1) provided a 
recognized area of imperial territory without formal colonization; and, 2) permitted an 
accelerated trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe (some of the ports permitted 
only ships from specific countries, and sometimes only from specific companies, to 
utilize them).  Additionally, like the land ownership along the railroad tracks, these ports 
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had an imperial element—monopoly privileges.  These monopolies provided foreign 
companies control in “port areas;” the companies used these monopolies to break the 
power of the established Ottoman unions by hiring non-union or foreign workers.203  
Before the development of these privileges, Ottoman workers ferried merchandise to the 
ships anchored in deeper water.  This labor intensive process permitted a strong union 
influence in Ottoman commercial affairs.  The preference for European (or alternatively 
non-union, but Ottoman) port workers contributed to the strengthening of central control 
in the Ottoman Empire, because, until the Powers displaced them, the worker’s unions 
had restricted the Porte’s ability to administer activity in costal areas.204 
 Although this study generally does not consider French imperialism, it is 
important to note that the completion of the Suez Canal by a French company subsidized 
by the state, increased the British imperial interest in the Ottoman Empire.  Initially, the 
British opposed the canal, fearing it would jeopardize their position in the Ottoman 
Empire (and especially in Egypt).205  Earl Russell explained his concern to his superior at 
the Foreign Office about the disquieting potential for the canal to encourage French 
colonial settlements in Suez; Russell wrote: 
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The Sublime Porte must be well aware from that Report that the 
difference between 10,264 hectares and 1,784 hectares represents the 
difference which exists between the quantity of land required for the 
purpose of the Canal of Suez according to the judgment of an honest 
and dispassionate observer, and the quantity which may be required for 
the purposes of colonization, fortifications, and barracks, according to 
the ambitious calculations of those who wish to wrest the dominion of 
Egypt from the Sultan and his successors.206 
 
 In spite of British concerns, the overwhelming majority of the ships that 
ultimately utilized the canal came from Britain.  Eventually, the British came to protect 
the Suez Canal as they had the “overland route.”  As this interest in the protection of the 
Suez Canal became a national concern; Baron Henry de Worms, asked the House of 
Commons if the English, in light of the importance of the Suez Canal to British 
communications and commerce with India, would propose an international conference to 
recognize the preponderance of British interests in the Suez Canal.  Specifically, he 
wished for Parliament to seek permission for the British to take “the necessary measures 
to prevent the communications of England with India from being interrupted by any 
Power.”207  Thus, Suez, while not constructed by the British, increased British imperial 
interests in the Ottoman Empire. 
The construction of railroads and ports in Ottoman territories not only 
transformed the economic relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the West, but it 
also changed the relationship between the Ottoman government and its people.  A 
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consequence of the large scale construction of railroads was that, for the first time, the 
Ottoman government could extend itself relatively quickly into most of its empire.  
Before the development of the railroad, the Porte had so little authority in some of its 
territories that merchandise traveling between provinces faced informal “taxes” from 
provincial leaders as well as threats from brigands (in 1857, brigands pillaged a caravan 
leaving Baghdad and made off with more than five million Turkish liras worth of 
cargo).208  This expansion of the Ottoman government’s ability to extend itself into the 
provinces was accompanied by a Tribal Pacification Program, which led the Ottoman 
government to administer provinces more effectively than it had in decades.209  This 
increased central control enhanced the imperial opportunities of the Powers by removing 
threats from brigands and illegal tariffs that provincial leaders often imposed on cargo 
transported through (or from) their province.  The British railroads recognized these 
security concerns and, under guidance from Ottoman officials, these railroads sometimes 
initially bypassed areas of economic importance in favor of areas of military 
significance.210 
 In addition to contributing to major changes in the infrastructure of the Ottoman 
Empire, the British model of imperialism also emphasized the support and enhancement 
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of the Ottoman military forces.211  Robinson and Gallagher’s “imperialism of free trade” 
(explained earlier), emphasized the imperial power not becoming directly involved in the 
imperial territory.  Instead, the imperialism existed through (among others): 1) the 
imposition of free trade conditions on the imperial territory; 2) pressure for the imperial 
territory to organize and direct its economic activities to meet the needs and surpluses of 
the imperial power; 3) taking over by European bankers and merchants of the domestic 
economies of the imperial territory.212  Implementing such conditions on the Ottoman 
Empire required the latter to be able to defend itself against external pressure (i.e. 
maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire) as well as to control its 
provinces213 (recall that Robinson and Gallagher contend that the move from imperialism 
to colonialism occurs because of internal conflicts that require the imperial power to 
intervene, thus stability in the Empire decreased the likelihood of the necessity of 
imposing colonialism).214  Consequently, while the importation of weapons or military 
advisors was quite common in the nineteenth-century, it had an imperial purpose in the 
Ottoman Empire.  Moreover, the importation of European military technology and tactics 
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resulted in Ottoman education becoming increasingly western, as it sought to emphasize 
science and European languages over traditional Islamic education. 
Once among the most feared fighters in all of the Eurasia, the Turks were 
marginal and in some cases, ineffective, soldiers by the nineteenth-century. Comprised of 
three components, a slave army, a territorial army, and an auxiliary army, the nineteenth-
century Ottoman military resembled the forces of Slueyman the Magnificent (1520-
1566)215 more than a modern European military.  The Porte recognized this, and 
instituted reforms intended to modernize the Ottoman armies in the eighteenth-century; 
however, the Russo-Turkish War of 1767-1774, which produced the previously discussed 
Treaty of Kuçhuk Kaynarja, and the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt illustrated the 
insufficiency of these military reforms.216  Part of the reason these reforms failed was the 
overt resistance, and even open revolt, from the Janissary Corps,217 which had been the 
basis of Ottoman armies for centuries.  Unable to completely disband the Janissary 
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(initially), Sultan Mahmud II, who disliked the Janissary for both their resistance to 
reform and the power they had, even sufficient power to depose a Sultan,218 debased the 
Janissary by removing the standards that had previously guarded entrance into it. 
Consequently, a British observer in 1799 could write, “[the] character [of the Janissary 
Corps] has been more than proportionally degraded, and many of them are notoriously 
stigmatized for cowardice, theft and the vilest crimes, whist others, enervated by a city 
life and the practice of the lowest trades have nothing military but the name of janizary 
[sic.].”219  Eventually, in 1826, Mahmud II disbanded the Janissary Corps.  The 
destruction of the Janissary Corps, starting with the dilution of its power, and then the 
decision to destroy it, marked the end of the traditional Ottoman army; henceforth, the 
Ottoman Empire would look to Europe, specifically Britain and Germany (and to a lesser 
degree France), to provision and direct the army.220 
 The reorganization of the Turkish army had been underway since the eighteenth-
century, but acquired new importance with the destruction of the Janissary (who refused 
to accept western reforms) and the implementation of the Tanzimat (1839-1876).  
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However, even after the removal of the Janissary, the Ottoman government did not 
implement sufficient reforms for European technology and tactics to be effective. An 
example of this insufficiency was the failure to deviate, in the mid-1820s, from the 
established theory that military leaders were born as such, and thus did not need 
significant specialized training or education.  Not only did this decision prevent Ottoman 
military officers from receiving the necessary education to lead a modern army, but it 
also meant that the “new” officer corps consisted of officers from the Janissary (and other 
branches of the old Ottoman army).221   
The arrival of the Prussian Field Marshal Helmut von Moltke in Constantinople, 
in 1835, is a reasonable beginning for considerations of imperialism and the Turkish 
army.222  However, even von Moltke’s efforts, while considerable, did not result in major 
changes, due to the Ottoman-Egyptian War of 1839, and the death of Sultan Mahmud II 
six days after the war’s conclusion.223  Mahmud II’s successor (Abdulhamid, 1839-1861) 
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carried on the reform movement, and by the early eighteen-forties, the organization of the 
Ottoman army resembled a modern European force.224 
 The use of foreign advisors to modernize an army is not, by itself, particularly 
imperialistic.  However, the reorganization of the Ottoman military along European lines 
did produce significant changes in Ottoman society (which facilitated imperialism); one 
such change developed in the Ottoman educational system.  To produce soldiers and 
officers prepared to utilize modern military equipment and tactics, an understanding of 
mathematics, European languages, and, most importantly, science, was essential.  A 
recent study of Ottoman educational reform contends: “modernization and scientization 
[sic.] became intrinsically linked together and a direct relationship was acknowledged to 
exist between modern Western science and Ottoman military revival.”225  Consequently, 
the ulema (Islamic religious establishment), which conventionally administered the 
Ottoman educational system and emphasized the development of the “perfect Muslim,” 
(and thus did not teach modern science or western languages), was gradually replaced by 
an educational system that emphasized science.  The first such reform movement was the 
development of the rüşdiyes, which instructed graduates of the ulema in grammar, 
history, science and mathematics.  This reform movement reached an apex in 1839 when 
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secular education became the norm.226  Increasingly, primary Ottoman education focused 
on the study of European languages, science, while specialized education (often from 
early ages, especially in the case of the military) occurred in modern diplomacy, the 
military, law, etc. Sultan Mahmud II began the process of westernizing education to 
improve the military, and, by 1860, the Empire had its first staff college.227  Further 
examples of this specialized, western education were the Mülkive Mektebi schools, which 
trained future Ottoman diplomats, and was based on the French Grandes Ecole,228 and 
the Mühendishâne military academy.229  Referring to the Galatasaray Lycée, a secondary 
school whose language of instruction was French, a recent scholar wrote that the French 
supported this “hoping to include the Ottoman Empire in their colonial…mission.”230 
 Not only did the Ottoman Empire face the problems of an antiquated military and 
an educational system based on religion, it also lagged behind in military technology (by 
the 1840s).  During the late eighteenth-century, the Empire made enough weapons to be 
considered self-sufficient, and a recent scholar explains that the “Ottoman production of 
firearms…[was within] the technological mainstream in the 1790s.”.231  In spite of this 
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assertion, which implies that the quality of Ottoman firearm production approximately 
equaled that of the Powers, in 1799 William Eaton observed: 
Their [Ottoman] musket-barrels are much esteemed, but they are too 
heavy; nor do they possess any quality superior to common iron 
barrels, which have been much hammered, and are of soft Swedish 
iron.  They are thus made: round a rod of iron they twist soft old iron 
wire and forge it; then they bore out the rod, part of which often 
remains, according as the wire was thick or thin, and the bore large or 
small…232 
 
 Regardless of whether the Ottoman firearms met the technological standards of 
the Powers in 1800 or not, by 1840, the western advances in rifled barrels made Ottoman 
arms factories obsolete.233 Henceforth, the latter would require a massive importation of 
European arms, tactics, and instruction, first from Britain then from Germany.234   
 Based on the recognition that the Ottoman Empire would import arms instead of 
attempting to manufacture them, the Times (London) reported: 
The Turkish Government lately resolved to re-arm the whole of their 
infantry, and to adopt the best rifle that could be found.  For a long time 
already they had been converting their muzzle loaders to Sniders, but 
these have been superseded in the estimation of the best authorities by 
certain small-bore rifles, it was determined to adopt one of the latter.  In 
consequence of this determination of the Government there have been 
recently gathered together in Pera agents of all the known rifle 
manufacturers in the world…the Sultan himself cut short the questions 
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[to the rifle manufacturers] with all their complications by deciding in 
favor of the Martini-Henry rifle…As all the patents for the Martinin-
Henry rifle are held in England by one company, the order will 
necessarily be executed in that country.235  
 
Essentially, from 1840 until the conclusion of the First World War, the Ottoman army 
remained dependant on European weapons and leadership to rectify its two great 
deficiencies: discipline and technology.236 
Capitulating to the reality that the Empire could not compete with European 
weapons, domestic military production shifted to clothing and other such low-tech 
military needs; however, this placed the Ottoman Empire in a precarious position.  
Ottoman officials recognized the danger in becoming dependant on one foreign country 
for weapons; thus, the Empire elected to import arms from all the European powers,237 
although England initially had the greatest share.  However, this policy effectively 
translated into the following reality: while the purchase of individual rifles and pistols 
issued to an Ottoman soldier might come from any of the European powers, or even the 
United States, Germany provided the overwhelming proportion of the Empire’s artillery 
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and Britain provided the overwhelming proportion of the Empire’s naval technology and 
ships.238  While the impressive English position in the sale of arms to the Ottoman 
Empire, before 1880, was not hegemonic, after the Germans began to extend themselves 
into the Ottoman Empire in the 1880s, the English position fell and the German position 
increased.239   
The transformation of the Ottoman military, in terms of both military technology, 
discipline, and its educational system, is an important component in the extension of 
European imperialism in the Empire.  As Robinson and Gallagher indicated in their 
theory of “imperialism of free trade” the European powers preferred not to intervene 
directly in the security and administration of the imperial territory.  However, the 
weakness of the Ottoman military, which made it vulnerable from within as well as from 
external powers, had to be corrected.  With the modernization of the Ottoman army, the 
Ottoman military could extend its influence and protection throughout the principal 
Ottoman territories.  Additionally, the Tribal Pacification Program that accompanied the 
improvement of the Ottoman military permitted greater (and “freer”) European trade with 
the provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
In addition to transforming the Ottoman economy, infrastructure, and military, 
British imperial influence also began to exert influence over Ottoman domestic politics.  
The most important example of this is the British effort to end the slave trade in the 
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Ottoman Empire.240 The British effort to end the slave trade did not originate in the 
Ottoman Empire; rather, this was a policy that the British adopted in the eighteen-forties 
for their colonies.  The British first incorporated this into their Ottoman policy in 1847, 
when British pressure “encouraged” the Sultan to issue a ferman (order) giving the 
British the right to search suspected slave ships and to seize them if they indeed had 
slaves aboard.  British control of the Gulf made this easier, but slave traders still sought 
to continue their trade in spite of this British naval supremacy.  The policy culminated in 
1880 with the Anglo-Ottoman Slave Trade Convention.241  While the details of the 
British anti-slave trade movement in the Ottoman Empire are interesting they are less 
important than the recognition that the British extended this colonial policy to the 
Ottoman Empire.   
British Cultural Imperialism  
 In addition to controlling Ottoman finances, being the primary recipient and 
originator for goods traded from and with the Ottoman Empire, building a transportation 
network intended to advance imperial interests (at Ottoman expense), and contributing to 
the restructuring of the Ottoman military and educational systems, the British engaged in 
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an active policy of appropriating Ottoman treasures and artifacts.  Much as the 
construction of transportation networks or the control of Ottoman finances contributed to 
Great Power imperialism, the appropriation and display of archaeological treasures 
contributed to imperial relationship between England and the Ottoman Empire.242  The 
purpose of this section is to introduce the imperial elements in the British appropriation 
and display of archaeological artifacts from the Ottoman Empire, as well as briefly 
introduce the importance of such manifestations of imperialism.   
European interest in Ottoman archaeology, and to be more precise, the 
archaeological artifacts, developed from late eighteenth-century Hellenism;243 
consequently, Europeans initially sought Greek artifacts.  The modern appropriation of 
Ottoman artifacts (and in this case only technically Ottoman, because Greece was, in the 
eighteenth-century, part of the Empire) began with the Comte de Choiseul-Gouffier in 
1784, but the most recognized of the early appropriations came in 1800 from the British 
expedition led by Lord Elgin.  Lord Elgin’s appropriation of the friezes from the 
Parthenon on the Acropolis catalyzed British archaeological interest in the Ottoman 
Empire.244 Beginning with the appropriation of the marble friezes, the British began a 
sustained campaign that uncovered and appropriated archaeological artifacts from the 
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Ottoman Empire, most notably in Egypt, Mesopotamia (present day Iraq), and the area 
around the Red Sea.  These discoveries occurred concurrently with the broader European 
movement to build national museums intended to “represent and celebrate the nation.”245 
These museums were to “assert an identity, [and] a ‘public culture,’”246 that transcended 
politics and even royalty; archaeological artifacts from the Ottoman Empire formed the 
core collection for many of these museums (including the British Museum, the “national 
museum” of England).   
 Parliament founded the British Museum in 1756, and among its original collection 
were Egyptian “lamps, papyri, and other small artifacts” from the collector Hans 
Slone.247 As previously mentioned, British archaeological interests extended beyond 
Egypt, as English archaeologists appropriated the friezes from the Parthenon, treasures 
from Mesopotamia, and artifacts from the area around the Red Sea.  The collection of 
artifacts from the Ottoman Empire was so intense, that, by middle of the nineteenth-
century, the British Museum’s general collection “concentrated almost entirely on ancient 
Rome, Greece, Egypt and Mesopotamia.”248  The collection of these artifacts continued 
throughout the century, and, in 1888, a contemporary author wrote: “The department of 
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Egyptian and Assyrian Antiques is constantly receiving additions…[that are] of infinite 
importance.”249 Although many of the excavations that produced these artifacts 
originated privately, the British government (usually through the British Museum) 
eventually accepted financial responsibility for most excavations in the Ottoman 
Empire.250  Moreover, the discovery and study of these artifacts received significant 
attention in the British press (depending on the artifact, some artifacts, such as mummies 
received more attention than others),251 and British citizens recognized it as a component 
of imperialism.  Part of the reason that these Ottoman artifacts can be considered imperial 
is that similar Indian artifacts (and to a lesser degree, artifacts from other parts of the  
British Empire) had been appropriated and displayed in England (imperial museums 
existed all over the British Isles).252  Even where individuals may not have had the 
opportunity to encounter imperial artifacts personally (for geographic, economic, or 
social reasons), this form of imperialism would not necessarily have been foreign to 
them.  One manner in which the display of imperial artifacts diffused to the greater 
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population was though the visual art of the period, and, specifically, the art that depicted 
the Ottoman Empire, which concentrated on two general themes, “[the] archaeological 
and [the] Biblical.”253     
The Ottoman government, contrary to some historical accounts,254 recognized the 
value of the artifacts excavated and appropriated by the Europeans.  In a limited effort to 
curtail this activity, the Ottoman government began to develop its own museum, refused 
to grant permits for European excavators, and passed the Antiquities Law of 1874, the 
Antiquities Law of 1884, and the Antiquities Law of 1906.  However, due to the strength 
of the European position in the Ottoman Empire, these efforts failed to check European 
seizures of Ottoman artifacts, and, in many cases, these laws and restrictions were simply 
ignored.255 For example, historian Wendy Shaw described Heinrich Schliemann’s willful 
disobedience to Ottoman law in the following way: “By the time Schliemann excavated 
Troy in 1870, the Ottoman government had established a pattern of granting foreigners 
permission to excavate…half of the antiquities found would go to the Ottoman 
government…Schliemann broke [the] agreement and secretly exported all of his finds to 
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Greece in 1874.”256  This disregard for Ottoman sovereignty continued after the First 
World War257 and was evident to the Turkish delegation to the Lusanne Conference, 
where the position of Turkey was negotiated by the Allies and the Turks.  At the 
conference, the mal-treatment of the issue of “antiques and archaeological research” by 
the Allies provoked strenuous protests from the Turkish delegation,258 who insisted on 
increased authority over their land and artifacts.   
The importance of these artifacts originated from the general informality of the 
British Empire (as previously discussed),259 which, according to a recent scholar, 
“…featur[ed] [very] little in the concerns of the great majority of early and mid-
Victorians...”260  If the great majority of Victorian Britons did not find the Empire a part 
of their daily existence, providing evidence of British imperial activity might have 
assumed an increased importance.  A recent study of nineteenth-century British art 
contends that “artists were generally very careful to depict archaeologically correct 
backdrops and objects, easily corroborated by the viewer form knowledge of the many 
objects in the British Museum.”261  This indicates that at least a significant proportion of 
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the artistically inclined citizens of Britain were familiar with the displays in the museum.  
A contemporary author writing about the museum wrote: “So many people have visited 
the British Museum that it is not necessary to give more than a few brief particulars of its 
characteristics.”262 Moreover, such displays addressed foreign audiences as well, by 
defining British imperial interests; the development of world fairs and exhibitions 
accelerated the ability of the Powers to use art and artifacts to define their imperial 
influence.  Even cursory considerations of the Great Exhibition of 1851, the Antwerp 
Expedition of 1894, etc. indicate that the display of imperial artifacts and treasure had a 
profound influence on the domestic, as well as foreign, population.263  
 The use of artifacts, whether in “national museums” or great exhibitions, to clarify 
the relationship between the imperial power (Britain) and the imperial territory (the 
Ottoman Empire) is only one example of the broader use of culture to advance 
imperialism.  Artifacts are an unusually effective tool in explaining this, because, in many 
cases, the value in them is inherently obvious (i.e. they are valuable if for no other reason 
than they are made of valuable materials), and they could not have been appropriated 
without taking them from the imperial territory (which is itself an illustration of imperial 
power).  However, the display of artifacts is far from the only example of the use of 
culture to convey imperialism.  The scholar most associated with the study of the 
relationship between culture and imperialism is Edward Said, whose books Orientalism 
and Culture and Imperialism catalyzed the debate about the relationship between the 
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European Powers and the nineteenth-century Middle East by focusing on the association 
between culture and imperialism. 
 Said’s principal contention was that the nineteenth-century academic discipline of 
Oriental Studies facilitated the imposition of European imperialism on the territories of 
the Ottoman Empire.  While Said provided other characteristics for the Orientalism that 
he studied, he defined nineteenth-century Orientalism in the following way: “…in short, 
Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over 
the Orient.”264  As explained in the first chapter of this study, Said contends that 
imperialism precedes colonialism and he further argues that “it can be achieved by 
economic, social, or cultural dependence.”265  Among the indicators of this dependence, 
Said used novels (but paintings, and other such representations would be appropriate as 
well) to illustrate the significance of the British and French (he devotes almost no 
attention to German) cultural influence in the Ottoman Empire. 
 Conventionally, literary scholars have understood nineteenth-century British 
literature to have had only a peripheral interest in the British Empire.  Said disagrees and 
his works argue that through consideration of novels by Charles Dickens, Daniel Defoe, 
Jane Austen, and others, the literature of Victorian England had a powerful influence in 
clarifying the relationship between Britain and the Middle East.266  Although Said’s 
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methods have been criticized, it is useful to briefly consider a few examples, most 
importantly, his treatment of Dickens’ novel Great Expectations, completed in 1861.  
Said devotes considerable attention to this novel, but the aspect of this consideration that 
is important is Dickens’ classification of Egypt (which did not join the British Empire 
until 1882) as “a British overseas territory;”267 Said also connects the activities of Henry 
James’ character Ralph Touchett from Portrait of a Lady (1880, serialized in the Atlantic 
Monthly before its publication as a book in 1881) in Egypt and Algeria with imperialism 
in the Ottoman Empire.268 
 Critics object to Said’s use of few sentences about Egypt or Algeria to claim that 
these Victorian novels belong not only “squarely within the metropolitan history of 
British fiction,”269 but also in the study of imperialism.270  However, the debate about 
Said’s use of sources is less important here than the recognition that nineteenth-century 
authors such as Dickens and James referred, as early as the 1860s, to Egypt as a part of a 
British overseas territory.  Indeed, one of the criticisms of Said is factual, claiming that, 
in 1861, Egypt belonged to the Ottoman Empire and not to England.271 Consequently, the 
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number and frequency of Dickens’ statements about Egypt is less important than the 
recognition that he considered it, in 1860, to be an area under British control.272 
 Although Said does not devote himself to the study or consideration of visual art, 
it is worth noting that some British painters paid particular attention to the Ottoman 
Empire.  Regrettably, scholars have not devoted themselves to the study of “the 
objectification of Islamic nations…in British academic painting…”,273 but it is possible to 
appreciate that the “academic paintings focusing on an exotic or decadent Islamic Egypt 
worked to justify contemporary imperial policies…”274 often before the formal British 
colonization of Egypt.  Similarly, visual arts justified the imperial relationship between 
Britain and her other imperial territories.275    
 Although scholars have not completed a comprehensive study of the relationship 
between British art and the Ottoman Empire, it is clear that individual artists in this 
period found a commercial market for their depictions of the East.  One such artist (who 
was Scottish, but whose works sold in London and throughout England) was David 
Roberts (1796-1864).  Roberts traveled to the Ottoman Empire following the completion 
of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention in 1838 and remained there, principally 
                                                 
272
 Said also does not devote much attention to newspapers and magazines. One satirical 
magazine, Punch, published satires on Egypt and the Ottoman Empire.  Notably, most of 
the places in the magazine were either prominent in international affairs or British 
imperial territories.  See: Unsigned, “That Infidel Earl!” Punch 11 November 1882, 222. 
 
273
 Monger, 11. 
 
274
 Ibid. 
 
275
 Kamille T.H. Parkinson, “Philip John Bainbrigge and the Group of 1838: Imperial 
Landscapes and The Colonial Art Scene in Canada,” (Ph.D. diss., Queen’s University 
(Ontario, Canada), 2005). 
 
121 
in Egypt and Syria, for more than a year. Robert’s paintings did not concentrate on 
depictions of persons (as one might expect if Said had considered visual art), but rather 
on “accurate representations of architecture and landscape.”276  The use of visual arts, 
such as those by Roberts, had an established imperial context.  Roberts’ paintings existed 
within a context in which “the formation of the Victorian public’s image of India and 
Africa owed much to the work of British landscape painters traveling abroad.”277  Finally, 
it is worth noting that beyond visual arts, archaeological artifacts, architecture, and 
literature an additional way in which cultural imperialism manifest itself was through the 
display of animals from colonies and imperial territories in British zoos278  —for 
example, the birth of a camel in Manchester was deemed worthy of coverage in the Times 
(London)279 .   
Conclusion 
The British involvement in the Ottoman Empire, including control of Ottoman 
finances, changes in Ottoman military and educational systems, the appropriation of 
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Ottoman artifacts, the development of an imperial transportation network, etc., allows for 
British activity in the Ottoman Empire, between 1838 and 1880 to be considered 
imperial.  While this model of British imperialism did not precisely replicate the 
imperialism used by the British in the rest of the world, it does contain a number of 
strong and significant parallels (i.e. emphasis on trade, economic dominance, 
appropriation of cultural artifacts, etc.).  Importantly, however, nineteenth-century British 
imperialism did not require uniformity; in fact, recent scholarship emphasizes the lack of 
coherence that British imperialism, in general, had: 
In its piecemeal administration, effected through trading companies 
such as the East India Company, the Royal Niger Company, and the 
Imperial East Africa Company, a mosaic of semiautonomous provinces 
and an assortment of paramountcies, viceroyalties, dominions and 
protectorates, as well as fiscal and military policies, British influence, 
while exercised to protect and expand important trade routes, lacked 
any over all coherence (emphasis added).280 
 
Thus, while the model of imperialism that the British established for the Ottoman Empire 
differed from that used in India or other places in the world, the lack of colonies and the 
emphasis that the imperial relationship between England and the Ottoman Empire placed 
on commercial affairs placed the Ottoman Empire (or portions of it) well within the 
recognized sphere of British imperial policy.   
The British managed to establish their particular form of imperialism on the 
Ottoman Empire in the period between the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial 
Convention in 1838 and the rise of German influence in the Empire around 1880.  
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However, after 1880, Germany began to take an increasingly important position in the 
Empire, eventually replacing Britain as the most important imperial power in the 
Ottoman Empire.  A recent scholar contends that the British influence flagged after 1880 
because, “British policy makers came to [the] conclusion that the Ottoman Empire was 
not a viable state any more [after about 1880]…and they expected that the Empire was 
sooner or later to collapse.”281  Although the British believed that the Ottoman Empire 
faced collapse by the 1880s, the Germans believed it could be sustained longer. Thus, the 
Germans began to replace the British in the imperialism that had been established for the 
Ottoman Empire.  The British recognition that the Ottoman Empire was no longer viable 
led to increasingly less capital investment (i.e. railroads, ports, etc., but trade remained) 
and loans.  The Germans recognized the decreased British interest in investing in 
Ottoman projects as well as the concurrent decline in interest in loaning money to the 
Sublime Porte, and, consequently, the Germans began to replace the British in these 
areas.  Thus, as the Germans recognized the intentional decline in British interest in the 
Ottoman Empire, the Germans began to embrace the imperial model established by the 
British and exert German influence in the Ottoman Empire. 
 There is no indication that the German imperial expansion into the Ottoman 
Empire was more aggressive or assertive than the British or French.  Rather, the Germans 
used the model established by the British (and previously adopted by the French as well) 
to assert themselves in the Empire.  This German imperialism intended to provide 
Germany an equal position in the Ottoman Empire, there is no belief that the Germans 
intended to establish a formal Middle Eastern colonial system, or any other major 
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deviation from the established British model for Ottoman imperialism.  Consequently, the 
subsequent chapters describe the flagging of British interests in the Ottoman Empire and 
the German effort to establish themselves as an imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. 
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CHAPTER V  
THE RISE OF GERMANY AND GERMAN ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM IN THE 
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
With regard to the Colonies, I believe that we must learn gradually.  
The military system has already been abandoned, and we are learning 
more and more to imitate the English and to direct our Colonists and 
turn them to profits as merchants.282 
--Reichskanzler Prince Hohenlohe (1897) 
 
 Since the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838, the 
British had maintained themselves as the chief imperial power in the Ottoman Empire. 
This position permitted them to assert their interests in the affairs of the Empire, but it 
also restrained the ambitions of the Russians and Mehemet Ali.  Moreover, the strength 
of the British position (and the significance of its investment in the Near East, as well as 
the protection of the “overland route” and later the Suez Canal) fostered a British interest 
in preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.  However, the dual policy of 
maintaining the Empire’s territorial integrity and exerting imperial influence by providing 
large loans ended with the Porte’s 1875 bankruptcy (discussed below) and with Lord 
Salisbury’s (Robert Cecil, 1830-1903) appointment as British Foreign Secretary in 1878.  
Salisbury “believed that the Ottoman Empire was irrevocably doomed to collapse,”283 
and that the Empire’s recent defeat by the Russians (the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-
1878) signaled the end of its “independence; henceforth [Salisbury believed] the Sultan 
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would survive, if at all, as a client of one of the Great Powers.”284    This perception of 
the Ottoman Empire’s future (based on the recent loss to Russia and the announcement 
that the Ottoman Empire would not make further debt payments) discouraged the British 
from continuing in the role of Ottoman protector after 1875.  Moreover, it also indicated 
a conclusion to the “Crimean policy,” which, since 1854, directed Britain to go to war to 
prevent the breakup of the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire.285  Indeed, not 
only did the British hesitate to remain the Empire’s protector, but, in 1882, the Eastern 
Express (Constantinople) characterized the relationship between the Porte and England as 
estranged.286  The British reticence to accept the position of Ottoman protector meant that 
the Porte had few appropriate Powers from which to choose.  The Porte had few suitable 
prospects because, since the Prussian defeat of France (1870), the Porte did not consider 
the French (who had actively colonized peripheral portions of the Ottoman Empire) an 
adequate protector.  A protective alliance with St. Petersburg remained improbable 
because of the established Russian ambition for the Straits as well as Russia’s recent, 
imperial misadventures in Bulgaria (1885-1888, discussed in Chapter VI).287 
Consequently, with the British disinterest in remaining the Ottoman protector and the 
distrust that the European Powers and the Porte had in France and Russia, an opportunity 
developed for the newly established Germany to assert itself in the Ottoman Empire.   
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 While international conditions favored an extension of German imperialism into 
the Ottoman Empire, Bismarck’s commitment to the consolidation of the German state, 
in the years following the unification of Germany (1871), is well known.  This 
Bismarckian interest in the consolidation of the recently unified Germany caused 
Bismarck to profess little interest in foreign affairs, beyond keeping Germany out of war.  
This determination to avoid involvement in a war catalyzed Bismarck’s disinterest in 
formal colonies, which he emphasized in the Reichstag by declaring “Ich bin kein 
Kolonialmensch… (I am no colonizer…).288  However, following the British decision to 
limit further financial involvement in the Ottoman Empire, the Germans (both 
governmental and non-governmental officials) recognized that conditions existed for the 
advancement of German interests in the Ottoman Empire through “trade, commerce, and 
a peaceful penetration.”289  The conflict between Bismarck’s official stated intention to 
avoid colonial fetters, and the general interest in extending German influence abroad 
made the acceptance of the British model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire 
particularly attractive. 
Bismarck’s interest in avoiding colonization did not wholly differentiate him from 
those who advocated for German expansion abroad.  Friedrich Fabri, in his famous 
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volume Bedarf Deutchland Colonien?290 (Does Germany Need Colonies?), advocated for 
German economic expansion into regions where European colonialism already existed, 
and, thus, “political annexation was out of the question.”291  Consequently, one of the 
most famous assertions for German expansion abroad (Fabri) promoted an imperial 
policy that specifically prohibited colonial development. Further, Karl von Koseritz, an 
influential German living in South America, and editor of the South American edition of 
Deutsche Zeitung, advocated a similar position.292 Indeed, the effort to secure imperial 
influence without colonies accorded with the general pattern of imperial activity in the 
Ottoman Empire.  The two most important examples of such imperial activity were the 
British occupation of Egypt (1882) and the creation of the new Bulgarian state (1878).  
Although the British occupied Egypt in 1882, the latter remained within the Ottoman 
Empire until the 1914 Turkish declaration of war against England.  Similarly, following 
the creation of Bulgaria, in the Treaty of San Stefano (1878), which the European Powers 
considered an unacceptable extension of Russian influence into the Ottoman Empire, the 
new Bulgaria remained, formally, within the Ottoman Empire.  Consequently, 
Bismarck’s support for the advancement of German interests in the Near East without 
formal colonization (while publicly proclaiming no interest in establishing colonies in the 
Ottoman Empire) indicates that his vision for the extension of German influence abroad 
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fit within the general context of European imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.  Further, 
this Bismarckian interest in expansion without colonies permitted him to embrace the 
accepted and recognized British model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire.  
Historians refer to the policy of German involvement in the Ottoman Empire as 
Orientpolitik, but they have not considered this as imperialism or colonialism.293  Rather, 
such historians have contended that Germany “intensified their economical, cultural, and 
military relations to the Middle East…”294 without considering the imperial implications 
of such “intensified activity.” 
 German involvement in the Ottoman Empire embraced the model established by 
the British, but subordinated imperial involvement in the Near East to Great Power 
politics in Europe.  Bismarck even sought, in the early 1880s, to reestablish British 
interests in the Near East,295 believing that securing such involvement (recall that the 
British interest in maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire ended between 1875 
and 1878) would bolster the position of the Ottoman Empire in the international arena.  
The British, however, had minimal interest in extending their position in the Levant (as 
previously discussed), and instead signaled a new relationship with the Porte by 
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partitioning Egypt from the Ottoman Empire (1882, as previously noted, but Egypt 
remained, formally within the Ottoman Empire until 1914).  This British decision for 
disengagement permitted the French to enjoy heightened influence in the Near East 
through a near monopoly on loans to the Porte, but, by 1888, the Germans began to 
challenge this monopoly as their banks began to loan money to the Ottoman government 
with considerable governmental support (discussed below).  However, the other 
European Powers regulated German, like the British and the French, imperial activity in 
the Ottoman Empire, and, thus, Bismarck and the Germans emphasized maintaining the 
status quo (i.e. no formal colonial development) as the first element in their Middle 
Eastern policy.296  The importance of maintaining peace in the Ottoman Empire found 
support among the Powers, whose ambassadors emphasized their willingness to use bold 
action to prevent the peace from being compromised.297  The formal establishment of 
colonies or other intensified imperial activities (far outside of the established British 
model) would have likely caused the other European powers to intervene in the Empire, 
possibly sparking a European war.  The Germans, under Bismarck, never intended for 
Ottoman policy to supersede European policy and, consequently, they carefully followed 
the established British model of imperialism.298 
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 German economic imperialism in the Ottoman Empire never achieved the same 
success as British imperialism did.  Rather, the Germans lagged behind the British in 
most areas of imperialism included in the model considered here.  However, while the 
Germans trailed the British in both the amount of money loaned and the total quantity of 
goods traded, the Germans built more railroad track, appropriated more Ottoman artifacts 
(if Egyptian artifacts are not considered), and contributed significantly to the reformation 
of the Ottoman military.  Consequently, while the Germans became one of the two most 
important imperial powers, together with the French, in the Ottoman Empire in the 
eighteen-eighties, British influence did not disappear completely, and tensions between 
the two powers remained until the conclusion of the First World War (as the fierce 
fighting in the Middle East during the First World War indicates299).  
 The extension of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, based on the 
British model, coincided with the accession of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) to the position 
of Sultan.  Abdülhamid’s credentials did not necessarily make him an attractive future 
Sultan; he was poorly educated and lacked knowledge of foreign countries (he had never 
traveled and he spoke only Turkish).  However, Abdülhamid II became intensely 
interested in foreign affairs and approached them with a “deep sense of the Ottoman 
Empire’s vulnerability to the European Great Powers.”300  Further, he “believed that all 
Powers but Germany were hostile [to the Ottoman Empire], and that the British in 
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particular were bent upon the Ottoman Empire’s destruction.”301  The new Sultan made 
the reestablishment of Ottoman autonomy his principal goal, but he recognized that this 
required further reforms, and likely necessitated that the Empire submit to the indignity 
of temporary Great Power protection.  Abdülhamid II considered Germany the best 
possible candidate for a protective relationship with the Ottoman Empire.302 
 Although Abdülhamid II sought closer relations with Germany, he rejected any 
proposals for a formal protective (i.e. imperial) relationship.303   Germany appealed to the 
Sultan because it had no established ambitions in the Ottoman Empire (as the British, 
French, and Russians did) and the inclusion of such a power might lead to a 
reestablishment of the balance of power in the Near East,304 which had been 
compromised by the strong British position since 1838.   Thus, while the Germans sought 
to establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire, the Porte and the Sultan encouraged 
informal German influence in the Ottoman Empire.  The Ottomans believed the Germans 
would provide protection from the other Great Powers and permit the Empire to continue 
to institute domestic reforms, eventually becoming sufficiently strong to exist without 
                                                 
301
 Ibid., 44. 
 
302
 Although held in Berlin, without an Ottoman delegation, the British disappointed the 
Porte and Abdülhamid more than the Germans (discussed in Chapter V). See: Akarli, 34-
35.  
 
303
 Yasamee, 50-51.  Abdülhamid is viewed in much western historiography as “anti-
modernist” or “anti-western,” but such a categorization is inaccurate.  He did seek to limit 
European intrusion and involvement in the Ottoman Empire, but he also recognized that 
such a goal would require the further advancement of the Ottoman financial, military, and 
educational systems.  Thus, he could not isolate himself from Europe.  He believed 
Germany posed the least threat to the Ottoman Empire of any of the Great Powers and 
thus fostered relations with the Germans.  See: Akarli, 2-6. 
 
304
 Yasamee, 50-51. 
 
133 
Great Power protection.  However, in spite of Abdülhamid’s intention to reestablish the 
Ottoman Empire without Great Power imperial influence, German influence in the 
Empire accelerated between 1876 and the Young Turk Revolution (1908).  During this 
period, in spite of the Sultan’s efforts, the Germans became increasingly involved in 
Ottoman trade, became a major source of loans for the Porte, participated in the 
development of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, further reformed the army 
under German influence, and appropriated the Pergamon Altar and other Ottoman 
artifacts.  Thus, by the early twentieth-century, the Germans, almost to the extent of the 
British between 1838 and 1875, imposed a strong imperial presence on the Ottoman 
Empire. 
German Commercial Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire 
 On 6 October 1875, the Ottoman government published the following notice in 
local newspapers: 
It is well known that the Budget shows a deficit exceeding £5,000,000.  
In order to be able to pay regularly the coupons of the various loans, the 
Government had hitherto been in the habit of obtaining fresh loans, 
thus paying one debt by contracting another.  The result of this 
expedient was an increase of the deficit and a diminution on the 
confidence of holder of Turkish securities, which is proved by the 
constant depreciations which Ottoman stock daily undergo [sic.]…305 
 
The announcement continued, explaining that the Ottoman government had suspended 
payment on its foreign debts.  While the announcement did not explicitly repudiate the 
debts, it was “tantamount to a formal declaration of bankruptcy.”306  This event (hereafter 
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the Ottoman Bankruptcy), which developed partially from the general economic 
depression that began in 1873,307 transformed the relationship between the Powers and 
the Ottoman Empire.  British investors became increasingly circumspect about future 
investments (but less so trade308) in the Ottoman Empire and, consequently, an 
opportunity developed for an assertion of further French and German economic influence 
in the Empire.   
 The Powers resolved the Ottoman bankruptcy principally through the Decree of 
Muharram (October 1881, also spelled Mouharrem) and the significantly less important 
Treaty of Berlin (1878, less important concerning the debt settlement, discussed in 
Chapter VI).309  The Ottoman Debt Administration (also referred to as the Public Debt 
Administration), which was included in the Decree of Maharram, became the instrument 
through which the European powers protected their investments in the Ottoman Empire, 
but it also became one of the principal tools of European economic imperialism in the 
Ottoman Empire.310  The Ottoman Debt Administration (ODA) did not replace the 
Imperial Ottoman Bank, or even displace the latter’s significant influence (see Chapter 
IV), but, rather, the ODA provided additional European oversight and control of Ottoman 
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finances.311  While the Decree of Maharram,312 which officially formed the ODA, 
extended substantial privileges and opportunities to the Powers, the Porte announced the 
Decree with a sense of relief, because the latter feared that the European Powers would 
use the bankruptcy as a pretext for formal occupation, as occurred in Tunis (1881) and in 
Egypt (1882).313 
The increased control provided by the Decree of Muharram was important 
because, until the First World War, the ODA operated simultaneously as the major 
conduit for Ottoman access to European finance markets (i.e. European loans)314 and “the 
permanent guardian of the [financial] interests of foreign nationals in the Ottoman 
Empire.”315 Without this guardianship, the European Powers (principally France and 
Germany) would have been hesitant to extend new loans to the Porte after 1875.  
Moreover, the ODA also represented (through the executive council, discussed below) 
the interests of all the European Powers, which became increasingly important as the 
Imperial Ottoman Bank, after 1875, became an instrument of French interests.316  Before 
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a specific understanding of German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire can be 
attempted, a basic understanding of the Ottoman Debt Administration and its relation to 
the Ottoman state must be considered. 
 Although economic powers had established protective organizations in foreign 
countries for decades, the Ottoman Debt Administration distinguished itself from similar 
contemporary organizations.  The ODA did not function conventionally because the 
flexibility and the scope of its authority within the Ottoman Empire provided the ODA 
with an unusually influential position.  The following characteristics of the ODA 
contributed to its unusually influential position: first, the ODA did not receive its 
authority from an international treaty or commercial agreement; rather, it claimed its 
authority from a decree issued by the Sultan, which provided a semi-legal status that 
afforded the ODA a large degree of flexibility.317  Second, the Ottoman state provided the 
salaries for the ODA officials, which, by 1913, exceeded fifty-five hundred employees, 
more than the entire Ottoman Ministry of Finance.318  Third, the Ottoman government 
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received no share of the revenues collected by the ODA, even if the revenues increased 
dramatically.  Fourth, the Decree compelled the Ottoman government to enforce the 
monopolies granted to the ODA (i.e. prevent smuggling or illegal sales of goods on 
which the ODA had a monopoly, such as tobacco);319 and, finally, the Ottoman 
government paid all of the ODA’s expenses.320  These characteristics permitted the ODA 
to control (directly) at least one-third of Ottoman revenues, represent both the individual 
countries (chiefly: Britain, France, and Germany) and private bondholders, and advance 
European imperial interests in the Empire.  While scholars disagree about the potency of 
the ODA, most agree that it represented a significant loss of sovereignty for the Ottoman 
government and concede that it “was a partner in [the European] imperialistic 
enterprise.”321  Indeed, the ODA conformed with the desires of the Powers so fully that 
the French, in their assertion of economic imperialism in China, sought “…an 
international debt administration…similar to that in Turkey…”322 
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 Although the ODA had many responsibilities in the Ottoman Empire, its primary 
purpose was “the furtherance of European imperialism.”323  The ODA principally 
asserted the imperialism of the Powers by facilitating loans and commercial agreements 
for the Porte (with the Powers).  The ODA accomplished this partially through its critical 
oversight role, without which the European Powers would have been reluctant to make 
additional loans to the Porte (after 1875, as previously mentioned).  The Powers, at least 
France and Germany, desired to provide loans and commercial agreements because they 
recognized them as a justification for the assertion of Great Power imperialism in the 
Empire,324 but also because the Powers benefited from these loans.  Many of the loans 
made by the Powers were made for the construction of imperial railroads and other 
European projects in the Ottoman Empire; frequently, the materials for the construction 
of these projects had to be purchased from the country that provided the loan.325  
Overwhelmingly, the Powers structured the ODA to introduce European railroads into the 
Ottoman Empire, and, consequently, a large proportion of the ODA’s delegates also 
represented companies involved in the development of railways.326  The importance of 
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railway development to imperialism is not surprising and occurred throughout Germany’s 
imperial territories in Asia and Africa.327  Indeed, the ODA delegates from Germany had 
an especially close relationship with domestic railroad companies.328   
The ODA officially sought the support of the Sultan and the Porte in the 
construction of railways and other large capital projects,329 but “it was also made 
repeatedly clear that the Sultan and his government were expected to go along with 
European plans and that they [the Ottomans] would only receive further financial support 
if they did so.”330  Not only did the ODA secure funding and permission for European 
imperial projects in the Ottoman Empire, but it also accepted responsibility for the 
collection of taxes and the payment of the Ottoman debt.331  In so doing, the ODA 
controlled “the salt monopoly, the stamp and spirit duties, the fish tax, and the silk tithe 
from a number of districts, as well as the part of the Annual Tribute from several 
provinces…initially, the ODA also collected the tobacco tax,”332 which, in total, as 
previously mentioned, constituted approximately one-third of regular Ottoman 
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revenues.333 Based on this level of involvement, the European bondholders considered 
the ODA quite successful.  Not only did it advance future imperial projects, principally 
the railroad which enjoyed enthusiastic construction after 1882,334 but it also provided 
regular debt payments, and powerful protective oversight for European interests in the 
Empire.335   
 The Decree of Muharrem, in Article XV, provided for an executive council to 
oversee the ODA.  The council consisted of seven members, one each to represent the 
bondholders from the following countries: Netherlands, Britain, France, Germany, 
Austria, and Italy; a delegate from the Imperial Ottoman Bank was the committee’s final 
representative.  While these members could not be diplomats assigned to the Ottoman 
Empire, they received diplomatic status and protection,336 although the existing 
capitulations already provided extraterritoriality protection to foreigners in the Ottoman 
Empire already.  In spite of the official limitations on the requirements for membership 
on the executive committee, the latter’s delegates often maintained a close, if quiet, 
relationship with their respective government.  Conventionally, “most members of the 
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[executive] council were appointed with the active though usually covert, support of their 
respective national governments.”337   
Among the countries to delegate a representative with the covert support of his 
national government was Germany.  Thus, the delegates to the governing board of the 
ODA often had a close relationship with their respective government, and thus provided 
the European Powers a mechanism to exert imperial influence without establishing a 
formal imperial relationship. 
 According to the Decree of Muharrem, the German delegate to the ODA was to 
be selected from the syndicate of German banks, which constituted the principal Ottoman 
creditors in Germany (until 1895 the only German bank in the syndicate was the House 
of Bleichröder).338  The syndicate selected Herr Justizrath Primker (formerly legal 
counsel to the German Foreign Ministry) as the first German delegate to the ODA’s 
executive committee.  Primker received the position based on the recommendation of 
Gerson von Bleichröder,339 whom historian Fritz Stern contends was “the German 
Rothschild,” and “the chancellor’s [Bismarck’s] banker.”340  However, Stern properly 
remarks that Bleichröder was more than simply Bismarck’s banker; rather, Stern 
contends “…he [Bleichröder] was given, and he sought, political assignments requiring 
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his particular mixture of [economic] expertise and discretion.  Europe knew him as 
Bismarck’s secret agent…Bleichröder’s career illuminates those aspects of Bismarck’s 
rule previously slighted or ignored.”341  Bliechröder’s involvement in the Ottoman 
Empire is revealing.  Bismarck’s frequent public assertions that he, and, thus, Germany, 
had no interest in the “Eastern Question,” Turkish affairs, or the expansion of German 
influence abroad must be seen within the context of Bleichröder’s participation in 
Ottoman affairs.  The assignment of Bleichröder as Bismarck’s principal representative to 
administer German affairs with the Turkish debt indicates that, while Bismarck did not 
want to be publicly associated with the extension of German influence into the Ottoman 
Empire, that this was an area of significance to him.342   
 Importantly, Stern begins his discussion of Belichröder’s assignment to the ODA 
with a brief discussion of imperialism, concluding somewhat non-committaly: “If the 
term ‘imperialism’ is extended to mean financial control by one nation or a group of 
nationals over the fiscal policy of another, then Bleichröder certainly participated in 
imperial ventures [in the Ottoman Empire].”343  This assertion of German financial 
control in the Ottoman Empire began earnestly in 1888, when Deutsche Bank became 
actively involved in the construction of capital projects in the Ottoman Empire, 
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principally, but not exclusively, railways and specifically, the Berlin-to-Baghdad 
Railway; however, as early as 1883, the Germans, through Bleichröder, began to exert 
their influence.  The Decree of Muharrem provided the ODA the right to maintain and 
collect revenues from the tobacco monopoly.  The executive committee of the ODA sold 
this right (as was their prerogative under the Decree) to a company known as the Tobacco 
Regie, which consisted of the House of Bleichröder, Credit-Anstalt in Vienna, and the 
Imperial Ottoman Bank.344  The Tobacco Regie was the sole entity which could license 
farmers to grow the product or provide loans to support its cultivation; however, it was 
obligated to purchase all of the tobacco harvested.345  Bleichröder’s early involvement in 
Turkish finances and imperialism permitted him to assume “the leading German role in 
the international supervision of Turkish finances.”346 
The assertion of German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire began in 
1888, but it did so largely because of the British decision to provide fewer loans, but not 
to decrease direct trade, to the Ottoman government based on the Ottoman Bankruptcy of 
1875.347  Deutsche Bank provided the first major German loan to the Ottoman Empire in 
1888, the same year that Bismarck famously told the Reichstag that Turkey was not 
                                                 
344
 Stern, 419; “The Tobacco Regie,” Eastern Express (Constantinople), 6 January 1886, 
10:c. 
 
345
 Owen, 204-205; Report, Deutsche Bank to Auswärtiges Amt, 28 June 1913, NARA/T-
139/reel 354/series I/0123. 
 
346
 Stern, 421.  A study of Bleichröder’s involvement in the Ottoman Empire and a history 
of the Tobacco Regie would be welcome additions to the historiography. 
 
347
 Pamuk, 76.  For example, the proposed Euphrates Valley Railway was never built, see: 
Jelavich, “Russian Acquisition of Batum,” 55-56. 
 
144 
worth the bones of a healthy Prussian grenadier.348  The Ottoman government contracted 
this loan for thirty million Marks to pay an indemnity it owed to Russia from the most 
recent Russo-Turkish War, a loan the Imperial Ottoman Bank refused to make.  However, 
the purpose of the loan, from the German perspective, was to facilitate the entrance of 
Deutsche Bank into Ottoman financial circles—specifically, the eventual construction of 
the Berlin to Baghdad Railway, which developed from the Anatolian Railway.349  
According to historian Kurt Grunwald, “This [loan] was the beginning of Germany’s 
paramount position in Turkey’s economic and financial affairs.   Deutsche Bank soon 
rose to a position equal, if not superior, to that of the Imperial Ottoman Bank.”350  
However, the ascendancy of Deutsche Bank occurred only because of the pressure from 
the German government (chiefly the new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, 1888-1918) on the bank, 
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hoping to compel the bank to become involved in the Ottoman Empire (based partially on 
the Sultan’s interest in increasing German investment in his Empire).351 
The involvement of Deutsche Bank in the Ottoman Empire appealed to the Sultan 
partially because, by 1888, British loans had slowed considerably, and, consequently, his 
only avenue for access to European financial markets came through the Paris branch of 
the Imperial Ottoman Bank.  While the Imperial Ottoman Bank officially maintained 
headquarters in both London and Paris, its authority had become concentrated in the 
latter.  Thus, the refusal of the Imperial Ottoman Bank to extend loans to the Porte (in 
specific cases, such as the first loan that Deutsche Bank provided) was directed 
principally from Paris, with considerable assistance from the Quai d’Orsay.352  This 
concentration of authority in the Paris branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank permitted the 
French a brief period (1875-1888) of unchallenged economic supremacy in the Ottoman 
Empire.  Consequently, it is not surprising that the Sultan welcomed, even invited,353 the 
assertion of German financial interests (via the Deutsche Bank) into the Ottoman Empire, 
and the competition it provided, both economic and political, and that such involvement 
did not receive the Imperial Ottoman Bank’s approbation.354   Complaints from the latter 
appeared in the Times (London) claiming (with mild exaggeration) that the Sultan’s 
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finance minister “planned the loan [the 1888 loan with Deutsche Bank] without them [the 
officers of the Imperial Ottoman Bank.].”355  While the Imperial Ottoman Bank 
(essentially directed by the French) did not encourage German investment, the ODA 
proved more compliant and, in some cases, assisted the Germans.356  The rise in German 
economic influence in the Ottoman Empire developed not only from British hesitance to 
facilitate loans to the Porte, but also because the Sultan recognized the “political-
territorial” ambitions of the British (and French) and, consequently, preferred to contact 
loans with the Germans whose position in the Near East was weaker than that of the other 
Powers.357 The confluence of these factors permitted the Germans to become a major 
factor in Ottoman financial affairs. Deutsche Bank became the principal instrument of 
German economic imperialism; however, a series of other German banks and companies 
(some of whom were subsidiaries of Deutsche Bank) also inserted themselves into the 
Ottoman financial markets, including but not limited to: Die Deutsche Palästina-Bank, 
the Ottoman Railway Company, Diskonto-Gesellschaft, Dresdner Bank, Darmstädter 
Bank, Württembergische Vereinsbank, and, of course, the House of Bleichröder.  
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The German investment in the Ottoman Empire was part of a broader, and 
somewhat controversial, German economic policy entitled Export Capitalism.358  This 
economic philosophy facilitated the aggressive loaning of money from Germany to 
foreign countries, but in supplying loans to these foreign governments, the German banks 
were encouraged to apply pressure that would direct the foreign government to use the 
borrowed funds in Germany.359  Such a policy fit with the German (indeed European) 
concern about Überproduktion, as it provided a market for excess German goods.  In the 
Ottoman Empire, this translated, overwhelmingly, into the construction of railways.360  
This railroad construction brought “in its wake schools, factories, hospitals, and harbor 
works, all the recognized paraphernalia of imperialist expansion,”361 which facilitated 
further loans from German banks.  Thus, Export Capitalism became a powerful tool of 
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German economic expansion within the Ottoman Empire.  Based on this economic 
philosophy, the Germans increased their ability to assert themselves in the affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire. 
Such expansion fit within the tangled foreign policy that followed the departure of 
Bismarck and the arrival of Weltpolitik in 1897-1898.362 During this transition period 
from Bismarckian foreign policy to Weltpolitik, German foreign policy lacked a guiding 
ideological principle, as the failure to renew the Reinsurance Treaty clearly exhibited.  
While the period from 1888-1899 was the most potent period in nineteenth-century 
German colonial expansion, the Germans, under Reichskanzler Georg Leo Count von 
Caprivi (1888-1892), also emphasized acquiring small strategic locations over larger 
colonial claims (the Heligoland-Zanzibar Agreement of 1 July 1890 is an example).363 
German influence in the Ottoman Empire addressed strategic interests, such as providing 
a presence in the Suez Canal, while also conforming to the developing framework of 
Weltpolitik that the Kaiser, his court, the navy, and industrialists advocated.364   
The use of Export Capitalism and the subsequent construction of railroads and the 
associated schools, factories, banks, etc. enabled Germany (in the form of private banks, 
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with governmental support and pressure) to become (rapidly) one of the Ottoman 
Empire’s primary creditors.  As late as 1888, the British maintained 56.2% of the 
Ottoman debt, with France controlling 31.7% and Germany merely 1.1%.  However, by 
1913, the British controlled only 15.2 % of the Ottoman debt and the Germans controlled 
27.5%, with the French controlling the largest share at 50.4%.365  The specific terms of 
the loans366 are less important than the rapid increase in German influence in the 
commercial markets of the Ottoman Empire.  The importance of German loans, 
proportionally and politically, encouraged the Germans to ask for (unsuccessfully, in 
1913) an additional seat on the executive council of the ODA and for a German to enter 
the rotation for president of the council (which alternated between a British and a French 
delegate).367  The ODA refused the German request; however, this refusal was likely 
more related to contemporary political environment than to a failure to recognize German 
influence in the Ottoman Empire.  The German interest in additional seats on the ODA 
executive council and inclusion in the revolving presidency emphasizes the importance of 
the ODA to German, and indeed European, interests in the Ottoman Empire.   
German investment in the Ottoman Empire grew from £166,000 in 1888 to 
£20,653,000 in 1913.  This investment included the construction of railways, ports, and 
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utilities, as well as investments in banking, commerce, industry, and mining.368  Of these, 
German influence in railway and port construction (at 37% and 18.1% of the total foreign 
investment in each respective category) and banking (at 19.7% of the total foreign 
investment in Ottoman banks) were the greatest, with the others between six and eight 
percent of the total investment.369  The German investment in railways (as previously 
mentioned) was not surprising because of the importance railways had in the domestic 
development of Germany, but also because Germany had built railways in many of the 
world’s peripheral areas, including Latin America, China, and the Near East.370 German 
railways in the Ottoman Empire, specifically the Oriental, Baghdad, and Anatolian 
Railways, served a dual purpose; they exerted German imperial influence and they 
brought profits to the German companies who built them.    
The companies that constructed German railways in the Ottoman Empire were 
ensured a profit because Ottoman government secured profits through kilometric 
guarantees (a guaranteed payment per kilometer).371  The first provision for a kilometric 
guarantee, which became one of the principal methods for financing railways,372 was 
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developed for the German construction of the Anatolian Railway.  This financial 
instrument developed because the Sultan preferred for the railway to bypass 
commercially important areas in favor of military and strategic areas.373  Indeed, the 1903 
Baghdad Railway Concession Agreement, in Article 45, required “the concessionaries 
[principally the Germans] to construct at their own expense…such military stations as 
may be deemed necessary by the Ministry of War.”374  Ottoman promises for payment 
(after 1875) would not have been sufficient, so the Ottoman government permitted the 
ODA to collect specific taxes and tithes to support the guarantees made to the German 
government and Deutsche Bank.375 In addition to the authority granted to the ODA for 
the collection of taxes and the enforcement of monopolies, the Germans exerted further 
political influence along the railways that they constructed in the Ottoman Empire.  One 
example of this enhanced authority was the inclusion of police powers (within the scope 
of Ottoman law) for the companies, which constructed the railway along the tracks that 
they built.376  As previously stated, the concessions that granted permission for the 
construction of these railways also provided limited ownership rights as far as twenty 
kilometers on either side of the track.377   Further, the Germans began to establish 
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consulates along their Ottoman railways.  These consulates directed business toward 
Germany, but also offered a political presence in many Ottoman cities and territories.378  
Finally, the development of railways, especially railways associated with specific 
European countries, such as the Berlin to Baghdad Railway, contributed to the sense that 
the Ottoman Empire was being partitioned into spheres of influence, or even imperial 
territories, especially as the German foreign office increasingly directed (in the twentieth-
century) the affairs of the Baghdad Railway.379  Some scholars assert that the extension 
of German imperialism into the Ottoman territories occurred without undue tension 
between the Germans and the Ottomans; one scholar even contends that the Germans 
living in the Ottoman Empire, alongside the Ottoman railway workers, provided 
“[positive] experiments in intercultural living” as Germans and Turks shared 
accommodations.380  However, such assertions obscure the imperial significance of the 
German involvement in the Ottoman Empire. 
German involvement in the construction of Ottoman railroads began with the 
Anatolian Railway.  As previously mentioned, this railway had its origins with the 
Austrian Baron Wilhelm von Pressel; however, the Germans received the concession for 
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its construction (and it developed into the Berlin to Baghdad Railway).381  Bismarck 
maintained an official policy of neutrality regarding the Anatolian Railway; however, 
eventually, both Wilhelm II and his ambassador to Constantinople Baron Adolf 
Marschall von Bieberstein (who had been the German Foreign Secretary from 1890-
1897,382 following the removal of Herbert von Bismarck) sought to advance German 
interests in the Ottoman Empire through railway construction.383  The Kaiser and his 
advisors pressed Deutsche Bank’s reluctant leaders, especially Georg von Siemens, to 
finance, albeit with international support, the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways.384  
However, as Bismarckain foreign policy faded, and Germany embraced the more 
militaristic Weltpolitik, the Baghdad Railway lost its international support and became an 
increasingly imperial project driven by the German government.385 
The construction of the Anatolian railway conformed to the ambitions and desires 
of the German government because Anatolia (and other areas in Turkey) was seen as a 
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seen as a territory from which large amounts of grain could be exported.386 Indeed, the 
British magazine The Economist lamented:  
…[drawing] attention to the construction of railways in Asia Minor as a 
matter of much importance…Asia Minor is a country of vast extent, 
having an area of 729,000 square miles…Quite one-third of this 
enormous area…is by nature splendidly fertile, whilst the prevailing 
climate is magnificent; but the means of communication are so 
defective that crops cannot be brought to the sea, and a great reservoir 
of cereals is thus left untapped.  It would surely be worth while for 
English capitalists to turn their attention to the construction of light 
railway from the interior of Asia Minor to various convenient points 
along the coast.387 
 
Grain exports interested the Kaiser’s government because Germany’s industrialization, in 
the eighteen-eighties, resulted in an important change in German grain production; 
Germany shifted from being a net exporter of grain to a net importer.388  Although 
Anatolia produced large amounts of grain, the inability to move this product from the 
province to the world market meant that its grains essentially served a local market.  The 
construction of the Anatolian Railway changed this immediately,389 and Anatolian grain 
began to be exported in significant quantities.  However, in spite of the introduction of 
railways, Anatolia (and almost all of the Ottoman Empire) remained largely an area of 
small farmers.  Consequently, the Anatolian Railway Company and the Ottoman 
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government began to introduce methods of scientific agriculture;390 these, however, had a 
limited effect on the general nature of Anatolian grain farming.391 
The first concession for the Anatolian railway went from Haidar to Angora (577 
km), and it proved the least controversial of all three of its eventual concessions. 392 The 
second, and highly controversial, concession (official on 15 February 1893) ran from 
Eskishehr to Konia.393  This concession for the Anatolian Railway (which soon became 
the Baghdad Railway) terminated in Konia, which was already served by two British 
railways originating from Smyrna.394  The second concession for the Anatolian Railway 
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threatened the influence and the importance of two existing British railways, and 
following the Sultan’s announcement that the Germans would receive the concession, the 
British threatened a naval demonstration off the coast of Constantinople.395  Although the 
demonstration never took place, the British objection to the perceived German intrusion 
into territory previously dominated by the British illustrates the importance that the 
Powers placed on “their” territory in the Ottoman Empire (the British believed that the 
Germans could have sent the railway through Sivas or Caesarieh and achieved the same 
end without injuring British interests in the area396). The British had reason to worry 
about being displaced by the Germans, as it became one of the principal German goals to 
irrigate the Konia Plain from Lake Karaviran to increase agricultural production along the 
German railways.  The Sultan initially resisted this plan, but eventually acquiesced, and, 
by the end of 1911, the German company formed for the project (Gesellschaft für die 
Bewässerung der Konia-Ebene) had made considerable progress.397  
Although the Germans acquired the second concession, Siemens and his Deutsche 
Bank officials expressed further concerns about the exposure that such a project had for 
them and even sought to decline the investment.  However, Siemens’ concerns mattered 
less by the eighteen-nineties, as Wilhelm II and his ambassador to Constantinople, Baron 
von Bieberstein, increasingly equated economic influence with political power.  
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Consequently, when Siemens and Deutsche Bank sought to avoid further investment in 
the Empire, the Kaiser and his foreign office applied increased pressure, eventually 
“convincing” Siemens to fund the project.  Siemens gained external financial support and 
backing through the development of the Anatolian Railway Company (composed of 
investors from Deutsche Bank, Würtrrembergische Vereinsbank, and the Deutsche 
Vereinsbank), which was incorporated under Ottoman law and thus formally an Ottoman 
company; however its profits were sent to Switzerland to the Bank für orientalische 
Eisenbahnen.398  Siemens and Deutsche Bank also sought international investors, and the 
French (through the Imperial Ottoman Bank) contributed to the early construction of the 
Anatolian (Baghdad) Railway.  An agreement between the Germans and the French for 
the consolidation of the Ottoman debt under the ODA “enabled” the financing of the 
Baghdad Railway.399  In spite of Siemans’ concerns, the banks profited from the project, 
as did other German companies and investors (including Philipp Holzmann’s company, 
which built so many of the German railways in the Ottoman Empire, and Krupp & 
Company who provided the rails).400 
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A modification of the Ottoman Land Code of 1866, which, in its amended form, 
permitted foreigners to own land in the Ottoman Empire, contributed to a series of 
international efforts to establish agricultural colonies (largely unsuccessful) in the 
territories that bordered the railway (sometimes purely Ottoman territory and other times 
under the direction of European powers or companies).  The purpose of these agricultural 
colonies was to concentrate the territorial agricultural production on a single commercial 
crop that could be exported,401 as opposed to the conventional practice in which small 
farmers produced small amounts of varied foodstuffs, which produced no predictable 
product or yield.  Although most of these efforts (and there were not that many) were 
British, evidently the Germans also attempted to establish such colonies.402  Evidence 
indicates that all such efforts failed, both by Germans and by the other Powers.  
Historians have argued that the failure of the Powers to establish such colonies (because 
the Powers could not acquire sufficient labor, because the local labor could not be 
coerced into working for the Powers) is a distinguishing feature that keeps the activities 
of the Powers in the Ottoman Empire from constituting colonialism.403 
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The construction of the Anatolian Railway not only permitted the European 
Powers to assert their imperial ambitions for the Ottoman Empire, but it also altered trade 
patterns within the Empire, as well as between the Empire and the world.  Although little 
is known about commerce within the Ottoman Empire, it is clear that the Anatolian 
Railway became one of the principal instruments used to deliver grain from the provinces 
to Constantinople and to the Ottoman Army.  While nineteenth-century Ottoman statistics 
are suspect, it appears that approximately twenty-five percent of the grain shipped on the 
Anatolian Railway was consumed in Constantinople, providing approximately two-thirds 
of the annual gain needs for the capital city, and that another ten percent went to the 
Ottoman military.404  Apparently, the Germans recognized the value of the domestic 
Ottoman market, and they began to challenge the British and French for control over the 
latter; in some cases (such as Damascus) the value of German trade exceeded that of the 
other Powers.405 
While the Germans extended their commercial influence into the interior of the 
Ottoman Empire, they also traded in bulk with Ottoman merchants and government 
officials in the Empire’s principal ports.  While Ottoman statistics are unreliable, 
confidence may be extended to parallel statistics collected by the German government (at 
least for a general consideration of German trade with the Ottoman Empire).406  Based on 
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the latter, it clear that between 1880 and 1914 German trade with the Ottoman Empire 
increased, both in value and in comparison to the other Powers.  This trend accelerated in 
the twentieth-century,407 with the number of German ships visiting Constantinople 
increasing from thirty five in 1881 to four hundred fifty-nine in 1913,408 and the ratio of 
the value of goods imported from Germany to the value of goods imported from Britain 
fell from 1: 3.41 in 1901 to 1: 1.688 in 1910.  More dramatically, the ratio of the value of 
German goods exported to the Ottoman Empire to the value of British goods exported to 
the Ottoman Empire improved from 1: 4.06 in 1901 to 1: 1.49 in 1910.409  It is important 
to note that this trade never became statistically important in Germany, and that the 
Germans never had the capacity to challenge the British in the Ottoman Empire (i.e. the 
British always traded more with the Ottomans than the Germans did).410  However, while 
British exports to the Ottoman Empire always exceeded those of the Germans, the 
Germans exported a much wider variety of goods and materials, many of which were 
manufactured goods as well as refined materials such as steel for railways.  
Consequently, while the Germans never traded as much (in value or real numbers) with 
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the Ottoman Empire as the British did, the Ottomans came to rely on the Germans for a 
greater variety of goods.411 
One of the products that the British and the Germans (as well as the French and 
the Americans) traded with the Ottoman government was weapons.  While the British 
provided the Ottomans with the ships that became the Ottoman Navy, without much 
competition,412 the sale of guns and artillery provided more potent competition.  
Eventually, as German economic imperialism exerted itself, the Ottomans increasingly 
relied on Krupp to supply weapons; as this occurred, the Times (London) wrote:  
The British Embassy has made serious representations to the Porte 
concerning the treatment accorded to English firms which competed for 
the supply of guns.  These firms were asked to send tenders, but as 
soon as they had tendered and before their offers had been examined 
they were informed that the military authorities had decided to “stick to 
the old firm [Krupp]” and buy from Krupp all the guns and ammunition 
required.413 
 
The purchase of weapons became a major commercial undertaking for the Ottoman 
Empire and, after the First World War, the Italians (seeking to exert themselves in 
Turkish affairs) sought to sell weapons to the newly established Turkey, because “they 
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concluded that the supply of arms was a tested great power method of gaining economic, 
political, and military influence in Turkey.”414 The Italians came to such a conclusion 
quite reasonably, as the British, French, and Germans competed with each other to sell 
weapons to the Ottoman government and used this as a platform to advance their imperial 
ambitions in the Empire.415  
The difficulty experienced by the British arms manufacturers in their efforts to 
sell to the Ottomans likely derived out of the reticence that the British banking houses 
had developed about loaning money to the Ottoman government.  The purchase of 
weapons from Krupp usually occurred through a loan provided by Deutsche Bank or 
some other German bank (and this fit within the idea of Export Capitalism).  For 
example, a loan between Deutsche Bank and the Ottoman government in 1905 provided 
approximately £2,400,000, of which the Porte received £350,000, the Anatolian Railway 
received £500,000, and Krupp received the remainder for the purchase of new 
weapons.416  Further, when the Porte considered French weapons, it contracted a loan 
through the French-dominated Imperial Ottoman Bank.417 Thus, as the British banks 
loaned less to the Ottoman government, the opportunity for British arms sales decreased 
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proportionally.  The sale of weapons not only facilitated economic imperialism by 
extending new loans to the Ottoman government, but it also coincided with an established 
nineteenth-century German effort to modernize the Ottoman military, which the Italians, 
after the First World War characterized as “[a] long established great power practice to 
exert military influence on the Ottoman Empire through military/naval advisors 
(discussed in Chapter VI).”418 
Ottoman trade with the Powers represented a critical market for the former 
because the Powers accounted for approximately seventy-five percent of all imports to 
the Empire and consumed between sixty and seventy percent of Ottoman exports.419  The 
importance of this trade permitted the Powers to exert a political influence in the Ottoman 
Empire.  The Times (London) remarked on the connection between economic investment 
in the Ottoman Empire and political influence in an 1893 article concerning the increase 
in the scope of German trade, “…the remarkable expansion of German trade with Turkey 
which has [been] followed upon [by] the growth of German political influence on the 
Bosphorous [sic.]...”;420 and, regarding arms sales that favored the Germans, the Times 
(London) wrote “…[the Ottomans] are not exempt from political influences.  Within the 
last ten years, Germany has almost exclusively furnished Turkey with torpedoes, rifles, 
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and cannon.”421  The position held by Germany due to its economic relationship with the 
Porte advanced further following the British occupation of Cypress in 1878 (following 
the Congress of Berlin, discussed in Chapter VI) and the occupation of Egypt in 1882, as 
the Porte became increasingly concerned about British ambitions in the Empire.  
However, Wilhelm II’s visit to Constantinople (discussed in Chapter VI), the first by any 
European monarch, also contributed to this.  However, the construction and growing 
importance of the Anatolian Railway (as discussed above in relation to grain deliveries to 
Constantinople and to the Ottoman Army, as well as the railway’s military importance) 
cannot be denied.   
 The ascension of Wilhelm II marked an important change in the relationship 
between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Instead of Bismarck’s public disinterest in 
involving Germany in Ottoman affairs, the new Kaiser sought to make Germany a 
powerful force in the Ottoman Empire and he often used his personal authority to 
advance this position. The most famous of his personal efforts to extend German 
influence in the Ottoman Empire came with the Kaiser’s official visit to Constantinople 
(discussed in Chapter VI).  However, while the Kaiser’s visit to the Ottoman Empire 
catalyzed German activity in the territory, this was only the grandest of his efforts to 
extend German influence in the Levant.  More commonly, the Kaiser used his personal 
influence to pressure private businesses, such as Deutsche Bank, to become involved 
(often by extending loans) in the Ottoman Empire, even when the bank’s director, Georg 
von Siemens, was reluctant to do so.422  The Kaiser pressured Deutsche Bank, more than 
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any other entity, claiming that if the Deutsche Bank did not make the investment (or 
loan), another European power surely would and Germany would lose its position in the 
Empire. 423 The strength of the German banking position in the Empire encouraged the 
British to develop the National Bank of Turkey (1909), which had the support of the 
Foreign Office, and contrary to its name was a British-owned bank.  In fact, the first 
director for the bank resigned his position as Secretary of the British Post Office to head 
the bank.424 Thus, the Germans (through Deutsche Bank), the English (through the 
National Bank of Turkey), and the French (through the Imperial Ottoman Bank) exerted a 
powerful collective and individual economic influence in the Ottoman Empire.  Although 
formal colonies did not develop in the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire in the 
pre-war period, the Powers, using intermediaries which they could control, exerted their 
national interests in the Levant through economic imperialism.   
This German economic investment in the Ottoman Empire is particularly 
impressive given the meager German resources between 1870 and 1900.  During this 
period, Germany suffered three economic depressions (1873-1876, 1883-1888, and 1891-
1895425) and transformed its society from an agrarian nation to an industrial nation, 
requiring major domestic investment and thus leaving less money for foreign 
investment.426  The aggressive expansion of German financial influence in the Ottoman 
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Empire developed from an intentional policy, directed by the central government, that 
intended to extend German influence into the Ottoman Empire by providing loans to the 
Ottoman government, which, in turn, would use that money to purchase German 
manufactured goods (Export Capitalism).  Further, the extension of German commercial 
influence into the Ottoman Empire occurred concurrently with the extension of German 
influence in Ottoman trade, government, and military affairs, as well as German cultural 
and political imperialism.   
 The extension of German economic imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, as 
previously mentioned, modeled itself on the model established by the British.  This 
model called for private banks (often with government connections) to invest, and for the 
Foreign Office to support the banks in their endeavors.  Such activities fit within the 
broader pattern of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century imperialism.  The German 
activity in the Ottoman Empire was not substantively different from French efforts to 
assert economic influence in China,427 or even German efforts to sell weapons from the 
Krupp factory for imperial gain in China.428 Further, just as opposition to the imperial 
activities in China exhibited themselves in the Boxer Revolution, the Ottoman citizens 
threw bombs at the Crédit Lyonnais and the Tobacco Regie.429 
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 Of all the aspects of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire considered in 
this dissertation (economic, political, and cultural), economic imperialism has received 
the greatest attention from scholars.  However, while a consensus of scholars would 
likely concur that this was imperial, such a consensus would not be universally accepted.  
Some historians have contended that the economic imperialism (through the PDA and the 
European railways) promoted a general European imperialism without advancing the 
imperial interests of any specific country.430  Others have contended that the railways 
were not imperial at all,431 and were rather merely an aggressive investment strategy that 
used a system of financial guarantees (the kilometric guarantees) that were detrimental to 
the Ottoman state.  However, other historians have argued that the economic imperialism 
of the Powers was a precursor, as in the case of Egypt, to colonialism.432  Indeed, the 
famous Pan-German League (which advocated for colonialism) asserted a German claim 
to portions of the Ottoman Empire.433 This dissertation contends that the cumulative 
consequence of the German economic involvement in the Ottoman Empire was economic 
imperialism.  However, this economic imperialism operated within (and in many cases 
accelerated) the broader context of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.  This 
included German political and cultural imperialism.  Considering a history of the 
Baghdad Railway without the context in which it existed is inappropriate, rather, 
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historians must consider German economic imperialism within the context of the broader 
German imperial practices of the period. 
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CHAPTER VI  
 
GERMAN POLITICAL IMPERIALISM IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1877-1908 
 
 Following the 1875 Ottoman bankruptcy, the commanding British position in 
Ottoman financial affairs collapsed, and the Germans became increasingly influential, 
eventually building the principal Ottoman railways and becoming the Porte’s second 
largest source of foreign capital.  Predictably, the Germans also secured a strong political 
position for themselves.  Although the decision to become involved in economic 
imperialism occurred because of the ascension of Wilhelm II, German involvement in the 
political affairs of the Ottoman Empire predated German economic imperialism.   While 
German political interests in the Ottoman Empire first developed under Bismarck, the 
circumstances of international politics and diplomacy catalyzed the German political 
position in the Ottoman Empire in 1888, the year that Wilhelm II came to power.  
Wilhelm’s ascension to the position of Kaiser coincided with a series of international 
events that ultimately limited the ability (or interest) of both the Russians and the British 
to exert continued political influence in the Ottoman Empire.  Although the French 
remained actively involved in Ottoman affairs, they were generally content to constrain 
their efforts to particular portions of the Empire (Tunisia, Syria, etc.).  But, after 1888,434 
the Germans became one of the principal (if not the most important) political powers in 
Constantinople.  This position increased dramatically as Wilhelm II made a personal visit 
to the Empire (the first ever by a European head of state, 1898), sent increasingly 
important military advisors and missions, and did not oppose the Turkish genocide 
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against the Armenians as the other European Powers did. Thus, the Germans, beginning 
with the Treaty of San Stefano (1878, and its revision at the Congress of Berlin) and 
concluding with the First World War, became the principal political power in the 
Ottoman Empire.435 
 The origins of German political influence in the Ottoman Empire came from the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.  Although the specifics of this war are not important to 
the argument presented here, the treaty that resulted from it, the Treaty of San Stefano 
(1878), compelled the Germans to become directly involved in Ottoman political affairs.  
While the “Eastern Question” (the question about what would happen when the Ottoman 
Empire collapsed) had vexed the European Powers for more than a century, affairs in the 
Balkans had been relatively quiet for the twenty years since the conclusion of the 
Crimean War (1856).436 This relatively peaceful situation deteriorated as the forces of 
nationalism, religious conflict, poverty, and dissatisfaction with the Ottoman government 
began to become manifest in the Balkans.437 Ultimately, the Near Eastern crisis that 
developed in the Balkans in the 1870s threatened the security Bismarck sought for 
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Germany through his European foreign policy (the so called “Kissingen Dictation,” in 
which Bismarck sought a political environment in which all the European powers, except 
France, needed the Germans and were thus prevented from forming coalitions against the 
Germans438).  Consequently, Bismarck’s decision to become involved in the Ottoman 
Empire and, specifically, the Balkans, originated as a component of his European policy 
rather than as an aggressive imperialistic policy.  However, after 1888, the Germans 
advanced their political influence in Constantinople for more imperialistic reasons.439 
 The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 began with predictable Russian victories 
over the Ottoman armies; however, following a brief period of Russian success, the 
Ottoman forces stiffened at Plevna440.441  Eventually, military and domestic 
circumstances made the continuation of this war mutually undesirable and the two 
powers agreed to the Treaty of San Stefano (1878).  Although this treaty was 
overwhelmingly a victor’s peace, its most devastating terms concerned the creation of a 
“greater Bulgaria” in the Balkan Peninsula.  This “greater Bulgaria” established the 
boundaries of Bulgaria that accorded with those of the greatest Bulgarian nationalists.  
Officials in London, Berlin, and Paris viewed such a large Bulgaria, which the former 
understood as a major advancement of Russian imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire, 
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as a threat to their Ottoman interests.442  Although the Powers, as well as the Ottoman 
Empire, recognized that Russia would dominate the new Bulgaria,443 the treaty did not 
technically sever this new Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire.  Rather, Bulgaria became 
an autonomous principality, with a Christian ruler elected by the Bulgarians from 
candidates proposed by the Powers, within the Ottoman Empire.  Although the 
Bulgarians were to elect their own king,444 the treaty required the Porte to approve this 
candidate before he could officially become the Bulgarian ruler.  Further, the Bulgarians 
had to pay a portion of the Ottoman debt, guarantee that its new government would not 
revoke the capitulation rights granted to foreigners by the Sultan, and make annual tribute 
payments to the Sultan.445  While the Treaty appeared to keep Bulgaria firmly within the 
Ottoman Empire, broad agreement existed that this new state constituted a major 
assertion of Russian imperial influence into the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire.446 
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 Although the new Bulgaria, the so-called “Greater Bulgaria” (for reasons already 
described), officially remained part of the Ottoman Empire, the Powers correctly 
perceived this new state as a major intensification of Russian influence in the Ottoman 
Empire.  One reason that the European Powers perceived this new state as a declaration 
of Russian interests was that the Treaty of San Stefano required the Ottoman military to 
leave the new Bulgaria and for the establishment of a Bulgarian militia (a euphemism for 
army), which the Russians would train and likely dominate.  In addition, the Russians 
expected that Bulgarian gratitude for the assistance provided from St. Petersburg (in 
securing Bulgarian “independence”) would result in deference to Russia.447  With a loyal 
and trained Bulgarian militia under Russian influence, the Russians threatened to become 
the dominant power in the Balkans and possibly the Ottoman Empire.  Such a position 
threatened the interests of almost every other European Power, but it posed a particular 
threat to Bismarck’s strategy for the Orient.  This intensification of Russian imperial 
interests threatened the Bismarckian policy of maintaining peace in the Ottoman Empire 
because conflict in the Orient could, potentially, upset the balance he sought to secure 
between Britain, France, and Russia (in Europe).448   
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 Following the Treaty of San Stefano, Russia pressured the European Powers to 
push for an international conference to address the Eastern Question.449  This conference 
met in Berlin and it inaugurated Germany’s political influence in the Ottoman Empire.  
The principal issue addressed at this conference was the status of Bulgaria, the status of 
which was the subject of more than one-third of the eventual articles in the Treaty of 
Berlin (twenty-two of sixty-four articles).450  However, Bulgaria was not Bismarck’s 
chief interest at this congress; rather, he sought to assuage the threats that the Near 
Eastern Crisis posed to European stability.  Specifically, Bismarck intended to repair 
relations between the British and the Russians, which had deteriorated considerably 
during the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and even further because of the resulting 
treaty (San Stefano).451   
Bismarck evidently recognized that the Treaty of San Stefano and the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877-1878 marked a significant departure from established European 
(specifically, British) policy for the Ottoman Empire.  Since the Crimean War in 1854, 
the British had insisted on maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, 
and, ordinarily would have supported the Ottoman Empire in its war with Russia. 
However, with Lord Darby’s departure from Whitehall and the subsequent appointment 
of Lord Salisbury as Foreign Secretary, the English policy towards the Ottoman Empire 
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began to shift.  The Powers could no longer be certain that the English would intervene to 
prevent an invasion of the Ottoman territories.452  Seeking to restore European harmony 
and consensus towards the Ottoman Empire, Bismarck consented to host the Congress of 
Berlin.  Bismarck had a special reason to fear that increased tensions (specifically 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia) in the Balkans would threaten German security.  
The principal reason for this concern was that Russia and Austria-Hungary had 
conflicting ambitions for imperial influence in the Balkans, and that if the two Powers 
became involved in a Balkan war, they would both expect German assistance, due to 
secret treaties that Germany had with both.453  The untenability of such a position 
catalyzed Bismarck’s decision to host the Congress of Berlin.  To secure European 
involvement in this, he had to overcome established French reticence to recognize 
Germany as a major European power (the recent Franco-Prussian War diminished French 
desires to do so) as well as British and especially Russian concerns about the terms of the 
proposed conference.454  Generally, the terms of the agreements required to secure Great 
Power participation in the congress are not important, except to note that the British 
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required a promise of colonial possession of Cypress, for strategic reasons, if the 
Russians retained any of the Ottoman Asiatic provinces.455  
 Representatives of the Powers met in Berlin from 13 June until 13 July 1878. The 
most important consequence of the Congress, and its subsequent treaty, was the 
redefinition of Bulgaria.  The Powers altered the Bulgarian boarders so that the size of the 
state went from 172,000 km2 to 64,500 km2, thus reducing the state to thirty-seven 
percent of its size under the Treaty of San Stefano.456 This new Bulgaria remained an 
autonomous province under the Ottoman Empire and the process for the selection of its 
ruler did not change (i.e. the Sultan still had to approve whomever the Bulgarians 
selected).  The Bulgaria established by this treaty was to be administered by a Russian 
Provisional Authority (nominally under the Sultan) in “consultation with the Porte and 
consular representatives.”457  While the Berlin Treaty diffused much of the international 
tension over the status of Bulgaria (and therefore Russian influence in the Balkans), the 
treaty was not universally successful.  For example, it failed to adequately address the 
problems of the Greeks (who sought independence from the Ottoman Empire).  Although 
the Congress of Berlin marked the final meeting of the Powers regarding the Ottoman 
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Empire before the First World War, subsequent international agreements included 
provisions regarding Ottoman affairs.  In one such agreement, Bismarck eventually 
acknowledged Russian interests in the “lesser” Bulgaria through a secret article attached 
to the Reinsurance Treaty signed by the two Powers, Germany and Russia, which 
pledged neutrality if one or the other went to war.458 Although the Berlin Congress did 
not resolve all of the outstanding Ottoman issues, it did resolve much of the tension over 
Bulgaria, and, the individual Powers generally recognized the danger in asserting 
themselves too aggressively in the principal territories of the Empire. However, in spite 
of the recognition that strong assertions of imperialism could result in conflict between 
European states, in the years immediately  following the congress, the Empire lost much 
of its European territory, as well as Cyprus, Egypt, and within a few years a significant 
portion of North Africa.459   
The critical German concern addressed though the Congress of Berlin was not, 
however, the status of Bulgaria, the Balkans, or even the Ottoman Empire; rather, the 
Germans (through Bismarck) sought to repair the fractures in European politics that 
threatened the European peace and therefore German security.  Although the Congress of 
Berlin addressed this question, concerns about European stability remained throughout 
Bismarck’s term as chancellor.  Bismarck believed that the best strategy for preventing a 
breech of the European peace due to Near Eastern affairs was to try to guarantee the 
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status quo.  This policy resulted in two agreements (20 October 1887 and 12 December 
1887) between the Powers (excepting Russia) that bound the signatories to preserve the 
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and forbade the Sultan from granting formal 
sovereignty to any power over Bulgaria or the Straits.  Further, if the Ottoman Empire 
faced a legitimate threat to its continued existence due to encroachments from other 
foreign powers, the signatories (Germany, Britain, and Italy460) would partition and 
occupy the Empire.  However, these agreements also recognized that the best way to 
avoid such a circumstance was to bolster the position of the Sultan within his Empire.461 
Consequently, it became a feature of both Bismarckian and Wilhelmanian policy towards 
the Ottoman Empire to provide the latter with resources (railways, military supplies, 
military training, loans, formal state visits to increase prestige, etc.) to assist the Sultan in 
his ability to administer his Empire.462  However, through the resources provided by the 
Germans, the latter were able to extend an imperial influence into the Ottoman Empire. 
 The Bismarckian involvement in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire, 
specifically through the Congress of Berlin, but also through other agreements, originated 
out of a concern that Near Eastern affairs might upset the delicate balance of power that 
Bismarck sought to secure within Europe.  Consequently, while German involvement in 
the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire remained until the conclusion of the First 
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World War, it is possible to categorize this involvement into two periods, the 
Bismarckian period and the Wilhelmine period.  While the former emphasized 
involvement in Ottoman affairs to maintain the security of Germany, the latter 
encouraged involvement in the Near East for strategic and imperial reasons.  Thus, 
beginning with the crowning of Wilhelm II (1888), German influence in the Ottoman 
Empire became increasingly imperial.  Importantly, this increasingly imperialistic 
German involvement in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire coincided with events 
in international politics that precluded the English and the Russians from continuing to 
assert themselves in Ottoman political affairs. Consequently, beginning in 1888, a 
confluence of German interest in increased involvement in the Ottoman Empire and a 
parallel decrease in the activity of Germany’s rivals created an opportunity for the 
Germans to assert themselves (politically) in the Near East. 
 Bismarck’s resignation in March 1890 precipitated a crisis in German 
government;463 specifically, his immediate successor, Leo von Caprivi (1890-1894), had 
limited knowledge of foreign affairs,464 and from 1890 until the start of the First World 
War, foreign policy decisions and direction came increasingly from Kaiser Wilhelm II.  
Bismarck’s departure from the Chancellorship in 1890 was quickly followed by an end to 
his foreign policy system, which expired when the Germans failed to renew the 
Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in April 1890.  Historian Gordon Craig contends that 
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following this decision, “…the old Bismarckian diplomatic system became a thing of the 
past.”465  While Wilhelm II was criticized (properly) by his contemporaries466 for his 
mercurial foreign policy, his “New Course” for German foreign policy and the 
subsequent Weltpolitik produced a principled and directed foreign policy for the Ottoman 
Empire. 
 Although Weltpolitik emphasized the development of colonial and imperial 
territory around the world, German involvement (as noted in Chapter V) in the Ottoman 
Empire did not await the arrival of such a policy to begin to exert its influence.  As 
previously noted, beginning in 1888, the Germans began to extend loans to the Ottoman 
Empire and to construct railways, ports, and roads as assertions of their influence.  While 
Weltpolitik represented a change in the relations between the Germans and the rest of the 
world, aspects of Bismarck’s policy towards the Ottoman Empire remained in Wilhelm’s 
new foreign policy.  Among the most important components of both the Bismarckian 
policy and the Wilhelmine policy towards the Ottoman Empire was the principle that the 
continued existence of the Ottoman Empire was desirable.  The preferred method for 
securing such an existence was to provide support to the Sultan by supplying him with 
the mechanisms necessary to bolster his ability to administer his empire (railways, roads, 
military reform, protection from the other Powers, etc.).467  While large capital projects 
are the most visible of such German efforts in the Empire, they are not necessarily the 
most dramatic. 
                                                 
465
 Craig, 232. 
 
466
 Röhl, 343. 
 
467
 Rich, 214; Grosse Politik, volume IV, 345-349. 
 
181 
 Wilhelm’s dedication to building railways and other related projects is well 
known (such as ports, as discussed in Chapter V), and is properly seen (among other 
things, such as a market for excess German industrial production) as a continuation of the 
Bismarckian policy of supporting the Sultan and bolstering his ability to control his 
empire.  However, Wilhelm dramatically enhanced the Bismarckian policy (and thus the 
German political position in the Ottoman Empire) by making an official state visit to the 
Ottoman Empire in 1898, the first such visit by a sitting leader from one of the European 
Powers.468  Recalling Wilhelm’s visit, Bernhard von Bülow (Foreign Secretary, 1897-
1900; Chancellor 1900-1909) wrote that Wilhelm “…[had a] predilection for the Sultan 
and all things Turkish…”469 However, Wilhelm’s decision to visit Constantinople in 1898 
rested less on his interests in “all things Turkish,” and more on his imperial and foreign 
policy ambitions.470 
 The timing of the Kaiser’s visit to the Ottoman Empire, following the first major 
Ottoman massacre of the Armenians (1894-1897) and the resulting European indignation 
towards the Sultan and his subjects, cannot escape a political context.  While most of the 
European Powers protested the treatment of the Armenians, Wilhelm II made a historic, 
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highly public, and supportive visit to the Ottoman Empire.471  Further, the other European 
Powers (specifically Britain and France) simultaneously began to support anti-Ottoman 
organizations and movements within their boarders.  For example, the Anglo-Armenian 
Committee met in London (with the approbation of the English government) and made 
public calls for the arrest of those involved in the earliest of the Armenian massacres.472  
Additionally, the First and Second Congresses of Ottoman Opposition Parties met in 
Paris in 1902 and 1907, respectively.473  Consequently, the Kaiser’s decision to visit the 
Ottoman Empire, which remained under a cloud of general European disapproval for its 
actions against the Armenian Christians, cannot be separated from the probability that 
this visit was intended to facilitate the German position in the Empire. 
 Surprisingly, Wilhelm’s dramatic visit to the Levant has received less scholarly 
attention than other aspects of the German relationship with the Ottoman Empire.474 The 
Kaiser began his trip to the Near East in October 1898, and, following brief stops in 
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Saxony and Vienna, he arrived in Constantinople on 18 October.475 Initially, the Kaiser 
intended to visit Constantinople, Palestine, and Egypt; however, threats to his security, 
which subsequent scholars have contended was a ruse for a British disinterest in Wilhelm 
visiting, precluded him from visiting Egypt.476 The purpose of such a trip is difficult to 
ascertain; however, coming as it did following the massacre of the Armenians (1894-
1897), the Fashoda Incident (in which imperial tensions between the French and British 
intensified), and the beginning of the Boer War, the visit appeared to some 
contemporaries as an attempt to advance German political influence in the Ottoman 
Empire.  Indeed, the New York Times, in October 1898, speculated that the visit “will 
have a political significance [and that a formal] German colony may be planted.”477 
Although a formal German colony did not develop from this visit, Wilhelm did little to 
disguise the political significance of this trip, and the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung devoted a 
series of seven articles to the Kaiser’s activities in the Ottoman Empire, calling for 
intensified German imperial involvement there.478  Speaking to the German colony 
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(which, as previously discussed, does not mean a formal colony, but rather a group of 
German nationals living in a foreign country, under the law and rules of that foreign 
country), Wilhelm said: 
You yourselves are best able to judge the benefits of such a policy 
[Wilhelm’s Eastern Policy]; and I am exceedingly glad you have been 
able to profit by it and to acquire so respected a position in this country 
[Turkey].  My satisfaction is greater because, in acting thus, you have 
been an honor to the German Empire.  I hope that you will continue in 
the same paths.  You may be certain that I will continue to display an 
interest in you and to extend to you my protection.479 
 
More famously, the Kaiser inflamed the other Powers when he addressed the Muslims of 
the world, declaring them under his protection.480 Wilhelm’s antagonism of the other 
Powers did not conclude with his declaration of protection for the world’s Muslims; he 
also accepted, as a gift from the Sultan, the Virgin’s Abode, a Catholic religious artifact 
that the French government had tried to secure from the Sultan for years.481   
 While much of Kaiser Wilhelm’s activities in the Ottoman Empire displeased the 
other European rulers, the Kaiser’s declaration that he was the protector of the “three 
hundred million Muslims around the world,”482 created significant dissent within the 
British government. At the time of Wilhelm’s statement, German colonial territories 
contained a small number of Muslims, especially when compared to the large Islamic 
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population in British India and Egypt.  An important reason, especially considering later 
events in the First World War, why the British objected to this assertion so strongly (even 
if the reaction was somewhat restrained in public statements) was that the British feared a 
pan-Islamic movement.  The British worried that such a movement would, without regard 
for political boundaries, challenge the position of the Europeans in the Ottoman Empire, 
and, most importantly, India.  This British fear of a pan-Islamic revolt lasted until the 
conclusion of the First World War.483 Further (as previously discussed), one of the 
established methods used to assert political influence in the Ottoman Empire was to claim 
to be the protector of a specific religious group.484  For example, in the Treaty of Küçhük 
Kainardji (1774), the Russians became the protector of the Sultan’s Orthodox subjects, 
and, later the French established the right to be the protector of the Sultan’s Catholic 
subjects.  Consequently, while the specific intent of Wilhelm’s statement cannot be 
reconstructed, the European powers reacted to it with concern, especially as German 
political influence in Constantinople had grown considerably in recent years. 
 While the threat of formal German colonies in the Ottoman Empire displeased 
many in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, the Kaiser’s trip was more than an effort to 
advance German imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire.  A principal motivation for 
the Kaiser’s visit was to secure the final concession for the Baghdad Railway to reach the 
Persian Gulf, which the Sultan granted immediately after the conclusion of the trip.  A 
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secret provision of the treaty that permitted the Germans to finish the Baghdad Railway 
also permitted them to “keep half of the antiquities found at any authorized 
excavation.”485 However, the interests of maintaining “German colonial neutrality” 
prevented the Germans from enforcing this article as fully as they might have.486 
Moreover, the Kaiser’s visit also encouraged the Sultan to meet with German 
industrialists interested in investing in the Ottoman Empire (such as those trying to 
electrify Constantinople, against the wishes of the Sultan).487 Based on these meetings, 
the Kaiser’s Foreign Secretary, Leo von Bülow, recalled the potential that the Ottoman 
Empire presented for German investment.488  German, American, and British papers 
reported that the concessions granted to the Germans during the Kaiser’s visit came at the 
expense of a promise from the Kaiser to the Sultan that the former would guarantee the 
“…support of the integrity of the Sultan’s Asiatic possessions…”489 
 Thus, beginning with Bismarck and continuing through the Wilhelmine period, 
the Germans recognized the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire’s Asiatic territories. While the Germans were willing to permit the Ottoman 
European territories to be partitioned among the Powers (provided that these territories 
remained, formally, under the jurisdiction of the Porte), maintaining the integrity of the 
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Asiatic territories was an important component in preventing a European war.  A method 
for advancing this goal was to provide the Ottoman government loans with which the 
latter could hire German companies to build large capital projects, but the Germans also 
made a formal state visit to the Ottoman Empire when the latter was suffering 
internationally for its slaughter of the Armenians.  However, the Germans also began a 
program of restructuring and retraining the Ottoman military (particularly its army).  
Through this program, the Germans formed an Ottoman army which could control much 
of the interior of the Empire as well as permit the Germans to exert political influence in 
the Empire, both in Constantinople and in the interior provinces, because there was no 
real distinction between civil and military responsibilities in the Ottoman state.  However, 
this restructured army also permitted the Ottoman government an opportunity to protect 
itself from further European incursions into their territory, while facilitating the ability of 
the Germans to influence Ottoman political affairs. 
German Military Relations with the Ottoman Empire 
 The specifics of the three major German military missions to the Ottoman Empire 
(Helmut von Moltke (1800-1891, in Ottoman service 1835-1839), Baron Colmar Frieherr 
von der Goltz (1843-1916, in Ottoman service 1883-1895), and Otto Limon von Sanders 
(1855-1929, in Ottoman service, 1913-1918)) are generally well known.  The renowned 
associated with these particular missions (and there were other German military missions 
to the Ottoman Empire) developed not only from the eventual importance of these 
individuals to German military history, but also from the extensive publications that each 
188 
of these advisors produced regarding their time in the Ottoman Empire.490  Based largely 
on this volume of publications (and the efforts of historians to explain the origins of the 
First World War), scholars have devoted significant attention to the activities of these 
German military advisors in the Ottoman Empire.  However, historians have focused 
predominantly on the contribution that these advisors made to the origins of the First 
World War and the Ottoman involvement in it, instead of the German imperial ambitions 
in the Empire.  Among the most established arguments to develop from this focus is the 
contention that German involvement, specifically that of General Limon von Sanders, in 
Ottoman military affairs propelled a reluctant Ottoman Empire into the First World War 
on the side of the Central Powers.  However, the most recent and careful scholarship on 
this topic, rejects such a claim.491 Indeed, a very recent dissertation contends that the 
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Ottomans entered the First World War specifically to secure their autonomy from the 
Great Powers and they believed that the Central Powers offered them the greatest 
opportunity to achieve that goal.492  The general historiographic contention that German 
military influence propelled the Ottomans to join the Central Powers likely developed 
from the strong position that the Germans held in the Ottoman military (including 
economic, political, and military influence), but, without considering such activity in a 
broader imperial context, scholars have failed to study one of the most critical aspects of 
the German military relationship with the Ottoman Empire. 
 Although these German military missions officially involved themselves only 
with military affairs,493 they increased international concern about the German imperial 
influence in the Empire.  Although the military assignments were technically non-
political, the appointment of Limon von Sanders, in 1913, was accomplished, at least 
partially, to “check British influence”494 and resulted in the “Russian government taking 
umbrage [over the significance of this assignment].”495  This resentment from the other 
Powers concerning the activities of German military advisors in the Ottoman Empire 
probably developed from the recognition that, in addition to the reorganization and 
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training of the Ottoman army, these advisors had a political significance.  This 
recognition likely originated from the established pattern in which the Powers sent 
advisors to territories in the Ottoman Empire in which the Power maintained an interest; 
for example, Russian military officials “in the service of the Ottoman Imperial 
Government” were dispatched to Macedonia to reorganize the Turkish gendarmerie 
stationed there.496  However, because Russian interests in the Balkans were well known, 
the assignment of Russian troops to Macedonia was perceived as an assertion of Russian 
imperial ambitions (a similar statement could be made about Russian troops in Bulgaria 
or British military advisors in Egypt).  Indeed, the Italians considered it (in the early 
twentieth-century) “established [G]reat [P]ower practice to exert military [and political] 
influence on the Ottoman Empire through military/naval advisors.”497 Consequently, 
accepting the official assertion that the German missions remained purely dedicated to 
helping the Ottoman Empire restructure its military forces obscures a necessary 
consideration of the imperial consequences of these German military missions.498  
However, before considering the imperial implications of these missions, it is important 
to review (briefly) the activities of these military missions in the Ottoman Empire.  The 
specific details of this German involvement in the Ottoman military are generally 
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unimportant (and reasonably well known);499 however, a basic understanding of these 
activities can contribute to an appreciation of the scope of the German-Ottoman military 
relationship. 
 Although von Moltke is perhaps the most famous German general to operate in 
the Ottoman Empire, his work concluded before Germany existed as a nation and, thus, 
had limited consequences for imperialism.  More important than the von Moltke mission 
(for considerations of German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire) was the mission 
of General von der Goltz, who began his term in the Ottoman Empire under General von 
Kaehler in 1882; von der Goltz accepted responsibility for the mission in 1883 and 
maintained that position for the next twelve years.500  During that time he, among other 
things, served as the inspector for the Turkish army, became an instructor at the Ottoman 
war college, forged relations with some of the Ottoman Empire’s most important 
eventual leaders, trained countless officers (many of whom reached the highest levels of 
the Ottoman military),501 formed a formal staff college, and established important 
political contacts.  Based on these and other activities, the relationship between the 
German officers sent to the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman military became quite 
close, and, eventually, the Ottoman government permitted its army to be completely 
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reorganized along German lines (this began, hesitantly, around 1844, but accelerated and 
was sustained after the appointment of General von Kaehler in 1882 and von der Goltz 
the following year502). Based on this influence, the Germans divided the Empire into 
seven military districts each of which contained an army.  Further, the Ottoman infantry 
was reorganized on the German model, the system of schools that trained Ottoman 
officers (and assigned Germans to teach in them) was expanded, the Ottomans adopted a 
German system for of conscription, and an Ottoman General Staff, based on the Prussian 
model, was developed.503 Although von der Goltz initially had little faith in the ability of 
the Ottoman armies, by the end of his twelve years in “Ottoman service” (as the leader, 
he served one year before heading the mission), he believed the Ottoman armies were 
prepared to assist the Germans in a war, as well as insure the survival (if not revival) of 
the Ottoman state.504  Ultimately, von der Goltz and the remainder of the German 
Military Reform Commission505 “exercised enormous influence over the reorganization 
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and modernization of the Sultan’s military forces,”506 which permitted the Germans to 
advance their imperial activities in the Ottoman Empire (explained below).  Indeed, this 
reorganization went so far that the New York Times considered the Ottoman-Macedonian 
conflict of 1903 as a test of the “value of German military instruction and Krupp 
guns.”507   
The German Military Reform Commission used, regardless of who was in charge, 
the Prussian model for military organization, which had been adopted for all of Germany 
after 1871, as the basis for reforms in the Ottoman Empire.  This method for developing 
and maintaining an army originated following Prussia’s defeat at Jena in 1806, and it 
became a model that most of the western European states embraced.508  This model 
required short term commitments to the military (one to three years, versus the French 
system which committed conscripts to a military career) and then service in the 
Landwehr and the Landsturm militias. Because this system trained a considerable 
proportion of the male population but allowed industry and agriculture to continue 
without significant interruption, it became enormously popular throughout Europe.509  To 
reorganize and retrain the Ottoman armies, the Germans sent a significant number of 
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German officers to the Ottoman Empire.510  Further, the German military influence in the 
Ottoman Empire extended beyond the reformation of the Ottoman; the Ottoman 
government relied upon German loans to purchase weaponry (especially artillery, which 
was an important component of the new military doctrine) from the Krupp company511 
(from which the Ottoman government purchased increasingly large numbers of 
weapons,512 as previously mentioned in Chapter V).   
In spite of the Ottoman decision to adopt the Prussian or German military model 
(and to purchase German weapons), it would be incorrect to consider this as unqualified 
evidence of German imperialism.  Part of the reason that the adoption of the German 
military system (and weapons) cannot simply be equated to imperialism is that so many 
of the European countries (as well as many countries outside of Europe) adopted this 
model. In the vast majority of the countries in which the German military model was 
adopted, German imperialism did not exist.  However, unlike most of the other countries 
in which the German military model was adopted, a German imperial presence developed 
in the Ottoman Empire.  This imperial presence manifested itself through the influence 
(discussed below) that the Germans asserted in their military relationship with the 
Ottoman Empire (beyond the “simple” reorganization of the Ottoman force along 
German lines). 
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 One of the principal avenues by which the German domination of the Ottoman 
army permitted the former to assert an imperial influence in the Ottoman territories was 
the resulting change in the relationship between the Ottoman government in 
Constantinople and the vast interior territories of the Empire (which had not been under 
the control of the central government for more than a century).  The freshly reformed 
Ottoman military (along with the railways constructed by the various European Powers, 
recall that one of the reasons that the kilometric guarantees developed was the diversion 
of the railways through militarily significant areas resulting in promising commercial 
markets being bypassed) permitted the Ottoman government to assert itself in territories 
that it had not governed for decades.  Because this newly formed army could not arrest 
territorial (especially in the European provinces) losses, the Ottoman government, 
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, increasingly concentrated its attentions on its 
Asiatic provinces and began a program of tribal pacification and internal control.513 This 
program extended the authority of Constantinople into territories conventionally 
controlled by guilds, tribes, or nomads.  Although not all of the tribes came under the 
central government’s direct political control, those that did not (such as the Kurds of 
eastern Anatolia) existed in increasingly isolated areas.514  This increased control over 
areas previously governed by tribes, guilds, or nomads, permitted the government in 
Constantinople to develop agricultural programs.  These programs offered land in 
exchange for a promise to farm the land, in the interior provinces, and further extended 
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the central control of the government.515 A leading historian contends that these military 
improvements permitted the Ottoman government to govern its interior territories in a 
manner almost unprecedented in recent Ottoman history and resulted in “revolutionary 
changes in Ottoman land use and transformed the face of the countryside.”516  
The Germans recognized the transformation of the Ottoman state and they sought 
to capitalize on it.  One example of the German effort to expand and assert influence in 
the Ottoman interior territories comes from General von der Goltz, who served 
(simultaneously with his military duties) as the president of the German-Asiatic Society.  
The organization advocated for increased German commercial and cultural relations with 
the Ottoman Empire, and specifically, the Empire’s Asiatic provinces that he viewed as 
its future.517 Further, a contemporary British observer argued that German influence in 
Constantinople was “developing” because the Germans were “opening it [the Ottoman 
Empire] up to civilization.”518 Although the central government, through the use of its 
German trained and organized army, extended its influence into the interior, and began to 
exercise centralized political authority, it had to compromise with local elites who 
remained in charge of tax collection (via tax farming) and thus remained wealthy and 
influential.519  Thus, while the Ottoman government did not have unqualified control over 
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its interior provinces, the changes that resulted from the reorganization of its military 
(based on the German model) permitted the Porte greater influence in these remote lands 
than it had enjoyed for decades.  The Germans recognized this, and through their 
simultaneous construction of railways (and the connected developments, such as the 
development of German banks in the Ottoman interior, the proposed development of 
German agricultural colonies, increased trade, archaeological discoveries, etc.) began to 
exert an imperial presence in many of the Ottoman territories. 
An important reason that the reformed Ottoman army could facilitate the ability of 
the central government to project its influence into the provinces was the new class of 
officers that had been developed to function in the adopted German military model.  This 
new class of officers had a close affiliation with their German instructors and the latter 
gained significant influence (both political and military) in the Empire.  The reason that 
the close relationship between the Germans and the Ottoman officers permitted the 
former to assert their imperial ambitions was that, in the Ottoman Empire, “no distinction 
was drawn between the civilian and military arms of the state, since both functions were 
frequently combined in the duties of a single individual.”520 Predictably, if no distinction 
was established between civilian and military duties, it is not surprising that 
contemporaries considered the Ottoman army to have been “from it earliest origins…a 
political entity.”521  Thus, by becoming the dominant foreign power in the Ottoman army, 
the Germans simultaneously gained important political influence.   
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The principal method that permitted the Germans to extend this influence was the 
training, and resulting loyalty, of the new Ottoman officer corps.  Recent historians have 
emphasized the importance of this by considering the general Ottoman “conviction that 
the officer corps was the vanguard of a new enlightenment, based on the adoption of 
Western techniques and thought patterns [principally German].”522  For example, 
between 1873 and 1897, a period in which the Germans had strong influence, especially 
after 1882, the Ottoman Harbiye War Academy graduated 3,918 officers,523 many of 
whom had been instructed by Germans and had an affection for Germany (von der Goltz 
assigned German officers to teach at the academy,524 the school was founded as a 
technical school but under von der Goltz it became a modern military staff college525). 
Moreover, many Turkish officers traveled to Germany, where they (and some of those 
perceived as the most talented526) participated in further training and education in 
                                                                                                                                                 
example of this was Enver Paşa, who served during the First World War.  Much of the 
conventional historiography on the Ottoman decision to enter the First World War 
contends that Enver Paşa pressured a reluctant Ottoman state to join Germany, as 
previously described more recent scholarship had rebutted this claim. 
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German military doctrine.527  When the implications of this new military (with a 
decidedly German orientation) are considered concurrently with the control that it 
permitted the central Ottoman government to exert in its provinces and the development 
of German railways in the Ottoman provinces, it increasingly appears that the Germans 
had the ability to exert control over much of the Ottoman interior.528   
 The establishment of German influence in the Ottoman army, and the subsequent 
ability of the Germans to assert their imperial ambitions, resulted in the Germans 
developing into the role of Ottoman protector.  Since the British decision to end the 
Crimean System, which directed them to go to war to prevent the partitioning of the 
principal territories of the Ottoman Empire (after the 1875 Ottoman bankruptcy), the 
Germans (first under Bismarck and then Wilhelm) insisted on maintaining the territorial 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire.529  This policy originated as a Bismarckian effort to 
maintain the European balance of power,530 but, by the mid eighteen-nineties, the 
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Germans (and the other Powers) recognized their strong position in the Empire,531 and 
began to act as the Ottoman protector—not to assure the European balance of power but 
to protect their position in the Empire.  Indeed, this became a public rationalization for 
increasing the size of the German navy.532  The Germans advanced this policy by 
accepting responsibility (from the French who held it into the early twentieth-century) for 
Ottoman subjects conducting business in China.533 
 The German dominance of the Ottoman army became a source of understandable 
concern for the other Powers, especially the British and the French.  The Times (London) 
asked, in 1914, “Have [sic.] the Turkish Government told their Army to expel the 3,000 
German officers and men who have audaciously gained control of Turkey and are turning 
the country into a German province?”534  However, before the First World War began, 
British concern about the German influence in the Ottoman military was sufficient for the 
British to permit the latter to reconcile themselves to some friction with Russia to gain 
influence in the Ottoman navy.  British influence in the Ottoman navy was weak because 
Sultan Abdülhamid II intentionally let the Ottoman navy collapse.  When the Ottoman 
Navy was rebuilt, its highest officers came from the army and were thus oriented towards 
Germany.  The 1907 Entente made Britain and Russia allies, but the British practice of 
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supporting the Ottoman Navy angered Russia, which wanted a weak Ottoman Navy in 
the Straits.  A British official wrote: “Turkey means to have a fleet whether we assist or 
not…[it would be] advantageous that the [assisting] power should be Great Britain and 
that the Turkish Fleet should not become Germanized like the Turkish army (emphasis 
added).”535  Thus, even at the expense of antagonizing their Entente partner, Russia, the 
British sought to strengthen, and, thereby exert influence, in the Ottoman navy.  
However, the British recognized that the Ottoman army had a much stronger position in 
the Empire, and, thus, even through the assertion of British interests in the Ottoman navy 
that the German imperial position (relative to the military) remained superior.536  
Moreover, the British had to constantly fight to prevent German interests in the Ottoman 
navy from becoming paramount.  As previously mentioned, many of the Ottoman naval 
officers transferred from the Ottoman army and were inclined towards Germany, but, 
more importantly, the British tried to limit the type and strength of ships sent to the 
Ottomans.  The Germans proved more willing to sell battleships (and possibly even a 
Dreadnought) to the Ottomans.537 
 Thus, the imperial relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire (in 
regards to the military) resulted less from the Ottoman military adopting a German model 
for organization and more from the training and association of the Ottoman military 
officers (including some of the highest officers in the country) with the Germans, and the 
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inclination that the former developed for the latter.  This new Ottoman military permitted 
the central government to project its influence and authority in the interior provinces, as it 
had not been able to do in its previous history.  The Germans recognized the importance 
of this and began to assert their influence in these interior territories (through railways, 
the establishment of banks, agricultural colonies, archaeological discoveries, etc.).  As the 
Ottoman military came to rely on German trains to transport them and the Ottoman 
government directed the location of railway tracks in areas of military significance 
instead of commercial (leading to the kilometric guarantees described in Chapter V) the 
imperial relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire grew. 
 In addition to the use of military officers and training to assert German political 
influence in the Ottoman Empire, the German government employed other less visible 
experts to assist in the assertion of German political interests in the Ottoman Empire. The 
most famous of these individuals was Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, who has been 
characterized as “enigmatic and controversial,”538 by a very careful scholar.  The enigma 
and controversy that scholars associate with Oppenheim developed from his varied 
positions in the Ottoman Empire.  Oppenheim’s family was an established banking 
family in Cologne539 and he entered the German civil service in 1883, but “soon 
thereafter began a career as an Orientalist and an archaeologist.”540  The controversy 
around Oppenheim is directed by the question of whether or not he was a spy.  He served 
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as a German consular official in Egypt (where he spent much of his pre-World War I 
time), but he was also a knowledgeable archaeologist with apparently genuine interests in 
the scholarship of the field.541  The controversy that surrounds Oppenheim is whether or 
not he was a spy.542  The importance of Oppenheim is that the German government used 
(to varying degrees) the archaeologists and other scholars who went to the Ottoman 
Empire to advance their political ambitions.   As the subsequent chapter will show, a 
close (even official) relationship between archaeologists and the German government 
enhanced the concern of the other Powers that individuals such as Oppenheim were 
engaged in espionage in the Ottoman Empire.  Further, the artifacts that German 
archaeologists appropriated from the Ottoman Empire became manifestations of German 
imperial influence in the Ottoman Empire. 
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CHAPTER VII 
GERMAN CULTURAL IMPERIALISM AND THE CULTURE OF IMPERIALISM IN 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
 Scholarly attention on the activities of German archaeologists in the Ottoman 
Empire has focused, principally, on Max von Oppenheim and Heinrich Schliemann.  
Ironically, however, these two iconic symbols of German archaeological interests in the 
Ottoman Empire were already anachronisms in the early 1880s.  The period in which 
archaeological activities could be carried out by a single individual had ebbed (although 
Bismarck certainly tried to extend its life543) and been replaced by what the most 
important historian of German archaeology in the Ottoman Empire has called 
Großwissenschaft (or, big scholarship, a term borrowed from Theodor Mommsen).544  
This large scale archaeology became one of the most important methods employed by the 
Germans in explaining their imperial relationship with the Ottoman Empire to the citizens 
of both Germany and the world. Although (for reasons already explained) the Germans 
could not formally claim large sections of the Ottoman Empire as “their” territory, 
through the appropriation and display of archaeological artifacts, the Germans illustrated 
their imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire.  The most significant element in this 
effort was the Pergamon Altar, for which a special museum was built in 1899 on Berlin’s 
Museumsinsel.  The construction of the Pergamon Museum (hereafter, the Pergamon) on 
Museumsinsel provided a political context in which to understand the importance of the 
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artifacts displayed there.  However, to appreciate the imperial significance of the 
Pergamon Altar it is necessary to go beyond the political context of construction of the 
Pergamon on Museumsinsel and to consider the specific manner in which the Germans 
elected to display the “Pergamon Altar” within the Pergamon Museum itself.545   
 The German appropriation and display of archaeological artifacts conformed to 
the imperial model established by the British and the French (as previously mentioned, 
famous examples included the Elgin Marbles, the Code of Hammurabi, etc.).  The 
appropriations of artifacts from the Ottoman Empire, by the British and French 
(displayed most famously in the Louvre and the British Museum, but also in a myriad of 
other smaller museums in these countries, especially the Musée d’Egypt in Paris), became 
well known and the museums housing these artifacts developed into some of the most 
popular destinations for visitors to London and Paris.  However, to construct such a 
museum, the Germans had to have an obviously magnificent artifact that would justify 
the museum’s development.  Although the Germans had secured artifacts from Egypt, by 
the time German influence in the Ottoman Empire became recognizable, it was 
impossible for the Germans to claim to have influence in Egypt (as it was already under 
British control).  Further, Germany’s early colonial efforts in Africa and the South Pacific 
had not produced a major imperial treasure that could be displayed in Berlin (as a 
corollary to the imperial treasures displayed in London and Paris).  The appropriation of 
the Pergamon Altar eventually satisfied the requirement of a magnificent imperial artifact 
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around which a museum could be built, and its museum quickly became a national 
museum that resembled those of France and Britain.  
Although the Pergamon Altar clearly represented Germany’s imperial position in 
the Ottoman Empire, it will also be argued that a principal reason for the German 
enthusiasm for the Pergamon Altar was a desire to overcome the established stigma of the 
Germans as “artistic barbarians.”546 Many Germans believed that to defeat this perception 
they required an obviously magnificent piece of art; the first effort to meet this 
requirement was the Cologne Cathedral, the second was the Pergamon Altar.  Based on 
the bogus claim that the Germans invented Gothic architecture, the Germans completed, 
in the late nineteenth-century,547 the Cologne Cathedral, which many hoped would 
become a unifying symbol for the newly formed German state (during the Kaiserreich, 
the Germans fiercely debated issues of national identity).548  However, the long-term 
political consequences of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf (1871-1878) prohibited a Catholic 
church from becoming an important national symbol. The failure of the Cologne 
Cathedral to serve as a tool of artistic unification encouraged the Germans to display the 
Pergamon Altar as a “national” treasure.  As an answer to this perceived artistic 
inadequacy, the display of the Pergamon Altar permitted “Berlin…to boast that it had 
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won this masterpiece of the antique equal only to the Parthenon frieze in London.”549  
Consequently, the desire to appropriate and display imperial artifacts (and specifically the 
Pergamon Altar) pandered not to a warmongering German public or government seeking 
to exhibit its “place in the sun.” Rather, this appealed to a German sense of artistic 
inadequacy as well as temperate German imperial ambitions, which remained well within 
the established model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire.  
The complicated and often antagonistic relationship between the German 
government (especially under Wilhelm II) and art meant that any public display of art 
between 1871 and 1914 constituted a political statement.550 Thus, the importance 
accorded to the Pergamon Altar by the German government requires that the political 
ramifications of this monument be considered.  Further, the display of imperial objects 
from the Ottoman Empire (particularly the Pergamon Altar) also occurred within a 
European political context that provided a framework within which the Germans could 
announce their imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire, while remaining within the 
established model for imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.  Although the display of 
artifacts in Berlin occurred in the context of nineteenth-century imperialism, as well as 
German unification, and an attempt to overcome the stigma of being an “artistic 
barbarian,” the most accomplished historian (of only two or three such historians) of 
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German archaeological efforts in the Ottoman Empire, has concluded that these efforts 
were only “quasi-imperialist.”551  This chapter intends to show that the German 
archaeological efforts in the Ottoman Empire were more than “quasi-imperialist,” and, 
rather, were a recognized component of the established model of imperialism for the 
Ottoman Empire.   
 An important reason that the German display of the Pergamon Altar may be 
understood in an imperial context is the familiar relationship between imperialism and 
archaeology in the nineteenth-century.552 In Germany, this relationship became 
increasingly evident after the founding of the German Reich (1871).  Evidence of this 
relationship developed as university trained and government supported scholars replaced 
independent archaeologists.  Employing the methods of Großwissenschaft, the Germans, 
with the active support of the German government, excavated some of the most important 
archaeological sites in the Ottoman Empire.  These new excavations led to the discovery, 
appropriation, and display of artifacts such as the Pergamon Altar, the Ishtar Gate 
(excavated between 1903 and 1914, but it was not displayed immediately, and thus is not 
considered here), as well as artifacts from Olympus and other important ancient sites.   
Writing about the excavations at Olympus (the first site to be excavated in this manner) a 
contemporary scholar explained the importance of Großwissenschaft compared with the 
earlier excavations led by single archaeologists: “The excavations at Olympia can be 
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called the academically most highly accomplished in the entire history of archaeology; 
they established new standards of discipline.  The achievement was possible only on the 
basis of state support.”553  However, what made the discoveries under this new policy of 
government support for archaeological research in the Ottoman Empire significant for a 
study of imperialism was that the accomplishments made by the team of archaeologists 
became German accomplishments instead of individual accomplishments.554 
What differentiated these larger excavations from those of “archaeologists” like 
Schliemann was that these later excavations occurred with the German government’s 
approbation, funding, and, most importantly, diplomatic support. Indeed, in 1871, with 
the founding of a unified Germany, the Prussian Istitut für archäologische 
Korrespondenz became a Reichsinstitut and was simultaneously renamed Der Kaiserlich 
Deutschen Archäologischen Institut (DAI, although the former was a governmental 
institute under the Prussians, the Prussians resisted making it such and its status increased 
dramatically under the new Germany).555  Moreover, its General Secretary, Alexander 
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Conze, became an employee of the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office, as Oppenheim 
would be some years later).556  The close relationship between the German government 
and archaeology eventually permitted the British to accuse the Germans of using 
archaeological expeditions as covers for espionage (most specifically espionage in the 
Ottoman Empire); Oppenheim was only the most famous of many such examples.557  
Thus, using the methods of Großwissenschaft, the DAI (whose director was an employee 
of the German foreign office) became the chief mechanism through which the Germans 
discovered and appropriated thousands of pieces of Ottoman, Byzantine, and other 
ancient history while asserting their influence in the Ottoman territories.558   
Originally founded in April 1829 as the Istitut für archäologische Korrespondenz, 
the DAI included both Leopold von Ranke and K.F. Schinkel as members, and its stated 
goal was to “gather and make known all archaeologically significant facts and finds.”559 
Although the DAI eventually became the most important state mechanism for the 
discovery and appropriation of artifacts from Ottoman territories, initially, the 
organization limited its interests to Greece and Rome;560 only after 1871 did the Ottoman 
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Empire became an important focus of this organization.561  However, the DAI’s early 
finds, even those made in Greece, including the finds in Olympia, “failed to find much in 
the category most prized by state bureaucrats, the Gymnasium-educated public, and even 
the archaeologists themselves: monumental sculpture of the high classical era.”562  This 
“failure” in Greece was eventually compensated for by discoveries in the Asiatic 
territories of the Ottoman Empire, especially the three digs at Pergamum (1881-1886, 
1901-1915, and 1933-1934)563 which resulted in the appropriation of the Pergamon Altar, 
whose “magnificence”564 received international attention.565  
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The Germans began receiving artifacts from the Pergamon digs with Carl 
Humann’s discoveries (Humann was in the Ottoman Empire to plan and construct 
railways) in eighteen-seventy two, but it was not until Humann convinced the DAI and 
Alexander Conze (Secretary General of the DAI) to assist him that German activity in 
Pergamum became regularized.566  Although regularized, the Germans intentionally 
concealed their discovery from the Ottoman officials, and, thus, secured for themselves a 
greater proportion of the artifacts.567  While the formal digs, under the supervision of 
state archaeologists, did not begin until 1881, “by 1880, two large fragments of the 
Gigantomachia [an important frieze] were on view in the Royal Museums.”568  Although 
a “permanent”569 museum for the Pergamon artifacts did not exist until 1899, the 
Germans found many opportunities to use Pergamon to exhibit their imperial presence in 
the Ottoman Empire.  One such example occurred at the Berlin Fine Arts Exhibition 
(1886), an international exhibition intended to celebrate the centennial of the Berlin 
Academy of Arts, where the German presentation of Pergamon overwhelmed the 
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exhibition.  Displayed in the imperial context of a simulated Egyptian temple in the 
British section, the Germans exhibited “the hugest [sic.] picture in all the exhibition—
namely, a panoramic view of Pergamon as it is judged by artists and archaeologists to 
have looked…In front of the [painting of the] Olympian Temple [Pergamon Altar] stands 
a tall obelisk, looking like a Cleopatra’s Needle, inscribed with the words…to ‘Kaiser 
Wilhelm the Victorious.’”570  Consequently, although the Germans could not display the 
artifacts from Pergamon in a permanent exhibit until 1899, paintings and other substitutes 
were presented frequently in an unmistakably imperial context.571 
A significant reason that the German discoveries in the Ottoman Empire (among 
them the Pergamon Altar) received such approbation and attention was the manner in 
which the Germans eventually displayed them, both before and after the construction of 
the Pergamon.  Understanding the display of German artifacts from the Ottoman Empire 
necessitates an appreciation of the context in which the Germans built the Pergamon.  As 
discussed previously (Chapter IV), in the post-revolutionary period (1815-1914), state 
sponsored museums became increasingly popular throughout Europe.  Indeed, these 
museums were created to “represent and celebrate the nation.”572  These museums 
maintained a close relationship to the European monarchs and, in some cases, the new 
museums “helped fill the spaces” left by the power that had been removed from the royal 
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prerogative during the revolutionary periods.573  In Germany, and more specifically 
Berlin, these museums populated Spree Island, which eventually received the designation 
Museumsinsel.   Germany’s Museumsinsel ultimately contained five museums: Die Altes 
Museum (originally called the Royal Prussian Museum574), Die Neues Museum, Die 
Nationalgalerie, the Kaiser Friedrich Museum, and the Pergamon Museum (which was 
the last one built, started in 1907 and completed in 1930; however, as previously noted, 
an “interim” Pergamon Museum was completed in 1899575) (the island also hosts the 
Berliner Dom, constructed between 1894 and 1905, which was the official church of the 
Hohenzollern family and contained, and does so to this day, the royal family’s crypt).576  
Although the Germans began construction of these museums in 1832, three of the five 
were completed after Germany unified in 1871.  This acceleration of building, between 
1871 and 1918, attests to the relationship between these museums and the new German 
state, which attempted to use them to bring further unity to the German people and to 
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define “German culture.” Recent scholarship has emphasized Wilhelm II’s use of 
architecture and large building projects, and concluded that the Kaiser “sought to 
consolidate his authority through building projects.”577 Although this scholarship does 
not adequately address the construction of museums, the latter’s construction, between 
1871 and 1918, accords with the author’s argument. 
 The construction of the Pergamon Museum on Museumsinsel is best understood 
in the context of the existing four museums on the island. The construction of each of the 
four earlier museums had a political significance and was constructed to meet specific 
political ends; the Pergamon was no different.  The first museum constructed on the 
island was the Altes Museum, designed by the famous Prussian architect Frederick 
Schinkel.  The Germans created the museum specifically to resemble the Mussée 
Napoléon in Paris, which housed imperial artifacts and treasures from the lands 
conquered and looted by Napoleon.578  The popularity of the Parisian museum led to the 
construction of museums throughout Europe that glorified the specific state through the 
                                                 
577
 Douglas Mark Klahr, “The Kaiser Builds in Berlin: Expressing National and Dynastic 
Identity in the Early Building Projects of Wilhelm II,” (Ph.D. diss.  Brown University, 
2002), 1 and 13.  Also see: Uta Lehnert, Der Kaiser und die Siegesalle.  Réclame Royale 
(Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1998).  Lehnert claims that the Siegesalle was “an 
advertisement for the dynasty.” See: Klahr, 14.  This contention fits with the Kaiser’s 
efforts (and those of others) to make Sedan Day a national holiday. 
 
578
 Gaehtgens, 55; Andrew McClellan, Inventing the Louvre: Art, Politics, and the Origins 
of the Modern Museum in Eighteenth-Century Paris (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 198.  Both authors emphasize the popularity of the new French museums; 
this popularity, as Gaehtgens contends, encouraged monarchs outside of France to being 
constructing museums with international artifacts and treasures in them. Also see: 
Porterfield,  3-12 
 
216 
display of “war booty” and other such imperial treasures.579  Indeed, the architecture of 
Schinkel’s museum intentionally mirrored that of the other great European museums, 
employing “a long frontal colonnade”580 and Classical columns.  The second museum 
erected on the island arose from the debate about the relationship between art and the 
state.  Specifically, Frederick Wilhelm IV (1795-1861, ruled 1840-1861) commissioned it 
to “attest to the fact that the state did not want to relinquish control over the arts.”581 
Frederick Wilhelm IV, who participated in the development of the museum, intended for 
the museum to be didactic and to emphasize “education [for what a Prussian or even a 
“German” should aspire to be] by historic example.”582  The third museum constructed on 
Musuemsinsel, Die Nationalgalerie, overtly emphasized its political function in its 
famous inscription: “Der deutschen Kunst MDCCCLXXI” (to German art), which hung 
above the figure Germania and an equestrian statue of Kaiser Frederick Wilhelm IV.  
Historian James Sheehan contends that the inscription was intended to “proclaim its [the 
museum’s] dedication to German art and the link between national art and political 
unification,”583 which had been an issue in Germany since the 1848 Revolution.  
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Moreover, rather than establishing the museum (Die Nationalgalerie) as an independent 
(or even autonomous) entity, its director Max Jordan (1874-1895) reported to the 
Kultsministerium, and the Prussian dominated Landeskunstkommission directed 
purchases.584  Construction on the National Gallery began in 1866 (the year of Prussia’s 
victory over Austria in the first war of German unification) and concluded in 1875. 
Consequently, appreciating the expectation that the museum would contribute to 
Germany’s artistic unification, as political unification had just been completed, is 
uncomplicated;585 this expectation existed throughout the Second Reich. The most 
famous illustration of the expectation that the museum should contribute to Germany’s 
artistic unification occurred when the museum’s second director, Hugo von Tschudi 
(1851-1911, administered the museum 1896-1909), attempted to introduce modern 
French impressionist art to the museum’s collection; Wilhelm II forced him to resign.586  
Karl Scheffler, in 1921, wrote “The Nationalgalerie served dynastic interests quite 
intentionally…,”587 by presenting “an oppressive mass of bombastic battle scenes,” which 
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glorified German military victories and history.588  Consequently, the construction of 
museums on Museumsinsel occurred within a political context, and the Pergamon 
Museum589 was not an exception.  
 Although the development of Museumsinsel began during the period between the 
conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and the unification of Germany, it accelerated after 
1871; indeed (as previously mentioned), it began its most intense period of construction 
after 1871, with three of its five museums being completed following German political 
unification.  Although the pace of development increased, the relationship between the 
museums and the government remained the same, museums (especially those on 
Museumsinsel) were political tools. Under the Kaiserreich, the museums were to “reflect 
the status of the empire, [and] to testify to the empire’s global and imperial claims;”590 
the Pergamon fit within this requirement—indeed it did so better than any of the other 
museums.  The German government could have constructed a museum of antiquities, 
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ethnography (which was constructed in Berlin, but importantly not on Museumsinsel), or 
even of Egyptian artifacts, which were held in the Neues Museum; however, it decided, in 
1897, the year before the Kaiser made his first trip to the Ottoman Empire, to build a 
museum dedicated to the Pergamon Altar591 and the recently established Department of 
Islamic Art—also referred to as the Museum of Islamic Art, although it has been housed 
within the Bode Museum and the Pergamon and it never stood alone.592  The decision to 
emphasize the German involvement in the Ottoman Empire went beyond a German belief 
in the magnificence of the Pergamon Altar—although that was a contributing factor.  
Rather, the decision to construct a museum around the Pergamon Altar represented a 
public statement of German imperialism in the Ottoman territories as well as German 
artistic achievement (through the altar’s acquisition and display). However, it also 
contributed to the internal unification of Germany by providing a symbol (or tradition) 
that the Germans could see as a visible manifestation of “German” artistic 
accomplishment.593   
 The relationship between the Pergamon Altar and German involvement in the 
Ottoman Empire is illuminated not only by the particular space on Museumsinsel that 
Pergamon Museum, in its varied forms, occupied, but also by the physical structure of the 
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Pergamon Altar itself.  The reconstruction and display of the “Pergamon Altar” is one of 
the most significant elements that permits an imperial message to be discerned from the 
language of display.  A significant reason that the specific display of the Pergamon Altar 
conveys imperialism is that the Germans did not uncover the Pergamon Altar as a whole, 
nor could they have. Rather the Germans “reconstructed” the altar, from ruins that had 
been manipulated (eleven centuries earlier) into a new structure, to fit nineteenth-century 
German imperial ambitions.  Originally, the last Attalid king (who died in 133 B.C.) 
commissioned the altar,594 but it eventually fell into ruin, and, by the eighth-century A.D., 
its ruins had been incorporated into a Byzantine wall,595 where they remained for eleven 
centuries.  Thus, when the Germans discovered the “Pergamon Altar,” it was not as a 
unified whole or even an unadulterated ruin; rather they “discovered” the “Pergamon 
Altar” in the form of a Byzantine wall.  Consequently, the location of the ruins 
discovered by the German archaeologists did not provide guidance for the altar’s 
reconstruction.  Further, in reconstructing the altar, the Germans had almost no direction 
from ancient literature, which provides modern scholars with only one certain reference; 
it reads: “At Pergamon is a great marble altar, forty feet in height with colossal sculpture.  
It also contains the battle of the gods and the Giants.”596 Moreover, although the 
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Pergamon Altar is conventionally presented as an altar dedicated to Zeus,597 scholars 
cannot even be certain that the altar was used for the worship of gods (much less any 
specific god). 598  Consequently, a recent scholar concluded that based on the condition of 
the ruins when the Germans discovered them, and the limited secondary knowledge 
available to scholars, that even an assessment of “its [the Pergamon Altar] date, program, 
and [principal] function (or functions) [is]…deeply problematic.”599  Thus, beyond the 
fact that the ruins excavated from a Byzantine wall originated from an altar and a 
consensus on the general dimensions of the structure, modern scholars cannot, with 
certainty, support any other claims.  In spite of this uncertainty (which is rarely addressed 
by scholars, even the most careful and precise scholars), newspapers, journals, books, and 
other publications make emphatic claims about the function and appearance of the altar 
(among other things, like the idea that the present altar resembles the ancient one and that 
the alter was indeed dedicated to Zeus).600   
An important reason for the broadly accepted belief that the structure presented in 
the Pergamonsaal (Pergamon Hall, the actual room in which the altar is displayed) was 
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an altar dedicated to Zeus, and that it resembles the original structure, is that the there has 
never been any broad public indication to the contrary.  This intentional deception is 
accentuated by the central presentation of Zeus and Athena on the modern version of the 
Pergamon Altar, which attentive scholars concur, is inaccurate.601  Although the German 
architects who constructed the Pergamon Altar in Berlin placed these depictions (Zeus 
and Athena) in the most prominent location on the “monument,” they were most likely 
originally on the monument’s eastern façade (the present representation of the Pergamon 
Altar has “only” one façade).602  Furthermore, while the presentation of the altar gives 
(and gave, when speaking of its earlier exhibition) the viewer the perception that the 
display includes the whole altar, the Pergamon Museum contains no more than a 
representation of a third of the original structure.  Moreover, the structure that is 
displayed as the “Pergamon Altar” (which visitors are encouraged to touch and climb on) 
is an amalgamation of original pieces and elements added (without distinction from the 
originals) by nineteenth-century German architects. Among the many elements added by 
the Germans is the staircase that comprises a large proportion of the center of the 
“altar.”603  Thus, it cannot be claimed that the nineteenth-century elements in the “altar” 
are peripheral; rather, they provide the altar with its essential shape and structure.  Not 
only did the Germans (as opposed to the original or even Byzantine artists) determine the 
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location of specific statues and friezes without considering their original placement (such 
as those of Zeus and Athena), but the Germans also constructed the entire present form of 
the Pergamon Alter to fit their nineteenth-century imperial ambitions, desires, 
perceptions, and goals.604  That the whole architecture of the “monument” came from 
nineteenth-century German architects and museum curators (and German imperial 
desires) is evident by recognizing that “radically different” models were proposed as a 
basis for the nineteenth-century “reconstruction” of the “altar.”605    
 The German motivation for the reconstruction and display of the Pergamon Altar, 
was not historical fidelity, rather, the principal German intention in the decision to 
display the Pergamon Altar as they did was imperialism.  The “reconstruction” of the 
“altar” in the most grandiose manner (both in its principal structure and the central 
depiction of gods like Zeus and Athena) was done to emphasize the magnificence of this 
monument and, thus, the German accomplishment in recovering it.  Further, by 
appropriating such an important structure from the Ottoman Empire, the Germans 
illustrated their imperial position.  This display of imperialism fit within both the 
established model for imperialism in the Ottoman Empire and the broader German policy 
of Kulturpolitik towards the Ottoman Empire.   The appropriation of the ruins that 
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composed the Pergamon Altar did not conflict with the policy of Kulturpolitik, because 
the Germans received “official” permission to excavate the site where they discovered the 
altar and they generally complied with the Ottoman laws on antiquities.606  However, 
German influence in the Ottoman government permitted the Germans to “accept not only 
sculpture and…jewelry”607 but to appropriate the entire altar without considering 
Ottoman objections. 
In spite of its obvious imperial appeal, the Pergamon Altar was more than an 
effort to illustrate German imperialism to the German people and the world; it was also a 
symbol of German accomplishment that contributed to the unification of the newly 
formed country.  Historian Eric Hobsbawm has explained the importance of such 
“invented traditions” to the development of a modern state, and the Pergamon Altar 
conforms to his model.608  Importantly, the Germans were not the only Power to use 
Ottoman artifacts in such a manner.  The placement of the Luxor Obelisk at “the center of 
Paris’s most important urban axis, the Place de la Concorde”609 in 1836 (appropriated in 
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1831) provides an example of how other imperial Powers used Ottoman artifacts 
didactically, and, eventually, created tradition while asserting their imperial presence in 
Ottoman territories.  Recent historical literature has emphasized this point by contending 
that the placement of the Luxor Obelisk “[at] the center of Paris’s most important urban 
axis” was to “substitute France’s ‘revolutionary passion’ with a ‘national passion’ 
founded on imperial expansion in the East.”610  Thus, the German display of the 
Pergamon Altar conformed to the established model for imperialism in the Ottoman 
Empire.  Consequently, the specific display of the Pergamon Altar emphasized German 
imperialism and national accomplishment (all the more so because of the specific manner 
in which the Germans constructed it), without upsetting the European balance of power.   
 However, in spite of the imperial nature of German activity in the Ottoman 
Empire, Edward Said famously asserted that Germany did not have a “protracted, 
sustained national interest in the Orient, and thus [had] no Orientalism of a politically 
motivated sort” (emphasis original).611  As previously explained (Chapter IV), Said’s 
principal contention was that a tradition of Oriental scholarship (be it literature, scholarly 
books, paintings, or some combination there of), established a basis for the assertion of 
imperialism and then colonialism in the foreign territory.  He argued that while “the main 
battle in imperialism is over land, of course…when it came to who owned the land, who 
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had the right to settle and work on it, who kept it going, who won it back and who now 
plans its future—these issues were reflected, contested, and even for a time decided” in 
Oriental scholarship.612  Said eventually conceded a German intellectual and scholarly 
interest in the Ottoman Empire, but maintained his contention that the Germans failed to 
connect this to an imperial policy.  This dissertation has exposed a national German 
interest in expanding into the Ottoman Empire, which permitted the Germans (as well as 
other European Powers) to assert themselves into the Ottoman territories without 
challenging the established balance of power.  This assertion of German national interests 
in the Ottoman Empire answers the question that scholars have asked about Said and 
German orientialism (and the point that Said never conceded). “Can this [German] 
tradition of scholarship be assessed in a way that productively connects it to histories of 
[German] imperialism and the exercise of power?”613  Thus, the remaining task here is 
not to show the German national interest in the Ottoman Empire (which I hope was 
shown in Chapters V, VI, and VII), but rather to provide a minimal context in which to 
appreciate (the already well recognized) German scholarly and artistic interest in the 
Ottoman Empire.614   
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The use of visual art to explain the German imperial position in the Ottoman 
Empire was particularly effective due to the contemporary conflicts that existed between 
the German government and the art world (especially under Wilhelm II).615  Wilhelm 
attached a special significance to the use of classical art (such as the Pergamon Altar) 
because he considered it a model for the type of art the Germans should be producing.  
For example, in 1901, Wilhelm II “made a sweeping claim of the supremacy and 
authority…of classical forms of art.”616  In this speech, Wilhelm exhibited his preference 
for classical art and, particularly for sculpture, which he considered one of the last 
unpolluted forms of artistic expression.  Contemporaries contended artistic expression 
had been polluted by modernism, and impressionism, which he and others considered 
particularly “un-German.”617  Thus, the display of the Pergamon Altar in Germany had 
multiple functions.  It explained the imperial relationship between Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire, which became the model that the Kaiser hoped future German artists 
would adopt, and it facilitated the unification of the German state through “the invention 
of tradition.”  However, it accomplished all of this without upsetting the European 
balance of power, because the Germans conformed to the model of imperialism 
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established for the Ottoman Empire.  Consequently, Imperial Germany’s developing 
Kunstpolitik emphasized the German connection to classical art (most notably the 
Pergamon Altar) and rejected influences from modern art. 
Although Germany never established a formal colonial relationship with the 
Ottoman Empire, German artists and writers illustrated the imperial relationship between 
the two countries for the German people.  This mirrored the use of art in other European 
countries to explain (and even prepare the country for) an imperial relationship with the 
Ottoman Empire (before the country formally became involved in imperialism there).618  
The visual representations of the Ottoman Empire in Germany consisted of both paintings 
and photographs.619  Among the most notable painters to embrace themes from the 
Ottoman Empire were August Macke (1887-1914, killed in the First World War) and 
Paul Klee (1879-1940), who traveled together in Tunisia before the start of the First 
World War (Klee also spent time in Egypt and other Ottoman territories before the war).  
These artists were part of the German artistic movement der Blaue Reiter, one of the 
principal proponents of German Expressionism (die Brücke is the other).  However, 
depictions of the Ottoman Empire were not the private reserve of modernist artists.  
Wilhelm Gentz, as early as 1876, painted a conventional portrait of Crown Prince 
Frederick’s 1869 visit to Jerusalem (a visit made during his trip to celebrate the opening 
of the Suez Canal); importantly, Gentz received support for his work from the new 
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Alexandridis and Wolf-Dieter Heilmeyer, Archäologie der Photographie: Bilder aus der 
Photothek der Antikensammlung, (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2004). 
229 
German state.620 Thus, through the works of German Expressionist painters, as well as 
court portraits, the German population began to acquire the familiarity with the Ottoman 
Empire that Said considered essential to the eventual establishment of imperialism. 
 Although the works completed by these artists (especially Klee and Macke, Gentz 
might be an exception) cannot be specifically connected to an overt assertion for German 
imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, these works contributed to an increased awareness of 
German influence in the Ottoman Empire (which Said considered essential). This art, 
both in Germany and in other European countries, created an increased awareness that 
permitted European artists to “provide [a] rational for the imperial project” before their 
specific government established a formal imperial or colonial presence.621  Thus, 
although specific domestic incidents (such as the protection of the Suez Canal, and the 
“overland route”) provoked European governments to establish a formal imperial or 
colonial presence,622 artists and their works “created the sense that it [imperialism in the 
Ottoman Empire] was a national endeavor.”623  Although Macke spent only a short time 
in the Ottoman territories, his paintings, including Turkish Garden and Turkish Garden 
Two, as well as the thirty-seven watercolors that he produced, contributed to the idea that 
Germany had an imperial or colonial presence in the Ottoman Empire.  
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One way in which Macke presented a claim for German imperialism in the 
Ottoman Empire was through the use of the depiction of “paradise,” in which “the 
traditional iconography of Adam and Eve in Eden was transformed to an exotic Arab 
setting and to a modern urban paradise.”624  The connection between imperialism and the 
idea of the imperial territory being a “paradise” originated in the earliest of European 
colonial and imperial endeavors and should require no further explanation, except to 
emphasize the conventionality of German imperialism.  Consequently, while the art of 
Klee, Macke, and the other German expressionists does not make an overt statement for 
German imperial expansion into the Ottoman Empire, it contributed to the intellectual 
context that Said considered essential to the establishment of formal imperialism.   
Much as the paintings and photographs of the Ottoman Empire contributed to the 
familiarity with the imperial territory that eventually facilitated the establishment of 
imperialism and colonialism,625 nineteenth-century German literature (especially between 
1870 and 1908) also introduced the Ottoman Empire to the German people.  Scholars 
have “only rarely” considered German orientalist texts in the context of German 
imperialism in the Ottoman Empire.626 Indeed, the whole field of German orientalist 
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literature has just begun to develop.  A particularly promising genre, the 
Professorenromane (or more specifically, archäologischer Professorenromane, 
archaeological scholarly novel, which often used copious footnotes in spite of the fact 
that the novel’s plot was fictional), may provide this field with an important perspective 
on German intentions in the Ottoman Empire.627  Indeed, German interest in the Ottoman 
Empire existed in both scholarly and literary spheres.  The nineteenth-century German 
Oriental scholars “surpassed all other European Orientalists [through] their valuable 
contributions to Arabic and Islamic Studies.628  
Without attempting to review the entirety of German orientalist literature, this 
dissertation briefly considers the work of one author, Karl May,629 and contends that 
May’s work accords with the model for imperialism established by the British and 
explained by Said.  Although the dissertation treats only Karl May, his enormous 
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popularity and the attention devoted to his works makes him one of the most important 
conduits of information about the Ottoman Empire. 
Karl May wrote no less than five novels (some of which are six volumes long) 
situated in the Ottoman Empire, these include: Durch das wilde Kurdistan, Von Baghdad 
nach Stambul, In den Schluchten des Balkans, Durch das Land der Skiperaten and 
Orientzyklus (which he originally published, significantly, in serial form in “Deutscher 
Hausschatz in Wort und Bild,” between 1881 and 1888).630  Although a specific study of 
May’s books is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note some of the 
themes he addressed in his works.  Among the ideas addressed by May was the role of 
German arms and military instruction in the Ottoman Empire; specifically, he wrote of 
the superiority of German weapons (meaning the Krupp weapons) and the sloppiness of 
Ottoman soldiers, whose lines were not straight.631 His novels also addressed the reality 
of the Turks as the “Sick man of Europe,” and sometimes proposed that Germany (in 
some unspecified way) would provide the Ottoman Empire with its salvation.632  Lastly, 
recent scholars have used post-colonial theories to contend that May “transferred [the 
heterosexual model of domination and submission] onto the relationship between Europe 
and the Middle East: Kara Ben Nemsi [the German protagonist in May’s Orientzyklus] as 
the representative of Europe and Halef [an Arab] as the representative of the Middle East 
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personify[ing ] the colonial paradigm.”633  Thus, through even this brief consideration of 
one of nineteenth-century Germany’s most popular authors, it is possible to appreciate 
the presence and significance of the Ottoman Empire to German literature 
Consequently, through the use of visual arts and literature, the German artistic 
community contributed to the imperial relationship between Germany and the Ottoman 
Empire.  These examples of the artistic depiction of the Ottoman Empire, including the 
Pergamon Altar, Expressionist art, and the work of Karl May placed the Ottoman Empire 
within many of the periods most significant and popular artistic movements.  Although 
Said has acknowledged the German cultural interest in the Ottoman Empire, it is worth 
emphasizing its breadth.  Further, this contribution accorded with the model of 
imperialism developed by the British, which permitted the Germans to expand into the 
Ottoman Empire without upsetting the European balance of power. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Article one hundred and fifty five of the Treaty of Versailles, which required 
Germany to adhere to all decisions made by the victorious powers regarding Turkey and 
Bulgaria, followed articles obliging Germany to surrender its colonial territories (articles 
119-127).  Although the subsequent articles in the Treaty obviously required Germany to 
surrender its formal colonies, these articles also required the Germans to relinquish their 
territory in China (articles 128-134), influence in Morocco (articles 141-146), and to 
recognize British authority in Egypt (articles 148-154).  Indeed, the section of the 
Versailles Treaty that included article 155 (the article concerning German-Ottoman 
relations) specifically concerned German colonial and imperial influence.  While other 
articles in the treaty regulated affairs between the Ottoman Empire and Germany 
(specifically those regarding the return of specific artifacts, article 246, and the articles 
addressing the Porte’s outstanding debts, articles 231-242), the inclusion of Turkey in the 
section devoted to German colonial territories is significant.  While Germany never had 
formal colonial territories in the Ottoman Empire, through the model of imperialism 
conceived by the British in the mid-nineteenth-century, the Germans had a recognized 
and effective imperial presence in the Ottoman Empire for more than twenty-five years.   
Regrettably, historians have failed to consider German imperial interests beyond 
the fact that the Germans failed to establish colonies in the Ottoman Empire, and this 
omission has created a distortion in the historiography of German 
imperialism/colonialism.  The German decision not to establish formal colonies accorded 
with the principles of imperialism for the late nineteenth-century.  Indeed, both the 
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Russian control of the “Greater Bulgaria” (however brief) and the British occupation and 
control of Egypt (between 1882 and 1914) emphasize the Powers’ reluctance to establish 
formal colonies in the Ottoman territories (an argument could be made that European 
imperial activity in China may also fit this principle).  Although French activity in North 
Africa and Syria deviated from this pattern, the general reluctance to establish colonies 
(and even more so colonial empires) is of central importance in understanding 
international relations between 1880 and 1914.634  Thus, that the Germans sought to 
extend their influence into the Ottoman Empire without the formal establishment of 
colonies should not preclude German activity in the Ottoman Empire from being 
considered in the imperial historiography of Imperial Germany.   
The inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the historiography of German 
imperialism/colonialism has significant implications for the historiography of German 
imperialism/colonialism as well as German foreign policy.  The most important factor in 
this consideration is the idea that German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire was quite 
moderate and well within the established pattern of imperialism.   At no point in the 
period between 1880 and 1908 did the Germans attempt to repudiate the established 
model of imperialism by seeking colonies or a more significant imperial influence.  
Indeed, in many circumstances, the Germans never surpassed the British or the French 
(and in other circumstances they surpassed one but not the other), content to be the 
second largest lender or trading partner.  When the Germans did finally surpass the 
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British or the French in specific aspects of Ottoman imperialism, it was often because the 
former elected to decrease their involvement in Ottoman affairs more than a German 
desire to increase their participation.  The most important exceptions to this are Kaiser 
Wilhelm’s 1898 visit to Constantinople and the German appropriation of Ottoman 
artifacts.  Beyond these two activities, the Germans usually remained behind either the 
British or the French.  Consequently, German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire 
cannot be considered militaristic or unusually aggressive.  Rather, as this dissertation has 
contended, the German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire may even be characterized as 
tepid.   
The model of imperialism developed for the Ottoman Empire originated out of a 
confluence of European balance of power politics and British concerns to maintain access 
to India.  Initially, this model developed following the invention of steam ships that could 
travel reliably and safely in the Red Sea.  The establishment of an oceanic route from 
London to India that did not require the circumnavigation of Africa made access to Suez, 
Morocco, and Bab el Mandeb (the strait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden) a 
national strategic concern for Britain.  However, the British had little interest in formally 
colonizing (which would have greatly increased their responsibility to these areas and 
might have provoked the other European Powers to object to British expansion) these 
areas.635  Rather, the British “merely” established themselves as the hegemonic imperial 
power in the strategic territory and protected their influence there.  This policy 
emphasized regional stability and was predicated on the continued existence of the 
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Ottoman government.  The British predicated their policy on the continued existence of 
the Ottoman government, because, if the Ottoman government fell, then it was probable 
that the competing European interests in the Ottoman territories would threaten the 
strategic positions that the British already held. 
 The British (and indeed the other Powers) had credible reasons to believe that the 
Ottoman government might collapse (or be destroyed).  Such a circumstance would have 
threatened the newly established “overland route,” and British security interests.  Thus, it 
became a British policy, between 1856 and 1888, to defend the governmental and 
territorial (particularly the principal Asiatic areas of the Ottoman Empire) integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire.  While the Ottoman Empire was already frequently considered to be 
moribund by the 1830s,636 the treaty of Hünkiâr İskelesi (1833) (between the Ottomans 
and the Russians) intensified concern about the future of the Empire, as the treaty 
provided the Russians a pretext to occupy Constantinople.  This treaty coincided with 
intensified British interest in Ottoman territories (for the establishment of the “overland” 
route), and thus was a (perhaps the) critical component in the development of the British 
imperial system for the Ottoman Empire.  The British preference for imperial influence in 
Suez and along the Red Sea represented a strategic decision not to establish a precedent 
that the other European Powers (most specifically Russia) might use to occupy, and 
partition, the Ottoman territories.  Consequently, the model of imperialism developed by 
the British, and adopted by the Germans, originated out of a need to secure strategic 
locations within the Ottoman Empire without providing a pretext for the other European 
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Powers (originally Russia) to seize colonies in the principal territories of the Ottoman 
Empire.  From 1838 until 1908, this model permitted the British, and then the Germans, 
to become important imperial powers in the Ottoman Empire (a fact well recognized in 
Ottoman and Turkish historiography, as mentioned below) without upsetting the 
European balance of power. 
The model for the assertion of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire (as developed 
by the British) allowed the imperial power to assert themselves in the Empire’s 
economic, political, cultural, and military affairs without providing the other European 
Powers a pretext to seize Ottoman territories.  This influence in the Empire eventually 
encouraged the European Powers (chiefly Britain and then Germany) to guarantee the 
integrity of the Ottoman territories.  The maintenance of the Empire’s territorial and 
governmental integrity was essential to the British model because, any colonization (by 
other Powers) in the principal territories of the Ottoman Empire would threaten the 
established British (and after 1880, the German) position.  The reason why such a 
partition represented a threat to the Powers (Britain and then Germany) was that: 1) the 
British had the territories they sought and thus any conflict over the Ottoman Empire 
could only reduce their position and, 2) the Germans had a profitable and important 
relationship with the Ottoman Empire and a war could only reduce that influence.  Thus, 
the model of imperialism for the Ottoman Empire permitted both Germany and Britain to 
maintain their positions within the Empire without provoking the other European Powers. 
 Although British activity in the Ottoman Empire (between 1838 and 1888) did not 
resemble conventional British imperialism, scholars have subsequently recognized this 
activity as imperial.  One (conservative) test for the presence of British imperialism is 
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John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson’s Imperialism of Free Trade.  Although this test has 
been criticized, it remains a reliable measure of imperial activity.  Although previously 
mentioned, it is worth reconsidering the components of this test, which include: 
1) The exertion of power or diplomacy to impose and sustain free trading conditions 
on another society against its will; 
2) the exertion of capital or commercial attraction to bend economic organization 
and direction of growth in directions complementary to the needs and surpluses of 
the expanding economy; 
3) the exertion of capital and commercial attraction directly upon foreign 
governments to influence them toward cooperation and alliance with the 
expanding country; 
4) the direct intervention or influence of the export-import sector interests upon the 
politics of the receiving country in the direction of collaboration and political-
economic alliance with the expanding power; 
5)   the taking over by European bankers and merchants of sectors of non-European 
domestic economies under cover of imposed free trade without accompaniment of 
large capital or export inputs from Europe, as in China.637 
 
Robinson and Gallagher envisioned one of these aspects to be sufficient to show imperial 
activity; however, in the case of the British (and later the Germans) in the Ottoman 
Empire, at least four of these were present.  Further, while most scholars expect for 
colonialism to precede imperialism, Edward Said has argued that, in the Middle East, 
imperialism preceded colonialism.  However, the imperial incubation period, which 
ended after the First World War, has confused scholars who anticipate a colonial 
presence in Ottoman territories as a test for German imperialism. 
Although the historiography of German colonialism does not include a treatment 
of German relations with the Ottoman Empire, Turkish and Ottoman historiography 
readily recognizes the imperial influence of all the Great Powers, including Germany.  
The historiography of Turkey contains many references to the influence of the European 
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Powers in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.  Some representative statements from 
this Turkish historiography include the following: “At this time, their purpose [the 
Powers] …was to maintain the unity of the Ottoman state, which had been invaded by the 
great powers of Europe;”638 “The destructive effects of western imperialism…,”639 and 
lastly “Turkish historians have readily accepted the notion not only that western 
economic and political imperialism prevented the Ottoman state from implementing 
effective reforms for the empire’s recovery…”640 Thus, although German imperial 
historiography does not include a consideration of Germany’s imperial activities in the 
Ottoman territories, scholars should not conclude that such a position is universally 
accepted.   
The failure to include German imperialism in the historiography of German 
imperialism has led to distortions in the scholarly understanding of German imperial 
activity.  The principal scholarly interest in German imperial affairs has been devoted to 
German activity in Africa, but also in the Pacific Islands as well as in China.  However, if 
the German imperial activity in the Ottoman Empire is considered, the dynamic of 
German imperial historiography changes in important ways.  Historical considerations of 
German imperialism have often treated nineteenth-century German imperialism as a 
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predecessor to the Nazi expansion within Europe.641  Further, even those historians who 
have not made an explicit connection between nineteenth-century German imperialism 
and the Nazis distort the reality of German imperialism.  For example, historian Hartmut 
Pogge von Standamm wrote “[the] announcing of Germany’s interventionist intentions 
for the entire globe did not satisfy expansionist ambitions [within Germany]” (emphasis 
added).642  Although the logical imprecision of claiming that German “interventionist 
intentions for the entire globe” failed to satisfy German expansionist desires requires no 
further comment, the implications for the understanding of German imperialism are 
almost as troubling.643 Even the Fischer thesis contends that “…the annexationist aims of 
the Imperial government not only predated the outbreak of the war but also showed a 
remarkable similarity to the plans made by the Nazis…”644  Although these are not 
Fischer’s words they represent his argument fairly.  The inclusion of the Ottoman Empire 
in the historiography of German imperialism, German foreign policy, and the origins of 
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the First World War might temper the seductive but misguided attempt to connect 
Imperial Germany (and specifically the government policies) to the Nazis. 
Although this dissertation rejects a connection between the foreign policy of the 
Imperial German government and the Nazis, it does not absolve the Kaiserreich of its 
responsibilities in the nineteenth-century.  However, the policies of the Kaiser’s 
government should be interpreted within a comparative context.  Fischer’s principal 
contention that Imperial German sought to expand throughout the world is, generally, 
correct.  However, this expansion has been distorted and viewed as aberrant.  This 
dissertation contends that in the Ottoman Empire, as well as other places, the German 
expansion was well within the established imperialism for the nineteenth-century.  Rather 
than considering German imperial expansion within the context of the distant Nazis, it 
seems appropriate to compare the German expansion to that of the other Powers.  Indeed, 
between 1888 and 1914, the major Powers asserted an imperial presence in most of the 
strategic areas of the world.  This is the context in which German expansion in the 
Ottoman Empire occurred, and this historical environment should be taken into 
consideration when assessing German imperial activity. 
Published in 1890, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (1840-1914) famous book, The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History encouraged the construction of large navies and 
global expansion, at least far enough to establish secure global coaling stations.  In the 
spirit of the new doctrine that developed from this book, the Powers began to assert 
themselves around the world and in so doing secured strategic positions.  For example, 
the United States between 1890 and 1914 established an imperial presence (often without 
formal colonies) in: Hawai’i (1898), Cuba (1898), the Philippines (1898), Puerto Rico 
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(1898), Guam (1898), Haiti (1903), and Panama (1903).  Further, through doctrines such 
as the Platt Amendment (1903) and the Roosevelt Corollary (1904) the United States 
established (and informed, formally, the other Powers to remain out) “American imperial 
territory.”  Similarly, in addition to French interest in North and West Africa, the French 
established themselves in Indochina no later than 1893.  Although not all of these 
territories became colonies (at least before 1914), it is without question that the period 
between 1888 and the beginning of the First World War was a period of imperial 
expansion (often without colonies) for the Powers.  Further, in this period there was an 
importance on strategic locations, and it cannot be questioned that the Ottoman Empire 
contained many strategically desirable positions.  Thus, nineteenth-century German 
expansion (or desire for “world power”) should be understood in the broader pattern of 
contemporary Great Power expansion.  This German desire to expand has more to do 
with the doctrinal and strategic interests of the nineteenth-century than it does the gas 
chambers and crematoriums of twentieth-century Poland. 
 The connection of nineteenth-century German imperialism to the Nazis and to 
some degree even the causes of the First World War, represents a problem with the 
historiography of German imperialism, but also German foreign policy.  The primacy of 
the First and Second World Wars in German history has inclined many historians to 
consider nearly every significant political, economic, and social event from 1871 (and 
sometimes earlier) as a cause of these wars.  The consideration of these events is not 
inappropriate; however, the focus on these wars has precluded historians of German 
imperialism and foreign policy from considering these policies in a broader context.  
Consequently, historians of German imperialism and foreign policy have devoted less 
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attention to issues such as German-American relations than they have relations between 
Germany and the rest of Europe.  The Euro-centric focus of these studies has narrowed 
(artificially) the study of German foreign policy and imperialism.  Although seductive, 
the First and Second World Wars have thus distorted our understanding of German 
foreign policy (which should include imperialism).  Rather than reconsider German 
expansionist desires, it seems that a comparative study of German imperialism would be 
of great benefit.  Instead of beginning with the assumption that German imperialism was 
aberrant, a comparative study of German imperialism might be of real importance.   
 Thus, this dissertation contends that the Ottoman Empire should be considered 
part of Germany’s imperial history.  The specifics of imperialism in the Ottoman Empire 
prohibited the establishment of colonies, but this is not the same as claiming that German 
did not have an imperial presence there. Indeed, historians of British, French, and to a 
lesser degree Russian imperialism recognize the imperial activities of these powers in the 
Ottoman territories. The inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in German imperial 
historiography may serve to moderate some of the more dramatic conclusions that have 
been made about it.  Although significant, the Germans rarely surpassed the influence of 
the British or the French, and when the Germans did so they remained solidly within the 
established model for imperial expansion in the Ottoman Empire.  This German 
expansion in the Ottoman Empire was not particularly aggressive or assertive.   
Consequently, the inclusion of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire indicates that 
German imperialism was not universally aggressive, a hint of the Nazi ambitions to 
develop in the 1930s and 1940s, or even an aberration.  Rather, by including the Ottoman 
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Empire in the historiography of German imperialism it is possible to consider that latter 
restrained and conventional. 
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